From: "Lois Shawver" <rathbone-AT-california.com>
Subject: RE: powerlessness
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2003 17:08:42 -0700


Judy, and like Hugh, I'm in complete agreement with your message on what
Wittgenstein meant by his aphorism on understanding a lion.  I liked your
explanation.  And, Steve, remember, I showed you that Wittgenstein talked of
reading the intentions of a house cat -- so it's not that it is totally
uninterpretable.  Wittgenstein has some interesting things to say on human
attempts to understand non-humans.  I can't imagine anyone thinking that I
can't understand my dog.  I often feel I understand him better than any
human.  But he does have an alien focus.  I hardly ever get down on the
floor to smell other dogs urine, and it is hard for me to fathom that
fascination.  I try to understand his amazing fascination with it as perhaps
a kind of reading of the dog's "message" - but, even so, it's a stretch for
me.  But I know very well when he wants a "cookie" or water in his bowl.  I
would say he even has a language.  He brings the bowl to me when it's empty.
I would count that as a kind of language, wouldn't you?  What about when he
shakes my hand when I extend mine?  Language?  Everyone?  I think it's
debatable, but I am on the side that it is language.  Still, the
appreciation of urine smells is beyond me at this point, and it comes so
easily for him.  I think the difference has something to do with our
physiologies, if not anatomies.

Do you feel more confident of your reading of non-humans than I do.

..Lois Shawver

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-lyotard-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU
[mailto:owner-lyotard-AT-lists.village.Virginia.EDU]On Behalf Of hbone
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2003 11:57 AM
To: lyotard-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: powerlessness



Judy/All,

I'm in substantial agreement with this message, and won't  make detailed
comments.  Generally, I think the only way we know the mind of another is
through their behavior, expecially words, but the same words can have
different meanings for two people, and different words can sometimes have
the same meanings.

We witness the same events, including words in books, and, on occasion, have
quite different understandings of their meanings because we have different
memories, experiences, life-histories which comprise the "software" that
enables one person to respond to an other.

As to quoting specific words or references to books by  respected authors,
1) the person addressed may not know that author, or 2) the addressor may be
subtituting quote or reference in place of a more personal and lucid
description of the idea/concept that is to be communicated.

regards,
Hugh

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~



> Lois, Steve,
> Lois said
>
>
> >The idea that different people are locked in private worlds of
understanding
> >and can't, by the nature of things, have their intentions read is, to my
way
> >of thinking, a mistaken view.  There is a quote from Wittgenstein on this
> >very matter that I like:
> >
> >647 What is the natural expression
> >of an intention?-Look at a cat when
> >it stalks a bird; or a beast when it
> >wants to escape.
> >
> >We read the intention of the cat.  The "intention" is not a private
thing.
> >That is, whatever is in the cat's mind, the word "intention" doesn't
refer
> >to a phenomenological consciousness in the privacy of the cat's mind.
The
> >intention is the goal directedness that animates the action.  That is how
> >the word "intention" is used in our language game of intention.
>
>
> This is one of Wittgenstein's 'behaviorist' passages, that is, he's
> making a common sense comment that what is called 'knowing an
> intention of another' involves drawing conclusions from their
> behavior, not from peering into their minds--and for that matter,
> what we call 'mind' is not something we logically know is objectively
> inside the head, but is a reference to various kinds of behavior.  I
> think he's saying something other than saying that we simply read
> intentions, as if the intentions are in the objective nature of
> things, but that in reading anything, the reader is involved in
> construction of meaning.  Not simply that 'the intention is the
> directedness that animates the action' but that 'intention' is what
> some agree to call "the directedness that animates the action," that
> is, "intention" is not a sign that points to 'directedness animating
> action', but rather is part of a system of grammatical rules that
> construct a reality.  As you put it, this is how a word is used in a
> language game.
>
> To say that the intention "is" the 'goal directedness that animates
> the action" is not an empirical statement but a grammatical one, as
> your phrase about use within a language game brings out.  In other
> words, this is why Wittgenstein's 'behaviorist' comments are not
> behaviorist in a positivist sense.
>
>
> >
> >But in humans things are much more complicated.  Intentions emerge in
> >conversation, are discerned through complicated analysis of context, and
are
> >generally debatable.  And once the author is dead there is the practical
> >question of when the analysis of intention is the most productive use of
the
> >text.  The other day, I was stating a spontaneous judgment on that
matter.
> >As an alternative one can learn to use the author's text to nourish one's
> >own creative voice, and to educate one's understanding so as to speak
from
> >one's understanding apart from other people's intended meanings.
> >
>
>
> I dont' see two different things here.  I don't think the situation
> is really more complicated with humans.  An intellectual conversation
> carried on between scholars, employing "complex" language has all the
> behavioral earmarks of any other species social behavior, stalking,
> bonding, threatening, aggression, submission, affection, evading,
> playing, etc etc, it's all there.  The overcomplicating or
> complexifying itself, expresses social behavior typical of other
> species as well.
>
> I don't see how someone being dead changes anything with respect to
> constructing their meaning when invoking their name.  I like your
> phrase, "the most productive use of the text," this draws attention
> to the way in which what one person says can be used by another in
> various ways.  This need not mean that the one one who's words or
> distinctive ideas are cited did not have something particular that
> they wanted to say, which was important to them, which may be at odds
> with how another person uses or interprets what they said.
>
> If a person uses the name and words of another to make a point, don't
> they bring into the exchange, the importance of what that person
> meant?  Otherwise, leave the person's name out of it.  Why invoke
> their name if not wanting to use their authority or prestige, as you
> said in your other post, to support what you want to say, to make
> what you say important or appealing, or for whatever reason one might
> have for using someone else's name and specific things they've said.
> What that person meant is raised as an issue when they are brought
> into it, isn't it?   Even if you say, "I'm using what this author
> said to educate and nourish my own ideas/voice", your language
> implies that that author had a meaning, a meaning which you may be
> acknowledging is different from yours, just an inspiration which may
> have nothing to do with what you want to say, yet in invoking the
> person's name, you introduce the issue of their meaning so that it
> then becomes legitimate or unsurprising if that person themself, or
> others who have studied them, may want to comment critically about
> the way the words have been used by you.  To invoke the name of a
> person who has inspired various people you may be addressing is to
> invite interest in what that person meant, at least to the extent
> that your contextualizing of the words of the author violates
> grammatical rules constructing another's understanding or way of
> speaking.
>
> Judy
>