Date: Sat, 14 Mar 1998 08:27:07 +0200 (SAT) From: Peter van Heusden <pvh-AT-leftside.wcape.school.za> Subject: M-FEM: Marx and women's liberation (fwd) This posting is from the CSF discussion of the Communist Manifesto, and in my mind provides a very solid basis for Marxist-Feminist theory. I note that Franklin Dmitryev seems to draw a lot from Raya Dunayevskaya - and I also note that Dunayevskaya's critique of Origin seems to parallel (insofar as it is quoted below) Lise Vogel's critique in _Woman Questions_ chapter 5. Has anyone read both authors? I've never seen Dunayeskaya's book, and my knowledge of Vogel is very recent. A comparison would be interesting. Also, I find the critique of Origin interesting for another reason - reading Vogel: "Origin is throughout by Engels' failure to base the discussion on an adaquate exposition of Marx's theory of social development" (basically Vogel thinks Engels - who was probably hurrying to respond to Bebel's _Woman in the Past, Present and Future_ - does not throw out enough of Morgan's crude materialism). Again Dmitryev puts drives a wedge between Engels and Marx (Engels' Origin, Marx's Notebooks) - and finally, Gramsci also undertook at one stage to drive a wedge between Marx and Engels, using the Theses on Feuerbach as a base, as I recall. In all three cases, an attack on the economic determinism of 'mainstream' Marxism seems to have fueled the theoretical development. All of the above is broad speculation - what do others think of the question of the distinctions drawn between Marx and Engels, and their possible relevance for Marxism-Feminism? Peter -- Peter van Heusden | Computers Networks Reds Greens Justice Peace Beer Africa pvh-AT-leftside.wcape.school.za | Support the SAMWU 50 litres campaign! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 12 Mar 1998 21:27:38 -0800 (PST) From: Terry Moon and Franklin Dmitryev <tmoon-AT-igc.apc.org> Reply-To: PSN-Seminars-AT-csf.colorado.edu To: Manifesto Seminar <PSN-Seminars-AT-csf.colorado.edu> Subject: Marx and women's liberation It seems to me that certain aspects of the discussion of reproduction are problematic. Methodologically, there seems to be a synthetic construction at work in some of the contributions. Given the claim of women's "non-inclusion in Marx's theory as women," a synthetic approach would be to juxtapose some foundational concept (the one proposed is "reproduction") to what is held to be the sole foundational concept for Marx, production. This, however, leaves intact the reduction that has been perpetrated on Marx by post-Marx Marxists, and simply adds on to it a parallel though not identical reduction of women's liberation. Reproduction is far from adequate as a theoretical basis for comprehending women's movements. Theories spun on this basis tend to reduce women's oppression to one aspect alone, and exclude or make invisible women who do not engage in reproduction. It also reproduces the concentration on roots of oppression, rather than on dialectics of liberation (just as the Manifesto criticized the utopians for seeing the working class only as suffering and not as subjects of revolution). And perhaps that is one of the problems of Engels's Origin of the Family. It is striking how frequently this work has been referred to in the discussion, while only Kevin Anderson has mentioned Marx's Ethnological Notebooks, which are very different from Origin of the Family. But to see that in the proper light, I propose a second look at the assumption that women "as women" were not included in Marx's theory. To begin with, in the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, Marx makes a major point of the relationship between the sexes: "The infinite degradation in which man exists for himself is expressed in this relation to the woman," etc. This becomes the measure of to what extent human beings have become human. Not only is it a measure, it is an indication of the depth and totality of social uprooting needed. Marx here is clearly distinguishing his view from what he calls "vulgar communism," whose failure to penetrate from questions of things (abolition of property, "community of goods") to the actual human relationships (seen in alienated labor and in the relationships of men to women) is reflected in the idea of "community of women," which Marx rejects as relegating women to the status of things. In my paper submitted earlier, I argued that this critique of vulgar communism is carried into the Manifesto, with its call for "abolition of the family," which I argued was quite different from Engels's position in "Principles of Communism." (In light of the call for abolition of the family, I am at a loss to understand Charles Brown's statement: "But they mention in the Manifesto no family equivalent in reproduction to the formula 'abolition of private property' in production.") Rob Beamish, in his paper, took up this question from a somewhat different point of view, arguing that Marx and Engels were fighting Hess's more Fourierist position on women and the family. In the 1850s, it is noteworthy that Marx's 1850 review (perhaps written with Engels?) in the NRZ-Revue of Daumer's book criticized it as follows: "It is the same with the cult of the female as with the cult of nature. Herr Daumer naturally does not say a word about the present social position of women; on the contrary it is a question only of the female as such. He tries to console women for their civic destitution by making them the object of a rhetorical cult which is as empty as it would fain be mysterious." In 1853-54 Marx wrote a great deal about the weavers' strike in Preston, England, taking up "both the special exploitation women were subjected to and the fact that even these monstrous conditions did not limit women to fighting those exploitative conditions of labor but challenged the educational system," Raya Dunayevskaya points out in her book Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution. To single out just one more event from the 1850s, Marx defended Lady Bulwer-Lytton, whose husband and son had her thrown into a lunatic asylum when she tried to rent a lecture hall to make public her views that differed from those of her politician husband. No doubt it will be argued that Marx took these positions despite the alleged inadequacy of his theory. And I echo Beamish in opposing a view of the Communist Manifesto as a "canon of eternal truths." However, in the spirit of Martha Gimenez, I do believe that a serious discussion of the question of adequacy of the theory requires a much more critical view of the assumptions about Marx underlying the claims of theoretical inadequacy, which tend to rely on isolating certain portions of Marx's writings and abstracting them from his practice and from other portions of his writings. In an extreme case, certain portions of one book, *Capital*, are isolated and other portions are judged to be inconsistent with the theory, whose nature has been determined precisely by abstracting it from that which is assumed to be inconsistent. Specifically, I am referring to the discussion of women, children, and the family in the chapter on "The Working Day." There Marx gives great detail on the terrible conditions faced by women factory workers. Yet he also refers to the need to transcend the current form of the family. I quote Dunayevskaya's remarkable analysis: "Marx didn't separate his 'economics' in Capital from its social and political ramifications, and thus he saw one and only 'one positive feature'--allowing women to go 'outside of the domestic sphere.' However, he warned at once against factory labor 'in its brutal capitalistic form' which is nothing other than a 'pestiferous source of corruption and slavery.' But the collective labor of men and women, under different historic conditions, 'creates a new economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relation between the sexes.' Marx continued: 'It is, of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern forms....' Marx ends by pointing to the fact that other historic conditions where both sexes work collectively could 'become a source of human development.' That, of course, is not what capitalism aims at, and therefore Marx intensifies his attack...." On the basis of this reading of Marx, which refuses to exclude the "inclusion of women as women" from the theory, Dunayevskaya concludes that there is a "wide gulf" between the Ethnological Notebooks and the Origin. If Marx called for the abolition of the family in the 1840s and projected "a higher form of the family" in the 1860s, in the 1880s he wrote: "The modern family contains in embryo not only slavery but serfdom also, since from the very beginning it is connected to agricultural service. It contains within itself, in miniature, all the antagonisms which later develop on a wide scale within society and its state." In the Ethnological Notebooks Marx "showed that the elements of oppression in general, and of woman in particular, arose from within primitive communism, and not only related to change from 'matriarchy,' but beginning with the establishment of 'ranks'--relationship of chief to mass--and the economic interests that accompanied it....Marx was not hurrying to make easy generalizations, such as Engels's characterization of the future as being just a 'higher stage' of primitive communism. No, Marx envisioned a totally new man, a totally new woman, a totally new life form (and by no means only for marriage)--in a word, a totally new society. That is why it is so relevant to today's Women's Liberation Movement and why we still have so much to learn from Marx's concept of Man/Woman, not only in the abstract 1844 articulation, but in the empiric 1880 formulation when it was integrated with the need for total uprooting of capitalism and creation of a classless society" (Dunayevskaya). Perhaps, then, the discussion of women's liberation can take on the spirit of Kevin Anderson's discussion of Eurocentrism: not fearing to bring a critical view to the Manifesto and other writings, yet at the same time keeping in view that Marx's thought was not static but was developing; and, as Rob Beamish stressed, it did not develop in a vacuum but in a historical, organizational, philosophic, political, polemical context. Franklin Dmitryev
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