File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_1998/lyotard.9812, message 77


Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1998 22:05:16 -0800
Subject: Re: paralogy


Wayne A. King wrote:

> Can somebody give a specific example of writing that
> they consider an
> example of paralogy vs. another example that wouldn't?

I see paralogy as happening in conversation.  But a paper
that defined its terms locally and provisionally and
related to a community of other authors works might be, in
my opinion, arguably paralogical.

However, as people here have noted, Lyotard does not tell
us very explicitly what paralogy is.  It's a key concept,
but less developed than most of his key concepts.  The way
I have read him has been to look for a meaning for
"paralogy" that would make the text make the most sense of
his text, not to look for a statement in Lyotard that
explicitly explains this concept.  This takes a kind of
imaginativeness which, I believe, by the way, to be
paralogical.

I expanded on my interpretation of "paralogy" in a paper
that I have told this list I can make available to it.  In
that paper I have tried to give some examples of what I
see to be paralogy.  First, let me give a little of the
context that frames the first example in the paper.  The
subtopic in this paper in which the example appears is
about Lyotard's concept of the little narrative.  Here is
an excerpt from my paper which includes an example of what
I think is best called paralogy:

Lyotard claims that for conversation to be paralogical it
must be
both local and provisional.  What he means is that the
rules that
define the conversation must be "agreed on by its present
players
and subject to eventual cancellation (Lyotard, 1984,
p.66)."  But
if paralogical discussions are local and provisional, one
might
wonder if they have any general value.  Are they not
restricted
in their value to a given moment and time?

This is the way that Rorty (1991) and Habermas (1982)
criticize
Lyotard.  They argue that Lyotard's call for local and
provisional narratives reduces conversation to an
"argument
which convinces a given audience at a given time," one
that is
entirely "context-dependent"(Rorty, 1991, 165).   But this

criticism may underestimate the power of Lyotard's
suggestion.
What is to be local and provisional is not the subject
matter
under discussion but the rules for discussing things
(Lyotard,
1984, p.66).

It is a powerful suggestion.  Consider an example.  Two
researchers are discussing Xerostomia (dry mouth) for the
purpose
of doing a study.  Notice the way their definitions are
shaped
provisionally in their conversation.  Then ask if this
practice
trivializes their topic as Rorty and Habermas suggest.

     Scientist 1: I think Xerostomia can be a major
           diagnostic tool for neurotransmitor
malfunction.
     Scientist 2: How are you defining Xerostomia?
     Scientist 1: Severe, maybe even zero saliva
production
           from at least two of the major salivary glands.

     Scientist 2: What about inability to swallow a dry
cracker
           without water?
     Scientist 1:  I don't think so.  That's not a good
diagnostic
           criterion.  People learn techniques for doing
that
           without adequate saliva.


Looking through the tables of data that sit on their desk,
they
will see some relationships if they define things one way,
and
other relationships if they define them another.  If their
first
definition does not unveil interesting correlations, they
might
try defining things another way.  By this definitional
maneuvering within the broader meaning of the term, they
gain a
flexibility with their concepts unknown to those
recounting grand
narratives. And this new flexibility has the power to
expose
hitherto hidden relationships between variables.

Taken from:

Shawver, L. (1998). Postmodernizing the unconscious
with help of Derrida and Lyotard.  The American Journal
of Psychoanalysis. 58(4), 361-390.

..Lois Shawver




   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005