Date: Thu, 04 Jul 2002 19:25:37 +0100
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.com>
Subject: Re: history... 93




Hugh/all

Ah - understood July 4th - simply a gloomy thursday.

History is not the property of 'powers that be' - nor should it be 
considered as such, it is however a site of ideological conflict. To 
understand this pre-marx/hegel and to continue to show evidence of 
 Kant's allergic reaction to anything empirical, with the inevitable 
conflicts that this brings to the surface.

One of the underlying points of question may indeed be the claim made 
that the holocaust suffers from an absence of 'history' - destined to be 
contested since it is one of the most documented events in history.

The quote referred to below is based on an erroneous assumption that is 
not supported by the diversity science/discipline of  history itself. 
Namely that of the 'not presentable...'  but it may be that nothing is....

As stated previously passage only makes sense if you substitute 
philosopher for historian...  a philosophy which has taken upon itself 
the guilt for the horrors of holocaust... If you read Adorno carefully 
this is certainly not what he had in mind - so why did that particular 
sub-group French philosophers take refuge in such a position?

regards
steve


hbone wrote:

>Steve,
>
>The pause in the US is partly the heat wave and national holiday, schools
>out etc.
>
>93 must be the longest numbered paragraph in the book.  If you study it, and
>all its references, you get the gist of the philosophy, but not the detailed
>analysis to phrases, genres, and how they operate.
>
>The philosophy of being and reality, truth and ideology, testimony and
>justice is constantly being rewritten by the powers that be, and those who
>support them.  So is history.
>
>Strangely, it is the absence of history that gives Lyotard such a problem
>with the Holocaust.  Hegel and Marx were certainly not the first nor the
>last to see history through ideological lenses and use it as an ideological
>tool.
>
>The quote:
>
>"... the historian must break with the monopoly over history granted to the
>cognitive regimen of  phrases, and he or she must venture forth lending his
>or her ear to what  is not presentable under the rules of knowledge..."
>
>invites historians to break free from unspecifed restraints and attend to
>the unpresentable   As ideology and metanarrative of the winners who are the
>rulers, history reflects what benefits them most.
>
>regards.
>Hugh
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>>We seem to have come to a pause, the expected moment when all goes quiet
>>whilst this is, pehaps, usually the case when people are engaged in
>>discussion about referents, names and discourse, personally I abhor
>>intellectual silences - allow me then to shatter some glass that annoys.
>>
>>In the last entry (93) two of the closing statements are sufficiently
>>interesting and challengable to require some phrases to be written. But
>>where to start, where indeed ..."...They will say that history is not
>>made of feelings..." or perhaps "... something new has happened to
>>history, which is that the facts...."  or event "...not only the
>>reality, but the meta-reality that is the destruction of reality?"  or
>>where he continues "....It is of course true that there would be no
>>histort without a differend. That a differend is born from a wrong and
>>is signalled by a silence..."
>>
>>But no it's not there but here that interests  "... the historian must
>>break with the monopoly over history granted to the cognitive regimen of
>>phrases, and he or she must venture forth lending his or her ear to what
>>is not presentable under the rules of knowledge..."  The assumption that
>>this is an accurate summation of what the unamed historian is capable of
>>doing has been challenged many times but not withstanding this - and
>>accepting that it is, as both Badiou and I would suggest, philosophy
>>which is Lyotard's true target and not the human science of history,
>>which is his target. For as we can identify nothing is outside of the
>>presentable in historical discourse, from the history of the working
>>class through an intimate history of humanity on into a history of
>>bombing and the city in history. Lyotard goes on "...every reality
>>entails this exigency insofar as it entails possible unknown senses..."
>>Perhaps, yes, even Lysenko will be proven to be right, along with the
>>memory of water and the genetic inferiority of some human sub-group or
>>other... I can imagine that here as I write this note, but suggest that
>>we recognize the difference between ideology and truth.... He ends with
>>"... Auschwitz is the most real of realities in this respect. It's name
>>marks the confines werein historcial knowledge sees its competance
>>impugned...." But to understand this it is necessary to replace
>>'history' with 'philosophy' - for within the conflicts over history and
>>historical knowledge - the struggle between ideological positions - it
>>makes no sense to misunderstand history as knowledge founded on these
>>differends.
>>
>>How then should philosophy accept the guilt for appalling events -
>>when,  individuals such as Oppenheimer notwithstanding science, economy
>>and politics do not and interestingly probably should not...
>>
>>We are not talking here about the differend between Neitzsche and Freud,
>>which plainly works as a discourse but rather between representations of
>>'events' which arguably may or may not have happened....
>>
>>
>>regards
>>steve
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>

HTML VERSION:

Steve,

The pause in the US is partly the heat wave and national holiday, schools
out etc.

93 must be the longest numbered paragraph in the book.  If you study it, and
all its references, you get the gist of the philosophy, but not the detailed
analysis to phrases, genres, and how they operate.

The philosophy of being and reality, truth and ideology, testimony and
justice is constantly being rewritten by the powers that be, and those who
support them.  So is history.

Strangely, it is the absence of history that gives Lyotard such a problem
with the Holocaust.  Hegel and Marx were certainly not the first nor the
last to see history through ideological lenses and use it as an ideological
tool.

The quote:

"... the historian must break with the monopoly over history granted to the
cognitive regimen of  phrases, and he or she must venture forth lending his
or her ear to what  is not presentable 
under the rules of knowledge..."

invites historians to break free from unspecifed restraints and attend to
the unpresentable   As ideology and metanarrative of the winners who are the
rulers, history reflects what benefits them most.

regards.
Hugh
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

We seem to have come to a pause, the expected moment when all goes quiet
whilst this is, pehaps, usually the case when people are engaged in
discussion about referents, names and discourse, personally I abhor
intellectual silences - allow me then to shatter some glass that annoys.

In the last entry (93) two of the closing statements are sufficiently
interesting and challengable to require some phrases to be written. But
where to start, where indeed ..."...They will say that history is not
made of feelings..." or perhaps "... something new has happened to
history, which is that the facts...."  or event "...not only the
reality, but the meta-reality that is the destruction of reality?"  or
where he continues "....It is of course true that there would be no
histort without a differend. That a differend is born from a wrong and
is signalled by a silence..."

But no it's not there but here that interests  "... the his
torian must
break with the monopoly over history granted to the cognitive regimen of
phrases, and he or she must venture forth lending his or her ear to what
is not presentable under the rules of knowledge..."  The assumption that
this is an accurate summation of what the unamed historian is capable of
doing has been challenged many times but not withstanding this - and
accepting that it is, as both Badiou and I would suggest, philosophy
which is Lyotard's true target and not the human science of history,
which is his target. For as we can identify nothing is outside of the
presentable in historical discourse, from the history of the working
class through an intimate history of humanity on into a history of
bombing and the city in history. Lyotard goes on "...every reality
entails this exigency insofar as it entails possible unknown senses..."
Perhaps, yes, even Lysenko will be proven to be right, along with the
memory of water and th
e genetic inferiority of some human sub-group or
other... I can imagine that here as I write this note, but suggest that
we recognize the difference between ideology and truth.... He ends with
"... Auschwitz is the most real of realities in this respect. It's name
marks the confines werein historcial knowledge sees its competance
impugned...." But to understand this it is necessary to replace
'history' with 'philosophy' - for within the conflicts over history and
historical knowledge - the struggle between ideological positions - it
makes no sense to misunderstand history as knowledge founded on these
differends.

How then should philosophy accept the guilt for appalling events -
when,  individuals such as Oppenheimer notwithstanding science, economy
and politics do not and interestingly probably should not...

We are not talking here about the differend between Neitzsche and Freud,
which plainly works as a discourse but rather 
between representations of
'events' which arguably may or may not have happened....


regards
steve