File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_1998/lyotard.9811, message 35


Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 12:56:02 -0500
From: "Smith, Donald S" <Donald.S.Smith-AT-usa.xerox.com>
Subject: RE: second paragraph of the PC intro


From: Don Smith,

Ed Atkinson wrote:
    <It (science) then produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to
its
own status, a discourse called philosophy.>
    Now this is hard for me, science's narrative is "called philosophy"?

Reply: Yes, it is called the philosophy of science. It is an established
discipline. For example here's a quote:
"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science encourages the
application of philosophical techniques to issues raised by the natural and
human sciences. These include general questions of scientific knowledge and
objectivity, as well as more particular problems arising within specific
disciplines. Topics currently being discussed in the journal include:
scientific realism, causation, the logic of natural selection, the
interpretation of quantum mechanics, the direction of time probability and
confirmation."

But don't be misled by the words "question, problems or interpretation".
They not only discuss the findings of science, they also legitimate the
methods and conclusions in a dialectical fashion. (if my assumption of the
dialectic bothers anyone forget I said it.)

Ed again:
  >  Then he (Lyotard) lists some metanarratives. This part is dear to my
heart and
I think I may actually catch a glimpse of what he's getting at with "the
Enlightenment narrative." This is an assumption grid, an operating
envelope of shared ideas, which (I understand) postmodernism recognizes
and calls into question. But he loses me a little when he refers to "the
creation of wealth" as a "grand narrative." How could that be? How could
"the Enlightenment narrative" be put on the same level as "the
hermeneutics of meaning?" Seems like there would be a hierarchy of
narratives.

Reply:
The metanarratives aren't hierarchical, they permeate our culture in varying
proportions and importance in the legitimizing process. Lyotard listed:
	The Dialectic of spirit
	The Hermeneutics of Meaning
	Emancipation of the Rational
	The Creation of Wealth
These are my interpretations of what Lyotard meant:
The dialectic of spirit is the philosophy of Hegel. 
The hermeneutics of meaning might be the philosophy of Husseral, Heidegger
and others.
Emancipation of the rational might be Marx or in another sense Rousseau.
(forgive these spellings)
The creation of wealth is the philosophy of capitalism (although I have
never heard it called philosophy, except as implied by Marx who would call
it metaphysics.
These are all metanarratives that are mostly legitimated through philosophy.


    <As can be seen from this example, if a metanarrative implying a
philosophy of history is used to legitimate knowledge, questions are
raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing the social
bond: these must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is consigned to
the grand narrative in the same way as truth.> 
    Is he saying here that if science works within a narrative in the
scientific/academic sphere, then that same narrative must work at all
levels of society?

Reply:
No, I think he is just saying that as the philosophy of science justifies
the truth claims of science there are also other metanarratives (and
sometimes the same metanarrative) that have formed our understanding of
justice and therefore how society functions vis a vis justice.

Don Smith

   

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