Subject: Re: Paralogy in psychology Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2001 15:34:43 +0800 Hi, I looked paralogy up on www.dictionary.com, and it came back with the definition: paralogy \Pa*ral"o*gy\, n. [Gr. ?; ? beside, beyond + ? reason.] False reasoning; paralogism. In what sense does Lyotard use the word? (I am guessing he leans more towards 'beyond reason' rather than 'false reason') Glen. >From: steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com >Reply-To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu >To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu >Subject: Re: Paralogy in psychology >Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 18:17:10 +0100 > >S > >I'm afraid I am non the wiser - how does the use of paralogy improve the >science >of psychology? Is there something more substansive I can refer to? > >The question Lyotard asks regarding legitimation of knowledge but never >satisfactorily answers remains relevant - " The problem is to determine >whether >it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy..." >(P61 >PMC). His use of the 'petit narrative' as the fundemental form of >imaginative >invention remains as dubious and questionable today as it was when he wrote >the >text. It is questionable because of the partial selection of narratives >being >refused in the proclaimed end of the 'Grande narratives...' (some of whom >are >reinventing themselves presently.) > >But since he is dealing with what he defines as 'an ideal usage...of >opinion' - >see for example the discussion in Just Gaming where Lyotard relates >paralogism to >Kantian idealism... I have some difficulty in relating such a usage to the >science of psychology.... However it seemingly fits within the type of >grand >narrative which works through legitmating the variety of of fields of >knowledge >in developing the knowledge and and education of knowing human subjects. >This >variety of human subject is proposed as the core of the telos of knowledge >and >the real, expanding on all the roads of science and legitimates them... > > >regards > >sdv > > > >Sissy wrote: > > > Matthew Asher Levy wrote: > > > > > Would you be willing to cite for us a few sentences from your >psychological > > > sources where they use "parology"? It would be interesting and easier >for > > > us to comment.... > > > > Hi > > Sorry it's taken me a bit to get back to you. I was hit with an email > > virus, and my comuputer was out of commission. > > These are two excerpts from the psychologists where parolgoy is > > being utilized. > > > > Subject: my ambivalence > > > > Nick, Tom, Leonard, and all the rest. I want to tell you that I'm here, > > and that I'm here looking over your shoulder and that I am admiring what >I > > imagine you to be doing -- but I'm reluctant at the moment to join you. > > I believe in your vision, but I am ambivalent about creating a > > conversation while people are telling us how terribly vulnerable they >are > > when people say things that challenge them, how dramatically unsafe > > opposing views make them feel. Maybe the world isn't ready for paralogy > > in every spot. Do you really think it is ready for it here? > > > > Subject: Re: My view on paralogy on MFTC? (a list community now >disbanded) > > > > Both Habermas and Lyotard were eager to distinguish their work. For one > > thing, Habermas has presented himself as one who believes in the >"project > > of modernity," and Lyotard represents himself as "postodern." This has > > framed their ongoing debate which only ended when Lyotard died a few >years > > ago. Perhaps these notes will be helpful to your comparison of Habermas > > and lyotard. They are taken from Lyotard's classic text, The postmodern > > Condition, pp.65-66. > > > > [I]t sems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in > > orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction >of > > a search for universal consensus through what he calls 'Diskurs', in >ohter > > words, a dialogue of argumentation. This would be to make two > > assumptions. The first is that it is ossible for all speakers to come to > > agreement on which rules or metaprescriptions are universall valid for > > languge games, when it is clear that languge games are heteromomorphous, > > subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules. The second assumption > > is that the goal of dialogue is consensus. But as I have shown in the > > analysis of the pragmatics of science, consensus is only a particular > > stage in the discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is > > paralogy." (pp.65-66) . > > _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
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