Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2002 19:42:07 +0100
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com>
Subject: Re: The Four Silences




  L and TT

I'd be interested in hearing more from both of you - not on the below 
lines of thought - but precisely on the relationship, as you understand 
it, between Lyotard's Differend and it's anti-Hegelian and 
anti-dialectical approach. Simply, incidentally, to understand what and 
how you read this aspect of the text.



regards
steve

L.Iyer-AT-mmu.ac.uk <mailto:L.Iyer-AT-mmu.ac.uk> wrote:

> Dear TT;
>
> I more or less agree with what you have to say about the Gorgias 
> notice, perhaps the key notice in LD. What might be at the root of the 
> problem so many people have in reading this notice is that it is badly 
> translated into English. The translation of Gorgias argument re: Being 
> and not-being is difficult to follow in English (also in French); and 
> in the paragraph immediately following the notice, Van Den Abeele 
> leaves out a crucial 'phrase'. If I remember correctly he omits to 
> say, "the four silences alleged by Gorgias". Now, this last point 
> might not seem to amount to much -- but somehow it shows how little 
> importance is placed by VDA on the Notices, which I think serve to 
> situate historially the whole account of the differend. It would 
> perhaps be inappropriate to go into a general account of the function 
> of the Notices now, and better to leave that until the book is read 
> and everyone can reflect on them. However, it seems to me that what 
> Lyotard does in this notice is draw out the seeds of the nihilism that 
> inhabits occidental thought about reality (if I can rather put it so 
> clumsily), or to rephrase: he draws the whole discussion back to the 
> nihilism that inheres in the way in which the west thinks of Being, a 
> nihilism that produces the protocols of the cognitive genre. We could 
> go onto talk about this if you wanted, but if you can see what I am 
> getting at, then you will see that when I wrote about Kant, I did not 
> make any slippage between "reason", "understanding", "argument", etc., 
> but rather, and for sake of concision ommited to trace out what 
> Lyotard lets reverberate in LD, namely the nihilism of a certain 
> disposition towards reality, or being, that occurs in Being being 
> grasped hold of by reason. After all, in the end, that is what the 
> whole discourse on cognition, and the cognitive genre establishes, as 
> you so rightly claim, when you write: "nihilism precedes and continues 
> to haunt the cognitive genre. Anyone can pick up Gorgias' strategy at 
> any moment, as does Faurisson. To refute Gorgias, one must play his 
> game, yet in the process, one reaffirms the same dormant nihilism, 
> albeit, keeping it at bay for a time". In other words -- whatever 
> cognition does attest to, it cannot ever rid itself of nihilism, of a 
> certain denial of reality...
>
> LIyer
>
> On 17 Jun 2002, at 10:16, Thomas Taylor wrote:
>
> All,
>
> Just a little about this. There seems to be much confusion. Here's my 
> reading. The Four Silences of Gorgias are intended as an indictment of 
> the cognitive genre. What they bear witness to is the process of 
> "verification". Before a discussion can even begin between two or more 
> interlocuters, a certain nihilism must be refuted (Gorgias' silences, 
> the lack of the four poles of the phrase universe). This refutation is 
> one of the ends of verification. Only after that will a phrase 
> universe be allowed for.
>
> To pause here a minute, nihilism precedes and continues to haunt the 
> cognitive genre. Anyone can pick up Gorgias' strategy at any moment, 
> as does Faurisson. To refute Gorgias, one must play his game, yet in 
> the process, one reaffirms the same dormant nihilism, albeit, keeping 
> it at bay for a time.
>
> Wrongs and Damages, Victims and Silences
>
> Now, to rewind a bit. A damage is an infraction which can be given 
> sufficient witness in some genre or other within a situation of 
> consensus as regards that genre's validity as a space for disputing 
> the infraction. (A litigation)
>
> A wrong has no such genre. It is the absence of such which makes it a 
> wrong. This is the special connection with silence. The victim has no 
> recognized voice (and I emphasize "recognized" here). The most often 
> consequence of such a situation is the conversion of the wrong into a 
> litigation. This however is itself a wrong, wrongs and damages being 
> in diffirend with one another.
>
> Now, this is no reason to deny litigation, nor to ignore or abolish 
> the idea of actual, socio-historical victims. Lyotard never clearly 
> strikes against this practice. On the contrary, a wrong may only show 
> itself from within a litigation. It will not do so as argument, as the 
> standard phrase (logos). But it has means of signaling itself (that is 
> the term Lyotard will use later: se signaler). From behind the logos 
> and the phrase. The very "is it happening?" of any phrase is such a 
> signal. For all of this about signaling, see the Stein notice and 
> surrounding paragraphs.
>
>
>
> In the latter, he lays out a condemnation of examples. Before I had 
> written that his writing in Le Dif. is in a sense, performative. 
> "Auschwitz" is ironic, insofar as it is an example for Lyotard's 
> argument. He chose an extreme word, I think, to dramatize the 
> mechanics of the cognitive genre. Lyotard suffers numerous technical 
> procedures to place "Auschwitz" properly and justly. However, it ca 
> nnot be so emplaced because it exceeds the cognitive genre. In so 
> doing, it is the most real of rea lities. (92-93). As such the 
> cognitive genre itself produces differends and is futhermore based on 
> them. They are not its exception. Of course, it does seem that Lyotard 
> puts himself in the same pos ition in proposing a general theory of 
> language. That is the paradox: wrongs only appear from withi n 
> litigations, from within dialogues.
>
> I hope this is not repetitive (I haven't had the chance to read all 
> the postings). The one thing I would like to emphasize most here is 
> the need to stick Lyotard's terms as he defines them. He gives them 
> special and specific meanings, which do not always extrapolate well 
> into common synonymous me anings in current use.
>
> Cheers,
> Rod T.
>
>

HTML VERSION:

Dear TT;

I more or less agree with what you have to say about the Gorgias notice, perhaps the key notice in LD. What might be at the root of the problem so many people have in reading this notice is that it is badly translated into English. The translation of Gorgias argument re: Being and not-being is difficult to follow in English (also in French); and in the paragraph immediately following the notice, Van Den Abeele leaves out a crucial 'phrase'. If I remember correctly he omits to say, "the four silences alleged by Gorgias". Now, this last point might not seem to amount to much -- but somehow it shows how little importance is placed by VDA on the Notices, which I think serve to situate historially the whole account of the differend. It would perhaps be inappropriate to go into a general account of the function of the Notices now, and better to leave that until the book is read and everyone can reflect on them. However, it seems to me that what Lyotard does in this notice is draw out the seeds of the nihilism that inhabits occidental thought about reality (if I can rather put it so clumsily), or to rephrase: he draws the whole discussion back to the nihilism that inheres in the way in which the west thinks of Being, a nihilism that produces the protocols of the cognitive genre. We could go onto talk about this if you wanted, but if you can see what I am getting at, then you will see that when I wrote about Kant, I did not make any slippage between "reason", "understanding", "argument", etc., but rather, and for sake of concision ommited to trace out what Lyotard lets reverberate in LD, namely the nihilism of a certain disposition towards reality, or being, that occurs in Being being grasped hold of by reason. After all, in the end, that is what the whole discourse on cognition, and the cognitive genre establishes, as you so rightly claim, when you write: "nihilism precedes and continues to haunt the cognitive genre. Anyone can pick up Gorgias' strategy at any moment, as does Faurisson. To refute Gorgias, one must play his game, yet in the process, one reaffirms the same dormant nihilism, albeit, keeping it at bay for a time". In other words -- whatever cognition does attest to, it cannot ever rid itself of nihilism, of a certain denial of reality...

LIyer

On 17 Jun 2002, at 10:16, Thomas Taylor wrote:

All,

Just a little about this. There seems to be much confusion. Here's my reading. The Four Silences of Gorgias are intended as an indictment of the cognitive genre. What they bear witness to is the process of "verification". Before a discussion can even begin between two or more interlocuters, a certain nihilism must be refuted (Gorgias' silences, the lack of the four poles of the phrase universe). This refutation is one of the ends of verification. Only after that will a phrase universe be allowed for.

To pause here a minute, nihilism precedes and continues to haunt the cognitive genre. Anyone can pick up Gorgias' strategy at any moment, as does Faurisson. To refute Gorgias, one must play his game, yet in the process, one reaffirms the same dormant nihilism, albeit, keeping it at bay for a time.

Wrongs and Damages, Victims and Silences

Now, to rewind a bit. A damage is an infraction which can be given sufficient witness in some genre or other within a situation of consensus as regards that genre's validity as a space for disputing the infraction. (A litigation)

A wrong has no such genre. It is the absence of such which makes it a wrong. This is the special connection with silence. The victim has no recognized voice (and I emphasize "recognized" here). The most often consequence of such a situation is the conversion of the wrong into a litigation. This however is itself a wrong, wrongs and damages being in diffirend with one another.

Now, this is no reason to deny litigation, nor to ignore or abolish the idea of actual, socio-historical victims. Lyotard never clearly strikes against this practice. On the contrary, a wrong may only show itself from within a litigation. It will not do so as argument, as the standard phrase (logos). But it has means of signaling itself (that is the term Lyotard will use later: se signaler). From behind the logos and the phrase. The very "is it happening?" of any phrase is such a signal. For all of this about signaling, see the Stein notice and surrounding paragraphs.



In the latter, he lays out a condemnation of examples. Before I had written that his writing in Le Dif. is in a sense, performative. "Auschwitz" is ironic, insofar as it is an example for Lyotard's argument. He chose an extreme word, I think, to dramatize the mechanics of the cognitive genre. Lyotard suffers numerous technical procedures to place "Auschwitz" properly and justly. However, it ca nnot be so emplaced because it exceeds the cognitive genre. In so doing, it is the most real of rea lities. (92-93). As such the cognitive genre itself produces differends and is futhermore based on them. They are not its exception. Of course, it does seem that Lyotard puts himself in the same pos ition in proposing a general theory of language. That is the paradox: wrongs only appear from withi n litigations, from within dialogues.

I hope this is not repetitive (I haven't had the chance to read all the postings). The one thing I would like to emphasize most here is the need to stick Lyotard's terms as he defines them. He gives them special and specific meanings, which do not always extrapolate well into common synonymous me anings in current use.

Cheers,
Rod T.