Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1998 14:54:15 +0200 (EET DST)
From: Vadim Verenits <grimnes-AT-physic.ut.ee>
Subject: Re: legitimation


What do you think about th opportunity to apply the fractal geometry ,
powered by deleuzian philosophy, to Huisinga`s concept of "Homo ludens",
and linked to  curent topic of discussion, i mean "notion of any kind of
the presupposed game  within any given scientific paradigm", as such as
Kuhn undersood it.

On Sun, 13 Dec 1998, Eric  Salstrand wrote:

> Mark wrote:
> 
> >I want to keep coming back to legitimation and its place within language
> >games, since Lyotard sets out on a very specific heading in PMC. Within a
> >domain of language games, legitimation would be a kind of presupposition
> >of how to play a given game--what moves are permissible. In re: science,
> >Lyotard takes this point up in section 7, pp 23-24. On p. 24 there's a
> >particularly interesting passage that addresses legitimation and language
> >games. He's discussing the somewhat recursive relation between statement
> >and referent in scientific knowledge:
> >
> Thanks, Mark.  You make excellent points and raise some important questions.
> I agree that legitimation is central to the PMC and would like to see
> further discussion of this topic.  One issue in particular that I would like
> to discuss is this.  In the PMC, Lyotard talks about two possible modes of
> legitimation in the postmodern context.  One of these is legitimation by
> performativity (power) which nows seems very familiar to all of us, even
> though it merits further discussion for that very reason.
> 
> The other mode is legitimation by paralogy, about which, alas, Lyotard's
> remarks are all too brief.  Unfortunately in his later work he proceeds to
> follow other tangents and the issue of legitimation by paralogy is never
> really explored in detail.  I believe this remains an open topic capable of
> new development today.  What would be characteristic of a politics that
> respects both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown?  I
> would welcome a discussion that talks in greater detail about these
> postmodern possibilities. It is not altogether clear to me what Lyotard
> means here. Can we flesh out his suggestions?
> 
> 
> >So you make a statement about the world and try to put it into play
> >within the langauage game of science. As the addressee of your statement,
> >and thereby legislator (given the quirks of the denotative language game
> >that science subsumes) I can respond:
> >
> > a) the statement meets criteria as legitimate move. I accept it
> >    as scientific.
> > b) the statement breaks the rules. I reject it as "unscientific"
> > c) the statement makes a "new move": no rules are broken, but it
> >    sets up an agonistic relation with existing moves. I accept it (and
> >    if I am buying into Kuhn, I would deem it revolutionary)
> >
> I would only suggest that we expand point c as follows:
> 
> On page 43 of the PMC, Lytotard writes:
> 
> "there are two kinds of progress in scientific knowledge:
> 
> c)  one corresponds to a new move (a new argument) within the established
> rules;
> 
> d) the other, to the invention of new rules, in other words; a change to a
> new game"
> 
> Anyone care to furnish examples that illustrate the difference between c and
> d?
> 
> 
> >Note that "true" has no place in this approach, although science claims
> >the authority to map the real/true as its referent.
> >
> >What Lyotard tracks in this book is the emergence of performativity as
> >the dominant prescriptive. To make a move in this game becomes about
> >communication, efficiency, context control.
> 
> 
> What are the chief characteristics of legitimation by paralogy?
> 
> 
> 
>