File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_1998/lyotard.9812, message 73


Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1998 13:33:38 -0800
Subject: Re: legitimation


mnunes-AT-gpc.peachnet.edu wrote:
> 
> > Mark,
> >
> > We were talking about legitimation in Lyotard and you were
> > discussing his study (pp. 23-24) of legitimation in
> > science.  Remember "Science plays its own game."  It is a
> > different language game than that of social narratives
> > that form a social bond. (#2, p.25)
> 
> I don't have my copy of PMC with me today, but I do remember that L.
> makes a point about the language game of science not being directly
> involved with the formation of social bonds--only indirectly, though the
> creation of professional classes etc. Any language game is going to
> necessitate some sort of social arrangement of "pragmatic posts": sender,
> addressee, and and referent.
> 
> > Science legitimates itself through
> > verification and falsification.
> 
> Do you see the "veri" in verification as independent of the language
> game of science? If not, then we're in agreement. Verification becomes a
> kind of *determination* of the referent.
> 
> > I believe he accepts the language game of science as is,
> > and what interests him is the narrative, the switch from
> > reliance on grand narritives to reliance on petit
> > narratives, the similarities and differences.  It is easy
> 
> I'm not sure I know what you mean by "accept." The shift from grand to
> petit is certainly of interest here--and I think it ties in with the
> distinction between innovation and invention.
> 
> > The question, then, is whether there can be legitimation.
> > If no narrative in and of itself has sufficient authority
> > to legitimate, how can we have faith in narratives?  I
> 
> Sure--a question of "metanarrative," with prescriptives that would
> legitimate all language games. Lyotard rejects this notion, even
> rejecting "ethics" as a meta- that would apply to all games. That
> doesn'tn mean no legitimation, but rather that legitimation is specific
> to each game (the rules of play).
> 
> > think Lyotard's answer to that would be something like,
> > "Postmoderns can have faith in the paralogical culture of
> > conversation and debate."  One might ask, "How can
> > paralogy legitimate?"  Just as science never presents a
> > conclusion that is beyond falsifiction, so paralogy does
> > not require access to apodictic truth in order to
> > legitimate.  The legitimation is a judgment that the move
> > is proper within the language game.  And within the
> > language game of paralogy, which is our postmodern
> > conversation, what is legitimate is a move that takes the
> > conversation forward, that presents us with a fertile
> > perspective, or destabililizes the status quo
> > taken-for-granted explanation and allows he generation of
> > new ideas.  Beyond that, the rules of the game are
> > determined locally and provisionally.  But, even so, these
> > rules exist and allow us to determine if a particular
> > statement is legitimate within the community.
> 
> sounds like a good summary to me!
> 
> --mark
> 
> >
> > ..Lois Shawver
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hugh bone replies:

Yes, it is a good summary.

But in an attempt to move our post-modern conversation forward:

1)Language game is a useful concept.  Language creates meaning in the
minds/memories of persons who participate in the situations/behaviors
(games) which accompany human utterance.

2)Lyotard focuses attention on the function of language in determining
human behavior and vice-versa.  This function is explored at length in
"Le Differend".

3)Legitimation "within" language games, and on a "local" basis, like 
legitmation of science by scientists, religion by theologians, and 
capitalism by capitalists is, by definition limited.

4)A broader sense of legitimation is the philosopher's "Why is there 
something rather than nothing?  

5)Some of those who practice science may be interested, although I don't
know of any books on the subject.

6)A young child will ask why? why? why? driving a parent to distraction
and forcing a change of subject.

7)If forced, one by one to give up your "beliefs", which would you give
up last?  This idea (Wittgenstein?) takes us into thoughts of a
"hegemony" of beliefs which may or may not be true or false, legitimate
or illegimate.

8)So where do beliefs come from?  Parents, peers, teachers, the entire
world of communicants who "reach" an individual.

9)Ask yourself why you believe "A", call your answer "B", then
like the annoying child continue the process until you find the belief
you would abandon last.

10)Along the way you encounter metanarratives.  You may no longer 
believe in them or have anything to replace them.  Julian Bond was
reported to have said that just because you stop beating your wife
doesn't mean you should start beathing your dog.  Others have noted that
when persons stop believing in God it doesn't necessarily mean they stop
believing, period. On the contrary, some of these folk will believe 
in almost anything. 

Cheers,
Hugh


   

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