File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_2002/lyotard.0206, message 22


From: "Eric" <ericandmary-AT-earthlink.net>
Subject: RE: Paradox, Protagoras
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 18:06:37 -0500


At first glance the Protagoras Note appears to be something of an
anomaly.  The open chapter seemed clear enough.  A differend is defined
as a conflict that cannot be litigated because a common rule of judgment
is lacking.  Then the reader is suddenly plunged into an abstract
logical discussion of Russell's theory of types and the Liar Paradox.
What is going on here?

I think it is possible to interpret this note both in the context of
Lyotard's stance regarding metanarratives as well as being a kind of
foreshadowing of the final chapter entitled "The Sign of History".  In
this first chapter, Lyotard certainly analyzes the differend, but what
should also be noticed is the extent to which the differend emerges in
the context of certain dogmatic judgments which refuse to be contained
within the very history upon which they judge. 

The two paradigm cases Lyotard discusses are the historical revisionism
of Faurisson concerning the Holocaust and the totalitarian standpoint of
Stalinist communism.  What both of these judgments share in common with
metanarratives is the basic position they take. It is the illusion of a
standpoint outside of history able to judge it in totality without being
judged in turn.  This is what leads to a kind of monopoly on the
procedures for the determination of what is real.

It is at this point that Lyotard interrupts to consider the paradox of
Protagoras. Essentially, it turns upon the matter of self-reflexivity.
If the judgment made by the individual is considered part of the series
rather than outside of the series (Meta) then the series includes that
judgment as well; and thus a paradox occurs.

What eludes 'logic' and creates the paradox are time and the process of
history itself.  The deictic "now' is both the origin of a series
(before & after) as well as an element within the series.  This leads to
the recognition that the "now", like the phrase itself, is a matter of
linkage in an indefinite series and therefore without finality; yet,
this now can also constitute the beginning of another series and
therefore signify an event.

One of the common misinterpretations of the metanarrative is that it is
that it is something merely willful on Lyotard's part, a kind of
premature foreclosure upon the possibilities of history. In this
passage, I believe that Lyotard is attempting to show that any attempt
to formulate a metanarrative of history will end in a kind of paradox of
the "All Cretans are Liars" variety.  The metanarrative attempts to
maintain objectivity by embedding its judgment in an exterior process
called history and thereby forgets that this judgment is actually one
made by the participant himself.  As Lyotard points out: "The history of
the world cannot pass a last judgment. It is made out of judged
judgments."

The physics of moving objects (including phrases) which Lyotard evokes
(see p. 7) is the attempt to constitute the generalized relativity of a
universe in which metanarratives, including those of Faurisson and
Stalin, are thereby rendered problematic. This is so because such
metanarratives position themselves outside of time (the logic of
history) rather than linking themselves onto it as a self-reflexive part
of a continuing series. Rather than take responsibility for its own
judgment, the metanarrative wants to pawn it off on history itself.
This is what constitutes the bad faith of Geist.

eric

 



   

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