Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1998 14:54:15 +0200 (EET DST) Subject: Re: legitimation What do you think about th opportunity to apply the fractal geometry , powered by deleuzian philosophy, to Huisinga`s concept of "Homo ludens", and linked to curent topic of discussion, i mean "notion of any kind of the presupposed game within any given scientific paradigm", as such as Kuhn undersood it. On Sun, 13 Dec 1998, Eric Salstrand wrote: > Mark wrote: > > >I want to keep coming back to legitimation and its place within language > >games, since Lyotard sets out on a very specific heading in PMC. Within a > >domain of language games, legitimation would be a kind of presupposition > >of how to play a given game--what moves are permissible. In re: science, > >Lyotard takes this point up in section 7, pp 23-24. On p. 24 there's a > >particularly interesting passage that addresses legitimation and language > >games. He's discussing the somewhat recursive relation between statement > >and referent in scientific knowledge: > > > Thanks, Mark. You make excellent points and raise some important questions. > I agree that legitimation is central to the PMC and would like to see > further discussion of this topic. One issue in particular that I would like > to discuss is this. In the PMC, Lyotard talks about two possible modes of > legitimation in the postmodern context. One of these is legitimation by > performativity (power) which nows seems very familiar to all of us, even > though it merits further discussion for that very reason. > > The other mode is legitimation by paralogy, about which, alas, Lyotard's > remarks are all too brief. Unfortunately in his later work he proceeds to > follow other tangents and the issue of legitimation by paralogy is never > really explored in detail. I believe this remains an open topic capable of > new development today. What would be characteristic of a politics that > respects both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown? I > would welcome a discussion that talks in greater detail about these > postmodern possibilities. It is not altogether clear to me what Lyotard > means here. Can we flesh out his suggestions? > > > >So you make a statement about the world and try to put it into play > >within the langauage game of science. As the addressee of your statement, > >and thereby legislator (given the quirks of the denotative language game > >that science subsumes) I can respond: > > > > a) the statement meets criteria as legitimate move. I accept it > > as scientific. > > b) the statement breaks the rules. I reject it as "unscientific" > > c) the statement makes a "new move": no rules are broken, but it > > sets up an agonistic relation with existing moves. I accept it (and > > if I am buying into Kuhn, I would deem it revolutionary) > > > I would only suggest that we expand point c as follows: > > On page 43 of the PMC, Lytotard writes: > > "there are two kinds of progress in scientific knowledge: > > c) one corresponds to a new move (a new argument) within the established > rules; > > d) the other, to the invention of new rules, in other words; a change to a > new game" > > Anyone care to furnish examples that illustrate the difference between c and > d? > > > >Note that "true" has no place in this approach, although science claims > >the authority to map the real/true as its referent. > > > >What Lyotard tracks in this book is the emergence of performativity as > >the dominant prescriptive. To make a move in this game becomes about > >communication, efficiency, context control. > > > What are the chief characteristics of legitimation by paralogy? > > > >
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