From: "Eric" <ericandmary-AT-earthlink.net> Subject: RE: readings on the 11th september Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 21:34:28 -0600 Rod, Thanks for posting the Badiou text. Since 'Theory and Event' requires a subscription to view, would you tell me if this was the full text or just a partial quote? I have been thinking for some time now about the connection between Badiou and Lyotard. For Badiou, ethics is about applying a process of truth to radically transform a situation, irregardless of the cultural, political or social considerations. It is what allows ethics to be concerned with what Badiou calls the Immortal as opposed to the consideration of the Other in the context of human rights. Despite Lyotard's interest in Levinas, I am convinced that Lyotard's approach to ethics and politics is closer to Badiou than it is to Levinas. The crucial move away from Levinas I believe Lyotard makes is to consider the Other not merely as the human Face, but more ambiguously as the figural; one that can certainly be found in another, but can also be found in ourselves. The figural is that which resists discourse and representation; it is also the sublime event which does not present itself; again it is the enfans upon whose flesh the Law is inscribed but which remains always external to the Law. Lyotard is consistently opposed to a humanism which is founded on metanarratives, universals and grids of representation because inevitably these systems must end implicitly denying the figural. Paradoxically, for Lyotard, we can only become human to the extent we testify to this inhuman Other (the figural, the sublime, the enfans). We must listen to this voice that is not a voice, framed in the silent language of the Out-Law. This is where Lyotard links back to Badiou. What one calls truth, the other the other calls the sublime. Both share in common a witnessing to something that is external to the situation, that cannot be represented in the situation, and that is necessary to realize in order to transform the situation. In short, for both, ethics is founded as the radical response to an Event. I would argue further that there is something deontological about this approach insofar as it cannot be identified with utilitarianism, pragmatism or phenomenology. In short, both Badiou and Lyotard are both Kantian with regard to ethics, albeit that this is a Kantian ethics of a very radical kind. I certainly do not mean here the kind of appropriation of Kant that is common to political liberalism, human rights theory, or philosophers such as Rawls. Rather I mean something closer to what Lacan identified in Kant; an uncompromising sense of duty as fidelity to the truth or the Real. A categorical imperative which remains empty to the extent that it tells us something must be done, but does not prescribe 'how' in any detail. As such, Kantian ethics becomes an Archimedean lever with which to move the world. At the heart of Kantian ethics is what Kant himself called the 'kingdom of ends' and here too we must reinterpret this in a much more radical way. Taken literally it means that there must be an end to domination of every kind; whether this is racism, sexism, authoritarianism, exploitation, chattel slavery, wage slavery, and any form of social existence where one person must become subservient to another. In short, Kant's imperative entails that we transform an existing set of situations that are planetary in their scope to create a world in which there are No Gods and No Masters. In short, it means we called upon to make an autopoietic society. I would like to propose this as one possible response to the current situation. Certainly, under the circumstances we must back necessary reforms, but we must also recognize such reforms are never enough. Ultimately, we must take the radical stance of demanding ethical responsibility in the growing face of a pervasive immorality. We must because we can. Another world is possible. There is always an alternative. eric
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