Date: Mon, 10 Nov 2003 21:47:08 +0000 From: "steve.devos" <steve.devos-AT-krokodile.co.uk> Subject: Re: Todorov and humanism Eric/all I'd like to open out the notion of 'freedom' as described in the below. Your focus on 'freedom' feels constrained because it seems to avoid the humanist use of the word 'autonomy' which is used "...to designate one's choice to feel, to reason, and to will for oneself....This is derived from Kant for whom autonomy consists not only of governing oneself but also of obeying only the law that we have ourselves prescribed..." (Todorov)This humanist assumption seems to contradict the representation of the tradition as a normative one. Rather what is presented is a structural tension between the desire of the master to dominate and the slave to refuse. I deliberately choose the master/slave dialectic because it seems to me that it opens out the contradiction of the anti-hegalian attempts to produce a positive freedom - whereas the reality is that one thing that the humanist's certainly have got right is that freedom is always negative. Autonomy implies action but which in some sense finds it's source in the subject itself. - The roots of this are well described in Negri and Hardt's description of 'Renassiance Humanism' the core of which negri describes as "...at the birth of European modernity humanity discovered its power in the world and integrated this dignity into a new consciousness of reason and potentiality..." I mention this to bring into play the notion that the soul and the sacred have nothing to do with freedom and autonomy as the liberal humanist (todorov) or the more materialist line understands it. It is not clear to me that Deleuze, Lyotard or Badiou have really gainsed that much by avoiding the human or non-human subject.... (Of course 'freedom' is not actually a purely human condition - only a humanist would suggest this... ) Can we also clarify that by rejecting anon's determinism - we are accepting that wide-range-determinism is acceptable and correct. Perhaps the question that a person in favor of development at all costs - could raise is the philosophical challenge raised by the necessity to redefine the notion of human freedom in the developing context of the increasing knowledge of genetics. To what extent can we be thought of as free when what constiutes our wide-range-determined selves is precisely made into a narrow-determinsm. What then of autonomy etc ? How to redefine freedom and autonomy when the human is restuctured into something genetically non-human. Hence the necessity for the 'subject' perhaps ? regards steve
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