Date: Wed, 16 Dec 1998 00:30:07 -0800
From: Lois Shawver <rathbone-AT-california.com>
Subject: paralogy in readable format


Wayne A. King wrote:

> Can somebody give a specific example of writing that
> they consider an
> example of paralogy vs. another example that wouldn't?

I see paralogy as happening in conversation.  But a paper
that defined its terms locally and provisionally and
related to a community of other authors works might be, in

my opinion, arguably paralogical.

However, as people here have noted, Lyotard does not tell
us very explicitly what paralogy is.  It's a key concept,
but less developed than most of his key concepts.  The way

I have read him has been to look for a meaning for
"paralogy" that would make the text make the most sense of

his text, not to look for a statement in Lyotard that
explicitly explains this concept.  This takes a kind of
imaginativeness which, I believe, by the way, to be
paralogical.

I expanded on my interpretation of "paralogy" in a paper
that I have told this list I can make available to it.  In

that paper I have tried to give some examples of what I
see to be paralogy.  First, let me give a little of the
context that frames the first example in the paper.  The
subtopic in this paper in which the example appears is
about Lyotard's concept of the little narrative.  Here is
an excerpt from my paper which includes an example of what

I think is best called paralogy:

Lyotard claims that for conversation to be paralogical it
must be both local and provisional.  What he means is that
the rules that define the conversation must be "agreed on
by its present players and subject to eventual
cancellation (Lyotard, 1984, p.66)."  But if paralogical
discussions are local and provisional, one might wonder if
they have any general value.  Are they not restricted in
their value to a given moment and time?

This is the way that Rorty (1991) and Habermas (1982)
criticize
Lyotard.  They argue that Lyotard's call for local and
provisional narratives reduces conversation to an
"argument which convinces a given audience at a given
time," one that is entirely "context-dependent"(Rorty,
1991, 165).   But this  criticism may underestimate the
power of Lyotard's suggestion.
What is to be local and provisional is not the subject
matter
under discussion but the rules for discussing things
(Lyotard, 1984, p.66).

It is a powerful suggestion.  Consider an example.  Two
researchers are discussing Xerostomia (dry mouth) for the
purpose of doing a study.  Notice the way their
definitions are shaped provisionally in their
conversation.  Then ask if this practice trivializes their
topic as Rorty and Habermas suggest.

Scientist 1: I think Xerostomia can
     be a major diagnostic tool for
     neurotransmitor malfunction.
Scientist 2: How are you defining
    Xerostomia?
Scientist 1: Severe, maybe even
    zero saliva production
    from at least two of the major
    salivary glands.
Scientist 2: What about inability
    to swallow a dry cracker
    without water?
Scientist 1:  I don't think so.
    That's not a good diagnostic
    criterion.  People learn
    techniques for doing
    that without adequate
    saliva.


Looking through the tables of data that sit on their desk,
they will see some relationships if they define things one
way, and other relationships if they define them another.
If their first definition does not unveil interesting
correlations, they might try defining things another way.
By this definitional
maneuvering within the broader meaning of the term, they
gain a flexibility with their concepts unknown to those
recounting grand narratives. And this new flexibility has
the power to expose hitherto hidden relationships between
variables.

Taken from:

Shawver, L. (1998). Postmodernizing the unconscious
with help of Derrida and Lyotard.  The American Journal
of Psychoanalysis. 58(4), 361-390.

..Lois Shawver