Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2003 19:59:45 +0000 From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk> Subject: Re: Postmodern Religion Eric/all i thought afterwards that I should have prefaced the below or postscripted it with a quote from Lyotard's friend Deleuze "... In these conditions, as soon as there is this type of multiplicity, there is politics, micro-politics. As Felix says: before Being there is politics. ...." regards steve steve.devos wrote: > Eric/all > rough notes and naturally enough unproof read... > > You are mistaken to believe that I am having it 'both ways'. I reject > the use of religion and the religious imperative as a means of > understanding 1) the human condition, 2) the development of the > universe 3) as a means of justifying or explaining morality or ethics > 4) anything else. It is interesting as a field of mythology (as I > believe I have stated previously) but not as a useful reference point > to the human condition. I believe that Zizek and Badiou are both wrong > to attempt to utilise, in their specific case 'Christianity', however > I have not read the Zizek text (The Fragile Absolute) concerned and > need do so to clarify whether my rejection is well-founded and further > to understand whether it is interesting and perhaps as challenging as > Badiou and Zizek's utilisation of Lenin has been. To clarify then in > relation to your initial question - it has never been my belief that > you should necessarily accept the entirity of a writer's discourse. It > should be clear that in relation to Lyotard I believe that aspects of > his work are acceptable as broadly correct whereas others are not and > are unsound. The same is true (of course) with Zizek and Badiou, for > example, it is not clear to me that the previously mentioned work > related to Lenin is correct. Zizek's text 'On Belief' is as it says on > the cover, tracing 'the contours of the often unconscious beliefs that > structure our daily experience....' His use of Christianity in the > text then can be understood in terms of the mythology point made above. > > Whilst I would and do critique the 'identity politics' we have all > been involved in during the past few decades - it is worth noting that > one of the hard lessons that we learnt in the experiment and must not > lose is that 'everything is political'. As such whilst religion cannot > possibly engage with everything in the universe, politics and as a > result society must. I am not attempting to reduce everything down to > a single genre - though I suspect that Ranciere might be accused of > such an approach in his reworking of the 'philosophy of politics' - > rather that all aspects of human and non-human existence has a > political aspect and as a consequence 'politics' is not one but many > genres. > > Eric your last paragraph is the most difficult to answer/discuss - for > in your initial discourse you proposed that religion in it's ideal > form is concerned with 'morality and mysticism, goodness and > happiness' - I am not as such a theist - and profoundly disagree with > the idealist tendency to argue that aethism appeared as a position as > a result of the development of monotheistic religion, rather it > appeared as a rejection of the aceptance that 'transcendent beings' > (of any gender) exist and that all aspects of the universe, in other > words it is a non-vulgar materialism. > > It seems to me that I should engage in a counter-proposal of 'goodness > and happiness' and why they are problematic. To engage in these > questions it is worth noting that the concepts of ethics and morality > are problematic because there origins are in normative social mores, > in that they propose a 'harmonic relationship' between the public and > private customs of a given society in a given country and from this we > postulate moral and ethical good behavior. From this the correct moral > life of an individual was and is defined and understood. This, which > Hegel called "the substantial nature of the ethical", subsequently > produces the proposal that the norms of the good are directly anchored > and guaranteed in the life of an existing community but this can no > longer be assumed today (Adorno) The primary reason normally given for > this is that the community, usually understood through the state as a > representation of the community, has become so powerful in its > relations to the individual that the resultant procedures and > processes impose the relationships upon the individual through the > social circumstances. The secondary reason is that both morality and > ethics have become associated with a rather restricted and narrow > ascetic ideal which in some sense is derived from the decaying > mystical and religious understanding of the societies we inhabit. The > notion of ethics being dealt with here is not dissimilar to the > standard conception of ethics which references the ideal that persons > should live in accordance with their own nature, this is supposedly > contrary to the understanding of morality as something imposed from > outside. (Of course in reality the now fortunately ended ethical turn > of recent years was actually a merging of ethics and morality). > However to clarify the issues with the concept of ethics from a purely > ethical conception of the good life or good act is reduced to the idea > that one should act in accordance with ones nature, an ethic and so > on. (This is related to Kants understanding of personality, harmony > and identity) . However it is necessary to recognise that for Kant and > consequently for us, moral and ethical issues and problems have until > recently always been engaged with the question of the interrelations > between the empirical human being and the rational human being, the > latter is especially determined by his own reason of which freedom is > a determining characteristic. > > sorry for the roughness again... > > regards > steve > >
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005