Date: Sun, 06 Apr 2003 15:48:45 +0100
From: "steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk>
Subject: Re: silence, enfans, il y a, sublime




Geoff/Eric/Hugh

Is this then the consensus amoungst you - that ethics is concerned with 
either the "self and other", or beyond that the "others, other"  who may 
in turn become your own other ? The other in these cases always being a 
human  or some other rational, intelligent being? Is this the limit of 
the ground on which your understanding of postmodern ethics stands?

I was interested in the following statement from Eric:  "... Secularized 
along the lines of Freud and Lacan, and with a touch of Levinas and 
Lyotard thrown in, this seems to imply that the goal does not imply 
simply returning to the enfans in the form of the noble savage. Rather 
it implies integrating the enfans with the human in a way that doesn't 
merely buy into the whole myth of development. For the centaur, the 
animal and human are distinct, yet consubstantial...."

The mixing of psychoanalysis and philosophy, makes it worthwhile to 
seperate the above from analysis which I'm thinking of here as a 
clinical practice - it is not the case within the field of "returning to 
the enfans" this being to miss the point of the process and reverse the 
meaning and intent of psychoanalysis. Serge Leclaire  putting it most 
clearly that we must all as human beings repeatedly "kill the 
phantasmagtic image of ourselves instilled in us by our parents" - 
starting from this point psychoanalysis deals with and address "the 
child within"  - the object being that the child always remains within 
and addressable. It is with the work of Melenie Klein, whose work on the 
child at the extreme limit of the appearence of language, dared to place 
and project subjective experience  back into the earliest periods when 
observation enables the proving of the difference between the linguistic 
and pre-linguistic dimension, through the simple observations that a 
child who does not yet speak reacts differently to punishment and being 
brutilised. Consequently it is unimaginable that the enfans can be made 
equivilant to the sophisticated social construct of the "noble savage" - 
even at its most "lovable" enlightenment based definition it's a 
phantasy therefore of a deeply capitalist social-economy...

Thus I doubt the "ethical life" proposal that followed the quote from 
Eric - unless the enfans can be forcibly seperated from the 
psychoanalytical meanings of the child, which I doubt.

regards
steve



regards
steve

gvcarter-AT-purdue.edu wrote:

>>But that situation tells me nothing about the "other",  Of course we assume
>>"others" are similar to ourselves, but we never know their minds.
>>
>>In my understanding of the term, "ethics" is always about self and other.
>>How ethics was derived by Lyotard and/or other philosophers, from silences,
>>the enfans, the il y a, the sublime, .is a process I would like to
>>understand.
>>
>>regards,
>>Hugh
>>    
>>
> 
>Hugh,
>
>Does the term "ethics" expand any if, instead of regarding it as a relationship 
>between the self and other, one regards ethics as being primarily concerned 
>with the other's other?  As much as I am concerned for the welfare of my 
>neighbor (self and other), I am concerned for the third party, the excluded 
>middle, the subaltern that may not be present but is always set to arrive.  The 
>other's other--an other we might refer to through a capitialization of Other--
>is the coming Other.
>
>You ask about the "process" of the il y a, etc., and I wonder if that's the 
>axiomatic term or whether "prior-ness" is.  Process versus prior-ness.  
>Levinas's radical prior-ness is a "darkness older than the absence of light."  
>His is an ethics older than any politics, a relationship that is behind the 
>self, further, perhaps, than any beyond.  
>
>To your list of silence, enfans, il y a, and sublime, I might also add 
>Deleuze's body without organs.  Do you find that as perplexing as these other 
>terms I wonder?  If not, why not?  I'm trying to extend your initial question 
>in the asking.  (And here it is again put more specifically:  What is the 
>relationship between the notion of il y a and body without organs?)
>
>best,
>
>geof
>
>
>
>  
>

HTML VERSION:

But that situation tells me nothing about the "other",  Of course we assume
"others" are similar to ourselves, but we never know their minds.

In my understanding of the term, "ethics" is always about self and other.
How ethics was derived by Lyotard and/or other philosophers, from silences,
the enfans, the il y a, the sublime, .is a process I would like to
understand.

regards,
Hugh
    

 
Hugh,

Does the term "ethics" expand any if, instead of regarding it as a relationship 
between the self and other, one regards ethics as being primarily concerned 
with the other's other?  As much as I am concerned for the welfare of my 
neighbor (self and other), I am concerned for the third party, the excluded 
middle, the subaltern that may not be present but is always set to arrive.  The 
other's other--an other we might refer to through a capitialization of Other--
is the coming Other.

You ask about the "process" of the il y a, etc., and I wonder if that's the 
axiomatic term or whether "prior-ness" is.  Process versus prior-ness.  
Levinas's radical prior-ness is a "darkness older than the absence of light."  
His is an ethics older than any politics, a relationship that is behind the 
self, further, perhaps, than any beyond.  

To your list of silence, enfans, il y a, and sublime, I might also add 
Deleuze's body without organs.  Do you find that as perplexing as these other 
terms I wonder?  If not, why not?  I'm trying to extend your initial question 
in the asking.  (And here it is again put more specifically:  What is the 
relationship between the notion of il y a and body without organs?)

best,

geof