Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2002 00:12:47 +0000
From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
Subject: Re: readings on the 11th september




Hugh
to raise the work of the liberal Rorty in the ruins of 
 liberal-democracy, as reality proves the poverty of his philosophical 
and political thought - liberal irony seems such a useless idea in times 
like these - but then it always did....

Let me quote one of the most repulsive passages in a philosophical text 
in my possession - "...do we say that these people must be helped 
because they are human beings? We may, but its is much more persasive , 
morally as well as politically, to describe them as fellow Americans - 
to insist that it is outrageous that an American should live without 
hope ..." (P191 in Contingency....)  And the appeal is what of such a 
thinker who would appeal to such an appalling piece of reasoning.

of course it failed which makes the point rather critical don't you think?

regards
steve

hbone wrote:

>Eric/All
>
>Eric, I'm in substantial agreement with both your messages, the philosophic
>one,
>and  the political message that followed.
>
>I'll make a few comments on the philosophic here, and perhaps get to the
>political later.
>
>First, a couple of quotes that seem relevant:
>
>1) "The emphasis on the cognitive is out of step with the post-modern
>thought of today.  Gadamer, for example, argues that Kant's ideal of
>thinking for oneself is both impossible and undesirable.  Thinking is always
>closely connected with our own historical and cultural horizon, with the
>result that reason and understanding are never pure.  Derrida questions our
>ability to know things just as they are, thereby critiquing the modernist
>scientific enterprise.  Rorty dismisses foundationalism and questions
>whether the self can ever be completely oneself, only a tissue of
>contingencies which are highly dependent upon the influences of one
>historical and cultural context.  From these come a thoroughgoing relativism
>in the form and content of schooling."
>
>2) "The chief importance of Rorty's work lies in his criticism of the
>traditional notion of truth.  Truth as conceived by most traditional
>philosophers is static, final, perfect and even eternal.  It may be
>identified with God, 'Being', 'the will to
>power', 'The Will', 'Reason', 'The Spirit,' etc.  These are, according to
>Rorty "only descriptions of the world".  Thus we should drop the idea of
>language as representation and..."de-divinize the world", that is, we should
>get to the point where we no longer worship anything...our language, our
>conscience, our community as a product of time and chance.  In other words,
>there is nothing called 'Truth'"
>
>Comparing the above with your reinterpretation of Kant, it seems that Kant
>"divinized" "ends", and all we have to do is fill in the blanks, i.e.select
>"ends" from
>today's scenarios. This is a very pragmatic approach - its meaning is its
>result - and I
>suppose Rorty would approve.
>
>You wrote,
>
>>At the heart of Kantian ethics is what Kant himself called the 'kingdom
>>of ends' and here too we must reinterpret this in a much more radical
>>way. Taken literally it means that there must be an end to domination of
>>every kind; whether this is racism, sexism, authoritarianism,
>>exploitation, chattel slavery, wage slavery, and any form of social
>>existence where one person must become subservient to another. In short,
>>Kant's imperative entails that we transform an existing set of
>>situations that are planetary in their scope to create a world in which
>>there are No Gods and No Masters. In short, it means we called upon to
>>make an autopoietic society.
>>
>
>The pragmatic approach de-divinizes, but doesn't quench the hunger for
>"justice, legitimization, the social bond" or other God-substitutes.
>
>"Feelings" about the sublime, the event, the unnamable, a huge family of
>intuitions, abstractions, wishes and dreams, continue to press/impress the
>"mind".
>
>What is the origin?   One possibility is the existential necessity that
>accompanied the species-evolution of  homo-sapiens:  "act, react, or die".
>
>Lyotard refers somewhere to "hearkening", and notes how, in extreme
>situations, action precedes cognition.
>
>Michael Frayn, in the play "Copenhagen",  has Heisenberg, an expert skier,
>describe how, plunging down a dangerous slope at max speed, a decision
>"makes
>itself".
>
>best regards,
>Hugh
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
>>Rod,
>>
>>Thanks for posting the Badiou text.  Since 'Theory and Event' requires a
>>subscription to view, would you tell me if this was the full text or
>>just a partial quote?
>>
>>I have been thinking for some time now about the connection between
>>Badiou and Lyotard. For Badiou, ethics is about applying a process of
>>truth to radically transform a situation, irregardless of the cultural,
>>political or social considerations. It is what allows ethics to be
>>concerned with what Badiou calls the Immortal as opposed to the
>>consideration of the Other in the context of human rights.
>>
>>Despite Lyotard's interest in Levinas, I am convinced that Lyotard's
>>approach to ethics and politics is closer to Badiou than it is to
>>Levinas.  The crucial move away from Levinas I believe Lyotard makes is
>>to consider the Other not merely as the human Face, but more ambiguously
>>as the figural; one that can certainly be found in another, but can also
>>be found in ourselves.
>>
>>The figural is that which resists discourse and representation; it is
>>also the sublime event which does not present itself; again it is the
>>enfans upon whose flesh the Law is inscribed but which remains always
>>external to the Law.
>>
>>Lyotard is consistently opposed to a humanism which is founded on
>>metanarratives, universals and grids of representation because
>>inevitably these systems must end implicitly denying the figural.
>>Paradoxically, for Lyotard, we can only become human to the extent we
>>testify to this inhuman Other (the figural, the sublime, the enfans).
>>We must listen to this voice that is not a voice, framed in the silent
>>language of the Out-Law.
>>
>>This is where Lyotard links back to Badiou. What one calls truth, the
>>other the other calls the sublime. Both share in common a witnessing to
>>something that is external to the situation, that cannot be represented
>>in the situation, and that is necessary to realize in order to transform
>>the situation. In short, for both, ethics is founded as the radical
>>response to an Event.
>>
>>I would argue further that there is something deontological about this
>>approach insofar as it cannot be identified with utilitarianism,
>>pragmatism or phenomenology.  In short, both Badiou and Lyotard are both
>>Kantian with regard to ethics, albeit that this is a Kantian ethics of a
>>very radical kind.
>>
>>I certainly do not mean here the kind of appropriation of Kant that is
>>common to political liberalism, human rights theory, or philosophers
>>such as Rawls.  Rather I mean something closer to what Lacan identified
>>in Kant; an uncompromising sense of duty as fidelity to the truth or the
>>Real.  A categorical imperative which remains empty to the extent that
>>it tells us something must be done, but does not prescribe 'how' in any
>>detail. As such, Kantian ethics becomes an Archimedean lever with which
>>to move the world.
>>
>>At the heart of Kantian ethics is what Kant himself called the 'kingdom
>>of ends' and here too we must reinterpret this in a much more radical
>>way. Taken literally it means that there must be an end to domination of
>>every kind; whether this is racism, sexism, authoritarianism,
>>exploitation, chattel slavery, wage slavery, and any form of social
>>existence where one person must become subservient to another. In short,
>>Kant's imperative entails that we transform an existing set of
>>situations that are planetary in their scope to create a world in which
>>there are No Gods and No Masters. In short, it means we called upon to
>>make an autopoietic society.
>>
>>I would like to propose this as one possible response to the current
>>situation. Certainly, under the circumstances we must back necessary
>>reforms, but we must also recognize such reforms are never enough.
>>Ultimately, we must take the radical stance of demanding ethical
>>responsibility in the growing face of a pervasive immorality.
>>
>>We must because we can.
>>
>>Another world is possible.
>>
>>There is always an alternative.
>>
>>eric
>>
>
>
>

HTML VERSION:

Eric/All

Eric, I'm in substantial agreement with both your messages, the philosophic
one,
and  the political message that followed.

I'll make a few comments on the philosophic here, and perhaps get to the
political later.

First, a couple of quotes that seem relevant:

1) "The emphasis on the cognitive is out of step with the post-modern
thought of today.  Gadamer, for example, argues that Kant's ideal of
thinking for oneself is both impossible and undesirable.  Thinking is always
closely connected with our own historical and cultural horizon, with the
result that reason and understanding are never pure.  Derrida questions our
ability to know things just as they are, thereby critiquing the modernist
scientific enterprise.  Rorty dismisses foundationalism and questions
whether the self can ever be completely oneself, only a tissue of
contingencies which are highly dependent upon the influences of one
historical and cultural context.  From these come a thoroughgoing relativism
in the form and content of schooling."

2) "The chief importance of Rorty's work lies in his criticism of the
traditional notion of truth.  Truth as conceived by most traditional
philosophers is static, final, perfect and even eternal.  It may be
identified with God, 'Being', 'the will to
power', 'The Will', 'Reason', 'The Spirit,' etc.  These are, according to
Rorty "only descriptions of the world".  Thus we should drop the idea of
language as representation and..."de-divinize the world", that is, we should
get to the point where we no longer worship anything...our language, our
conscience, our community as a product of time and chance.  In other words,
there is nothing called 'Truth'"

Comparing the above with your reinterpretation of Kant, it seems that Kant
"divinized" "ends", and all we have to do is fill in the blanks, i.e.select
"ends" from
t
oday's scenarios. This is a very pragmatic approach - its meaning is its
result - and I
suppose Rorty would approve.

You wrote,

At the heart of Kantian ethics is what Kant himself called the 'kingdom
of ends' and here too we must reinterpret this in a much more radical
way. Taken literally it means that there must be an end to domination of
every kind; whether this is racism, sexism, authoritarianism,
exploitation, chattel slavery, wage slavery, and any form of social
existence where one person must become subservient to another. In short,
Kant's imperative entails that we transform an existing set of
situations that are planetary in their scope to create a world in which
there are No Gods and No Masters. In short, it means we called upon to
make an autopoietic society.

The pragmatic approach de-divinizes, but doesn't quench the hunger for
"justice, legitimization, the social bond" or other God-substitutes.

"Feelings" about the sublime, the event, the unnamable, a huge family of
intuitions, abstractions, wishes and dreams, continue to press/impress the
"mind".

What is the origin?   One possibility is the existential necessity that
accompanied the species-evolution of  homo-sapiens:  "act, react, or die".

Lyotard refers somewhere to "hearkening", and notes how, in extreme
situations, action precedes cognition.

Michael Frayn, in the play "Copenhagen",  has Heisenberg, an expert skier,
describe how, plunging down a dangerous slope at max speed, a decision
"makes
itself".

best regards,
Hugh

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Rod,

Thanks for posting the Badiou text.  Since 'Theory and Event' requires a
subscription to view, would you tell me if this was the full text or
just a partial quote?

I have been thinking for some time now about the connection between
Badiou and Lyotard. For Badiou, ethics is about applying a process of
truth to radically transform a situation, irregardless of the cultural,
political or social considerations. It is what allows ethics to be
concerned with what Badiou calls the Immortal as opposed to the
consideration of the Other in the context of human rights.

Despite Lyotard's interest in Levinas, I am convinced that Lyotard's
approach to ethics and politics is closer to Badiou than it is to
Levinas.  The crucial move away from Levinas I believe Lyotard makes is
to consider the Other not merely as the human Face, but more ambiguously
as the figural; one that can certainly be found in another, but can
 also
be found in ourselves.

The figural is that which resists discourse and representation; it is
also the sublime event which does not present itself; again it is the
enfans upon whose flesh the Law is inscribed but which remains always
external to the Law.

Lyotard is consistently opposed to a humanism which is founded on
metanarratives, universals and grids of representation because
inevitably these systems must end implicitly denying the figural.
Paradoxically, for Lyotard, we can only become human to the extent we
testify to this inhuman Other (the figural, the sublime, the enfans).
We must listen to this voice that is not a voice, framed in the silent
language of the Out-Law.

This is where Lyotard links back to Badiou. What one calls truth, the
other the other calls the sublime. Both share in common a witnessing to
something that is external to the situation, that cannot be represented
in the situation, and tha
t is necessary to realize in order to transform
the situation. In short, for both, ethics is founded as the radical
response to an Event.

I would argue further that there is something deontological about this
approach insofar as it cannot be identified with utilitarianism,
pragmatism or phenomenology.  In short, both Badiou and Lyotard are both
Kantian with regard to ethics, albeit that this is a Kantian ethics of a
very radical kind.

I certainly do not mean here the kind of appropriation of Kant that is
common to political liberalism, human rights theory, or philosophers
such as Rawls.  Rather I mean something closer to what Lacan identified
in Kant; an uncompromising sense of duty as fidelity to the truth or the
Real.  A categorical imperative which remains empty to the extent that
it tells us something must be done, but does not prescribe 'how' in any
detail. As such, Kantian ethics becomes an Archimedean lever with whichto move the world.

At the heart of Kantian ethics is what Kant himself called the 'kingdom
of ends' and here too we must reinterpret this in a much more radical
way. Taken literally it means that there must be an end to domination of
every kind; whether this is racism, sexism, authoritarianism,
exploitation, chattel slavery, wage slavery, and any form of social
existence where one person must become subservient to another. In short,
Kant's imperative entails that we transform an existing set of
situations that are planetary in their scope to create a world in which
there are No Gods and No Masters. In short, it means we called upon to
make an autopoietic society.

I would like to propose this as one possible response to the current
situation. Certainly, under the circumstances we must back necessary
reforms, but we must also recognize such reforms are never enough.
Ultimately, we must take the radical stance of demanding ethi
cal
responsibility in the growing face of a pervasive immorality.

We must because we can.

Another world is possible.

There is always an alternative.

eric