File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_2001/lyotard.0107, message 151


Subject: Re: Paralogy in psychology
Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2001 15:34:43 +0800


Hi,

I looked paralogy up on www.dictionary.com, and it came back with the 
definition:

paralogy \Pa*ral"o*gy\, n. [Gr. ?; ? beside, beyond + ? reason.] False 
reasoning; paralogism.

In what sense does Lyotard use the word? (I am guessing he leans more 
towards 'beyond reason' rather than 'false reason')

Glen.

>From: steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com
>Reply-To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
>Subject: Re: Paralogy in psychology
>Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 18:17:10 +0100
>
>S
>
>I'm afraid I am non the wiser - how does the use of paralogy improve the 
>science
>of psychology? Is there something more substansive I can refer to?
>
>The question Lyotard asks regarding legitimation of knowledge but never
>satisfactorily answers remains relevant - " The problem is to determine 
>whether
>it is possible to have a form of legitimation based solely on paralogy..." 
>(P61
>PMC). His use of the 'petit narrative' as the fundemental form of 
>imaginative
>invention remains as dubious and questionable today as it was when he wrote 
>the
>text. It is questionable because of the partial selection of narratives 
>being
>refused in the proclaimed end of the 'Grande narratives...' (some of whom 
>are
>reinventing themselves presently.)
>
>But since he is dealing with what he defines as 'an ideal usage...of 
>opinion' -
>see for example the discussion in Just Gaming where Lyotard relates 
>paralogism to
>Kantian idealism... I have some difficulty in relating such a usage to the
>science of psychology....  However it seemingly fits within the type of 
>grand
>narrative which works through legitmating the variety of of fields of 
>knowledge
>in developing the knowledge and and education of knowing human subjects. 
>This
>variety of human subject is proposed as the core of the telos of knowledge 
>and
>the real, expanding on all the roads of science and legitimates them...
>
>
>regards
>
>sdv
>
>
>
>Sissy wrote:
>
> > Matthew Asher Levy wrote:
> >
> > > Would you be willing to cite for us a few sentences from your 
>psychological
> > > sources where they use "parology"?  It would be interesting and easier 
>for
> > > us to comment....
> >
> > Hi
> > Sorry it's taken me a bit to get back to you.  I was hit with an email
> > virus, and my comuputer was out of commission.
> > These are two excerpts from the psychologists where parolgoy is
> > being utilized.
> >
> > Subject:      my ambivalence
> >
> > Nick, Tom, Leonard, and all the rest.  I want to tell you that I'm here,
> > and that I'm here looking over your shoulder and that I am admiring what 
>I
> > imagine you to be doing -- but I'm reluctant at the moment to join you.
> > I believe in your vision, but I am ambivalent about creating a
> > conversation while people are telling us how terribly vulnerable they 
>are
> > when people say things that challenge them, how dramatically unsafe
> > opposing views make them feel.  Maybe the world isn't ready for paralogy
> > in every spot.  Do you really think it is ready for it here?
> >
> >  Subject: Re: My view on paralogy on MFTC? (a list community now 
>disbanded)
> >
> > Both Habermas and Lyotard were eager to distinguish their work. For one
> > thing, Habermas has presented himself as one who believes in the 
>"project
> > of modernity," and Lyotard represents himself as "postodern." This has
> > framed their ongoing debate which only ended when Lyotard died a few 
>years
> > ago.  Perhaps these notes will be helpful to your comparison of Habermas
> > and lyotard. They are taken from Lyotard's classic text, The postmodern
> > Condition, pp.65-66.
> >
> > [I]t sems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in
> > orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction 
>of
> > a search for universal consensus through what he calls 'Diskurs', in 
>ohter
> > words, a dialogue of argumentation.  This would be to make two
> > assumptions. The first is that it is ossible for all speakers to come to
> > agreement on which rules or metaprescriptions are universall valid for
> > languge games, when it is clear that languge games are heteromomorphous,
> > subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules.  The second assumption
> > is that the goal of dialogue is consensus. But as I have shown in the
> > analysis of the pragmatics of science, consensus is only a particular
> > stage in the discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is
> > paralogy." (pp.65-66)  .
>
>


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