Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1998 22:05:16 -0800 Subject: Re: paralogy Wayne A. King wrote: > Can somebody give a specific example of writing that > they consider an > example of paralogy vs. another example that wouldn't? I see paralogy as happening in conversation. But a paper that defined its terms locally and provisionally and related to a community of other authors works might be, in my opinion, arguably paralogical. However, as people here have noted, Lyotard does not tell us very explicitly what paralogy is. It's a key concept, but less developed than most of his key concepts. The way I have read him has been to look for a meaning for "paralogy" that would make the text make the most sense of his text, not to look for a statement in Lyotard that explicitly explains this concept. This takes a kind of imaginativeness which, I believe, by the way, to be paralogical. I expanded on my interpretation of "paralogy" in a paper that I have told this list I can make available to it. In that paper I have tried to give some examples of what I see to be paralogy. First, let me give a little of the context that frames the first example in the paper. The subtopic in this paper in which the example appears is about Lyotard's concept of the little narrative. Here is an excerpt from my paper which includes an example of what I think is best called paralogy: Lyotard claims that for conversation to be paralogical it must be both local and provisional. What he means is that the rules that define the conversation must be "agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation (Lyotard, 1984, p.66)." But if paralogical discussions are local and provisional, one might wonder if they have any general value. Are they not restricted in their value to a given moment and time? This is the way that Rorty (1991) and Habermas (1982) criticize Lyotard. They argue that Lyotard's call for local and provisional narratives reduces conversation to an "argument which convinces a given audience at a given time," one that is entirely "context-dependent"(Rorty, 1991, 165). But this criticism may underestimate the power of Lyotard's suggestion. What is to be local and provisional is not the subject matter under discussion but the rules for discussing things (Lyotard, 1984, p.66). It is a powerful suggestion. Consider an example. Two researchers are discussing Xerostomia (dry mouth) for the purpose of doing a study. Notice the way their definitions are shaped provisionally in their conversation. Then ask if this practice trivializes their topic as Rorty and Habermas suggest. Scientist 1: I think Xerostomia can be a major diagnostic tool for neurotransmitor malfunction. Scientist 2: How are you defining Xerostomia? Scientist 1: Severe, maybe even zero saliva production from at least two of the major salivary glands. Scientist 2: What about inability to swallow a dry cracker without water? Scientist 1: I don't think so. That's not a good diagnostic criterion. People learn techniques for doing that without adequate saliva. Looking through the tables of data that sit on their desk, they will see some relationships if they define things one way, and other relationships if they define them another. If their first definition does not unveil interesting correlations, they might try defining things another way. By this definitional maneuvering within the broader meaning of the term, they gain a flexibility with their concepts unknown to those recounting grand narratives. And this new flexibility has the power to expose hitherto hidden relationships between variables. Taken from: Shawver, L. (1998). Postmodernizing the unconscious with help of Derrida and Lyotard. The American Journal of Psychoanalysis. 58(4), 361-390. ..Lois Shawver
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