File spoon-archives/lyotard.archive/lyotard_2002/lyotard.0206, message 60


Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2002 23:22:36 +0100
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com>
Subject: Re: Rewriting Marx




Eric/all

As I edge towards working my way towards replying to the body of the 
email, which in my view relates to the question of truth, rather than 
the opposition that you propose. From that I would suggest that since 
 philosophy is the means by which we seize truths it is necessary for us 
to critique those aspects of the works under consideration. It amuses me 
here that as far as I can ascertain only 'I' seem to think there is a 
problem (at all) with Lyotard's approach to the crisis he, in a sense 
personifies. This crisis, which is associated with the collapse of the 
metanarratives is normally referred to as the crisis of metaphysics, 
 the heart of the postmodern critique. This produces in the work of 
Lyotard, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and so on the familiar anxiety of the 
question of truth. Broadly speaking philosophy is often thought to be 
nostalgic for the moment, long gone now, when it was supposed to be able 
to answer questions related to human existence. For postmodernity this 
is regarded as a sign of a sickness at the heart of our western 
philosophy.  Part of Lyotard's take on this issue is related to both the 
crisis in knowledge - proposed through the analysis of the death of 
grandnarratives/metanarratives - but also the issues related to the 
holocaust  and the Victim (as historical subject) (which you will have 
to answer more adequately than you have chosen to so far). Whilst I have 
some sympathy for the former the latter may no longer be defensible.

Briefly I agree that, of course,  the tradition of thought represented 
in my email by Hegel (because Lyotard so succinctly writes against this 
body of work) and Marx (for similar reasons) has become problematic, it 
is not my intention to deny this - but it is my contention that 
Lyotard's position is equally problematic and for similar reasons, as 
hinted at before. Perhaps the most pertinent extra-philosophical one is 
that the postmodern world is repeating the mass-holocausts of the late 
19th C, events which cannot be understood through the use of current 
theorisations of postmodern conditions of incommensurable interests, nor 
should they be understood through the identifcation of countless morally 
equivilant victims.

I do not have any reason to not agree with your suggested method 'move 
more slowly, reading and discussing...' but is  this happening ? and a 
final conclusion is plainly impossible, or rather that any conclusion is 
made within its temporary socio-historical context and will inevitably 
change from one instant to the next

Hummm enough for now...

regards#
steve

> The question is whether or not it is possible to rewrite Marx in 
> another way that avoids this dilemma and whether Lyotard has anything 
> significant to contribute in that regard. I will not attempt to answer 
> this question yet for the other issue I have is that you seem to be 
> summarizing Lyotard's argument too quickly and in a way that is too 
> pat, critiquing Lyotard for certain stances I am not sure are even 
> really there. (Should such a straw man version of Lyotard be 
> considered a victim?) I would prefer to move more slowly, reading and 
> discussing The Differend in relation to these issues, but bracketing 
> the final conclusion until we have presented the scope of the entire 
> argument Lyotard is making as accurately as possible.  
>
>  
>


HTML VERSION:

Eric/all

As I edge towards working my way towards replying to the body of the email, which in my view relates to the question of truth, rather than the opposition that you propose. From that I would suggest that since  philosophy is the means by which we seize truths it is necessary for us to critique those aspects of the works under consideration. It amuses me here that as far as I can ascertain only 'I' seem to think there is a problem (at all) with Lyotard's approach to the crisis he, in a sense personifies. This crisis, which is associated with the collapse of the metanarratives is normally referred to as the crisis of metaphysics,  the heart of the postmodern critique. This produces in the work of Lyotard, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and so on the familiar anxiety of the question of truth. Broadly speaking philosophy is often thought to be nostalgic for the moment, long gone now, when it was supposed to be able to answer questions related to human existence. For postmodernity this is regarded as a sign of a sickness at the heart of our western philosophy.  Part of Lyotard's take on this issue is related to both the crisis in knowledge - proposed through the analysis of the death of grandnarratives/metanarratives - but also the issues related to the holocaust  and the Victim (as historical subject) (which you will have to answer more adequately than you have chosen to so far). Whilst I have some sympathy for the former the latter may no longer be defensible.

Briefly I agree that, of course,  the tradition of thought represented in my email by Hegel (because Lyotard so succinctly writes against this body of work) and Marx (for similar reasons) has become problematic, it is not my intention to deny this - but it is my contention that Lyotard's position is equally problematic and for similar reasons, as hinted at before. Perhaps the most pertinent extra-philosophical one is that the postmodern world is repeating the mass-holocausts of the late 19th C, events which cannot be understood through the use of current theorisations of postmodern conditions of incommensurable interests, nor should they be understood through the identifcation of countless morally equivilant victims.

I do not have any reason to not agree with your suggested method 'move more slowly, reading and discussing...' but is  this happening ? and a final conclusion is plainly impossible, or rather that any conclusion is made within its temporary socio-historical context and will inevitably change from one instant to the next

Hummm enough for now...

regards#
steve

The question is whether or not it is possible to rewrite Marx in another way that avoids this dilemma and whether Lyotard has anything significant to contribute in that regard. I will not attempt to answer this question yet for the other issue I have is that you seem to be summarizing Lyotard’s argument too quickly and in a way that is too pat, critiquing Lyotard for certain stances I am not sure are even really there. (Should such a straw man version of Lyotard be considered a victim?) I would prefer to move more slowly, reading and discussing The Differend in relation to these issues, but bracketing the final conclusion until we have presented the scope of the entire argument Lyotard is making as accurately as possible.  

 



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