From: "Eric" <ericandmary-AT-earthlink.net> Subject: RE: Fear. Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2003 20:23:22 -0600 All, Let me say first of all I thought Geof's position was rather eloquently stated. I want to chime in, however, in favor of Steve's comment that Levinas is reactionary. Perhaps, Geof is right about Levinas being hard to put into politics terms because his ethics is concerned with a mirco-level face-to-face basis regarding the other. I think it is still possible to raise the issue that Levinas does not really break with the moral tradition of the west, he simply finds new ways to defend it, and therefore the core of his ethics remains conservative and even reactionary. Certainly, at the heart of this western tradition there lies the notion of original sin - the self left to own device becomes evil. This self must always be subjugated through the law in order to be saved. When this is done, the worship of god and the respect for the neighbor are seen as the primary ends of ethics. Jewish tradition obeys the Torah; Christianity discards the rules of kosher and ritual purification, but still maintains the law of love. One of the ways this break is characterized (usually by Christians) is that the old law is based upon 'fear of the lord' where god is seen as a being who is wrathful and quick to anger. Nonetheless, this fear is useful insofar as it teaches humility, the repentance to sin in sack cloth and ashes. Christianity usually claims this fear must be overcome by love and posits a new, more intimate relationship with god - Jesus is my friend. This kind of tenderness seems to be related closely to the kind of positive fear that Geof was invoking. Levinas is interesting because he rewrites this tradition in a way that stands Christianity on its head and tends to validate the Jewish tradition from facile and empty criticisms. The problem with all this, however, is that this disowned self under both the Jewish and Christian traditions tends to be very negative. In the Lacan-Badiou sense it gives up on desire. The western tradition strongly advocates making the self at best, passive and at worst, masochistic. Feminists have usually critiqued this kind of ethics as follows. It tends to idealize service and for women, roles such as being a mother, teacher, nurse, nun, - the so-called caretaker and nurturing roles are valorized. Certainly these are concerned with the ethics of the other, but in a way that tends to limit the woman herself. If a woman chooses to become something else, such as an artist, writer, athlete these roles tend to be seen as somehow suspect and less than the ideal. Such a woman may be described by religious judgment as being selfish when she was really being ethical. Without going into the details, I think it is fairly obvious that Levinas never really breaks with any of this basic orientation in his ethics. He always tends to disavow the self (chez soi) versus the face of the other. In his system, alterity always trumps desire. In this sense, Badiou is more modern and more political in his approach. Instead of the traditional self-other axis, his is an immortal-animal axis which is guided by truth rather than god as the ultimate source of its ethics. This may be seen as contra-natural in the sense that ontology-sets-difference-being are in some sense natural. It is not, however, concerned with the care of self, but rather with the event of truth. Who we ultimately become stems from this break; this encounter. In this way, ethics are always political in their import. eric -----Original Message----- From: owner-lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu [mailto:owner-lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu] On Behalf Of Don Socha Sent: Monday, February 17, 2003 3:23 PM To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu Subject: Re: Fear. >G/all > >I had thought of the Levinas angle but discarded it, for myself at >least, because of my rejection of his ethics. Beyond the critique of >Levinas by Badiou, there is something deeply reactionary in statements >such as "...Ethics is, therefore, against nature because it forbids the >murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first..." > > >regards >steve I don't see what's necessarily reactionary about this position, Steve. Surely you don't mean to suggest that Levinas is anything like a biological determinist. Though I don't want to overlook the always difficult context of his work, isn't he simply saying that while nature is indifferent, people need not be fatalistic? I've yet to read Badiou (plan to begin this week), but doesn't Levinas mean something quite distinct when he says "against nature"? I do know he wasn't in favor of putting his own existence first... rather, his whole ouvre stands against precisely this. Or do you see ethics as something other than an artificial means by which better versions of ourselves might be explored? Don Socha
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