From: "Eric" <ericandmary-AT-earthlink.net> Subject: RE: Paradox, Protagoras Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 18:06:37 -0500 At first glance the Protagoras Note appears to be something of an anomaly. The open chapter seemed clear enough. A differend is defined as a conflict that cannot be litigated because a common rule of judgment is lacking. Then the reader is suddenly plunged into an abstract logical discussion of Russell's theory of types and the Liar Paradox. What is going on here? I think it is possible to interpret this note both in the context of Lyotard's stance regarding metanarratives as well as being a kind of foreshadowing of the final chapter entitled "The Sign of History". In this first chapter, Lyotard certainly analyzes the differend, but what should also be noticed is the extent to which the differend emerges in the context of certain dogmatic judgments which refuse to be contained within the very history upon which they judge. The two paradigm cases Lyotard discusses are the historical revisionism of Faurisson concerning the Holocaust and the totalitarian standpoint of Stalinist communism. What both of these judgments share in common with metanarratives is the basic position they take. It is the illusion of a standpoint outside of history able to judge it in totality without being judged in turn. This is what leads to a kind of monopoly on the procedures for the determination of what is real. It is at this point that Lyotard interrupts to consider the paradox of Protagoras. Essentially, it turns upon the matter of self-reflexivity. If the judgment made by the individual is considered part of the series rather than outside of the series (Meta) then the series includes that judgment as well; and thus a paradox occurs. What eludes 'logic' and creates the paradox are time and the process of history itself. The deictic "now' is both the origin of a series (before & after) as well as an element within the series. This leads to the recognition that the "now", like the phrase itself, is a matter of linkage in an indefinite series and therefore without finality; yet, this now can also constitute the beginning of another series and therefore signify an event. One of the common misinterpretations of the metanarrative is that it is that it is something merely willful on Lyotard's part, a kind of premature foreclosure upon the possibilities of history. In this passage, I believe that Lyotard is attempting to show that any attempt to formulate a metanarrative of history will end in a kind of paradox of the "All Cretans are Liars" variety. The metanarrative attempts to maintain objectivity by embedding its judgment in an exterior process called history and thereby forgets that this judgment is actually one made by the participant himself. As Lyotard points out: "The history of the world cannot pass a last judgment. It is made out of judged judgments." The physics of moving objects (including phrases) which Lyotard evokes (see p. 7) is the attempt to constitute the generalized relativity of a universe in which metanarratives, including those of Faurisson and Stalin, are thereby rendered problematic. This is so because such metanarratives position themselves outside of time (the logic of history) rather than linking themselves onto it as a self-reflexive part of a continuing series. Rather than take responsibility for its own judgment, the metanarrative wants to pawn it off on history itself. This is what constitutes the bad faith of Geist. eric
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