Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2001 18:16:53 +0000
Subject: Re: ethics




  Eric/all

A number of starting points... I agree that what Badiou is doing is to 
refuse Levinas - however our readings differ beyond that point.

"Hegel will introduce a subtle distinction between 'ethics' and 
'morality'. He reserves the application of the ethical principle to 
immediate action, whicle morality is to concern reflexive action. He 
will say for example that 'the ethical order essentially consists in 
[the] immediate firmness of decision...'" (Page 2). In using this quote 
Badiou is codifying his critique of Kantian descended ethical positions 
- which he explicity states in the paragraph that follows "The 
contemporary return to ethics uses the word in an obviously fuzzy way, 
but it is certainly closer to Kant (the ethics of judgement) than to 
Hegel (the ethics of decision)..." The rest of the introduction and 
ultimately the book refuses Kantian positions in favor of situations and 
descisions.

I am not familiar enough with Badiou's history to understand why Lacan, 
who is the most Hegelian of psychoanalytical theorists (most notably in 
the explicit use of the dialectic(see Ecrits)) is used by Badiou, I 
presume it is because of Lacan's ethics of the real which focusese on 
neither the imaginary good nor the pure symbolic form of universal duty 
but on the limit cases that define psychoanalytical experience - the 
death drive. I agree however that Lacan is recognisably one of the 
starting points for Badious position - whereas Kant is one of the 
'explicit targets' who Badiou is intent on refusing. See the difference 
between Badiou's subject 'the one who bears a process of truth' (note 
the singular 'a' placing the subject in the situation) and Kant's 
transcendental subject and transcendental subjectivity - which in 
Badious reading refers to the subjective conditions of experience - 
however Kant's normalising use of 'moral law' which is a pure form of 
universal legislation... Badiou inverts practically all Kant's 
propositions and works contrary to all Kant's prescriptions . (It is 
curiously close to Deleuze's reading of Kant somehow by turns 
affectionate but recognisably the enemy...).

There is an additional reason why the Hegelian element is important - 
Badiou is thinker who deliberately allies himself with whatever the 
revolutionary workers movement is at a given moment - see the interview 
in Ethics for example - the situation, the event, the truth process - 
all the core terms and themes of the Ethics are directed pointers 
towards the 'ethic of truths' which is strangely close to the 'ethic of 
decisions' he commences from. "All the theoretical strands of the 
revolutionary worker's movement stem from critical confrontation with 
Hegelian thought...." (Debord -para 78 The society of the spectacle) I 
suspect that the revolutionary Badiou would not disagree with that 
sentiment.

(Hypplolite) (shorthand...)
During the 1960s the anti-humanist direction of french philosophy was 
well established - this version of 'anti-humanism' was also 
'anti-hegelian'. It is less well known that Hyppolite's early 1950s book 
is one of the starting points for the both these great anti's - 
Hyppolite's work ended the earlier humanistic reading of Hegel that 
Kojeve developed in the 30s and established the means by which 
philosophy could develop a way out of the humanistic positions. It is 
probably putting it strongly but the introduction to the english edition 
states that the point of origin for the philosophies of difference, the 
anti-hegelian philosophies of Foucault, Lyotard and Deleuze began from 
the work Logic and Existence... 'The richness of hippolytes book could 
then let us wonder this can we not construct an ontlogy of difference 
which would not have to go up to contradiction, because contradiction 
would be less than difference and not more? Is not contradiction itself 
only the phenomenal and anthropological aspect of difference?' (Deleuze 
1954)

The issue with the notion of difference (Badiou, Jameson, Negri and 
Hardt) has become that the multiculturalist celebration of difference 
relies on the recognition of the essential and underlying 'One' which 
results in the radical obliteration of Difference, of the antagonism 
that exists between us. The same analysis works for the standard 
postmodern critique of sexual difference as a binary opposition - which 
is to be deconstructed, re-understood through the cyborgian line - 
...there are not just two sexes/genders, but a multiplicity of sexes, 
genders, sexual identitities... but the reality that this reduces us 
back to the One sex, the eradication of gender differences in the 
weirdly boring perversity of gender differences/sameness which functions 
to lock the multitude in a societal containment vessel.... Badiou 
rejects the 'difference' but not the anti-humanism - (I, longterm reader 
of Deleuze that I am, and contrary to Diane, think that Badiou has a 
point when he argues that Deleuze is the radical monist whilst also 
being the philosopher of the rhizome multitude...) curiously, and its 
remains a surprise Lyotard in the second chapter of The Inhuman follows 
the sexual difference logic and argues for the necessity of the 
antagonistic gap between m/f as being essential for thought...

1.2.3..... (oh and the cat shook his head disgust at the idea of being 
reduced to the One... )

regards
steve

Mary Murphy&Salstrand wrote:

>steve.devos wrote:
> 
>
>>no not Kantian - Hegelian... Hegelian descended through Hyppolyte's
>>work Logic and Existence...
>>
>
>Steve and his cyborg cat:
>
>I'm afraid, even with rehab woes, I can't let you off that easily.
>
>1. There is clearly a connection between the sense of obligation that
>derives from Kant's categorical imperative and the sense of obligation
>that derives from Badiou.  In my reading, Badiou is simply opposing Kant
>to Levinas and making an argument that inverts somewhat the arguments
>Levinas uses to oppose Kant.
>
>2. I am not making this up. Even the translator, who is in the process
>of publishing a book on the philosophy of Badiou makes this connection.
>See section Section III (xvi) where he connects both Kant and Lacan to
>Badiou.
>
>3. It is not enough to throw out a name (Hyppolyte) who I am not familar
>with.  What is the argument and how does it differ from Kant's?
>
>eric
>
>

HTML VERSION:

steve.devos wrote:
 

no not Kantian - Hegelian... Hegelian descended through Hyppolyte's
work Logic and Existence...

Steve and his cyborg cat:

I'm afraid, even with rehab woes, I can't let you off that easily.

1. There is clearly a connection between the sense of obligation that
derives from Kant's categorical imperative and the sense of obligation
that derives from Badiou.  In my reading, Badiou is simply opposing Kant
to Levinas and making an argument that inverts somewhat the arguments
Levinas uses to oppose Kant.

2. I am not making this up. Even the translator, who is in the process
of publishing a book on the philosophy of Badiou makes this connection.
See section Section III (xvi) where he connects both Kant and Lacan to
Badiou.

3. It is not enough to throw out a name (Hyppolyte) who I am not familar
with.  What is the argument and how does it differ from Kant's?

eric