Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2003 21:20:38 +0000 From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk> Subject: Re: Fear. Don/All rough notes... Eric has already replied more or less as I would have and I have some sympathy with his mail - most specially raising the issue of Badiou's critique of Levinas. I was tempted at this point to raise again the Hegelian and Psychoanalytical refusal of Levinas - but since both perspectives are part of Badiou's critique it may be more pertinent to refer to a more vuilgar materialist refusal - hence what follows below which assumes a more materialist and utilitarian approach to morality and ethics.... The Levinas position being founded on transcendence - excludes the non-human from the ethical. Rather it maintains the idea that in some sense a human is more significant than a non-human, which is an absurd position that cannot be justified given our status as the biggest extinction event in 65 Million years. Consequently what cannot be addressed from inside his position is the most critical ethical issue of the day - which can be understood in terms of the detritous of the bad sort of humanism - namely that it references the philosophical idea that being human matters morally, as in the equivilant idea that belonging to a particular race matters morally. Anyone who thinks that race or species boundaries are morally significant is completely blind to what makes an individual human or non-human significant. It has recently been argued that the terms "Human Being" and "Person" should be seperated for whereas the former signifies a member of our species (which, lest we forget some Darwinians argue does not exist) whilst the latter refers to any being that posses "a conception of self as a subject of experiences and other mental states and believes that it is a continuing entity..." (Michael Tooley). (Now it so happens that most "Persons" I meet are Human Beings however George the cat is plainly a person and as such has as much right to be considered and treated ethically as any Human Being, more than some human beings I could name.) For Levinas the "face of the other" appears to me through the face of God (the other resembles God, and I see the face of the other thanks to my relationship with God). Respect for the other, an ethical relationship with him is possible thanks to the passage through the absolute Other: God... What Levinas does is place God between myself and the Other thereby making preventing dialogue - reducing discourse to something already said by the Other. Need I point out that since Hegel and Kant it has been accepted that ethics are founded on the social and political - not on the face of a dead and non-existent god... Anyone know which text of Irigaray's contians the critique of Levinas? Hegel hhhmmm later. regards steve Don Socha wrote: >>G/all >> >>I had thought of the Levinas angle but discarded it, for >> >> >myself at > > >>least, because of my rejection of his ethics. Beyond the >> >> >critique of > > >>Levinas by Badiou, there is something deeply reactionary in >> >> >statements > > >>such as "...Ethics is, therefore, against nature because it >> >> >forbids the > > >>murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence >> >> >first..." > > >>regards >>steve >> >> > >I don't see what's necessarily reactionary about this >position, Steve. Surely you don't mean to suggest that >Levinas is anything like a biological determinist. Though I >don't want to overlook the always difficult context of his >work, isn't he simply saying that while nature is >indifferent, people need not be fatalistic? > >I've yet to read Badiou (plan to begin this week), but >doesn't Levinas mean something quite distinct when he >says "against nature"? I do know he wasn't in favor of >putting his own existence first... rather, his whole ouvre >stands against precisely this. > >Or do you see ethics as something other than an artificial >means by which better versions of ourselves might be >explored? > >Don Socha > > >
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G/all I had thought of the Levinas angle but discarded it, formyself atleast, because of my rejection of his ethics. Beyond thecritique ofLevinas by Badiou, there is something deeply reactionary instatementssuch as "...Ethics is, therefore, against nature because itforbids themurderousness of my natural will to put my own existencefirst..."regards steveI don't see what's necessarily reactionary about this position, Steve. Surely you don't mean to suggest that Levinas is anything like a biological determinist. Though I don't want to overlook the always difficult context of his work, isn't he simply saying that while nature is indifferent, people need not be fatalistic? I've yet to read Badiou (plan to begin this week), but doesn't Levinas mean something quite distinct when he says "against nature"? I do know he wasn't in favor of putting his own existence first... rather, his whole ouvre stands against precisely this. Or do you see ethics as something other than an artificial means by which better versions of ourselves might be explored? Don Socha