Date: Wed, 4 Dec 96 00:42:00 UT
From: "Ang " <uls-AT-msn.com>
Subject: M-G: Part 2 of 4 - on Rwanda/Zaire, etc


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>From 1989 onward America supported joint RPF-Ugandan attacks upon Rwanda.
Telegrams to the state department cited foreign military observers
documenting Ugandan support for RPF attacks. There were at least 56
'situation reports' in State Department files in 1991. Between 1989 and
1992 the USA favoured Uganda, donating some $183m in aid. double the amount
given to Rwanda. As American and British relations with Uganda and the RPF
strengthened. so hostilities between Uganda and Rwanda escalated. Between
1990 and 1993, Uganda blocked supplies to Rwanda from Kenya (see H.
Marwitz, 'Another side of Rwanda's bloodbath', Washington Times, 11 August
1994).

By August 1990 the RPF had begun preparing an invasion with the full
knowledge and approval of British intelligence. Rwigema toured the
Banyarwanda exile communities in Europe and North America. Sections of the
Kigali elite recognised that the squeeze on Habyarimana to share power with
the RPF was a prelude to war, and were keen to switch allegiances in
anticipation of the government being toppled. On 25 August Vincent
Kajeguhakwa, a Tutsi businessman and former partner of Habyarimana, and
Pasteur Bizimungu, a relative of Habyarimana -- and head of a state
company. fled to Kampala, urging invasion.

On 26 September 1990, while Habyarimana and president Yoweri Museveni of
Uganda were attending the World Summit on Children in America, Rwandan NRA
officers and ordinary soldiers began leaving their posts. A large troop
movement towards the Rwandan border raised no alarm. The soldiers openly
bade farewell to their families and friends. They travelled with their
weapons for two days and assembled in Kabale soccer stadium, just north of
the Rwandan border, about 200 miles from Kampala. Their weaponry included
land mines, rocket-propelled grenades, 60 millimetre mortars, recoilless
canons and Katyusha rocket-launchers. According to Western diplomats,
international military observers, Ugandan army officers and other
eye-witnesses who saw soldiers unloading crates of Kalashnikovs, Uganda
willingly provided arms, food, fuel, batteries and ammunition to the RPF
throughout the war (see Nation, 2 May 1994, E-mail nation-info-AT-igc.apc
org).

The invasion began on 1 October 1990. Ondoga ori Amaza, NRA director of
publications, gave the official line that the RPF was made up of deserters
>from the Ugandan army, and that Museveni learned of their desertion while
in America. This position was also adopted by Oxfam (see G. Vassall-Adams,
Rwanda: An Agenda for International Action, Oxfam, 1994, p. 21). However,
other Ugandans, notably ax-president Godfrey Binaisa, poured scorn upon
this version of events:

'We are further told by the Ugandan government that these returnees had
already deserted from the Ugandan army. How many deserters were ever
captured? What was the result of the trials? Did the Tutsi commissioned
officers in the Ugandan army ever take the oath of allegiance to Uganda
when they were appointed? Why is it that the present rebel commander
Major-General Paul Kagame formerly chief of army intelligence in the
Ugandan army keeps on moving in and out of Uganda without fear of arrest?
Only one conclusion remains to be drawn, that the present conflict was
started by Uganda, and it would be a fiction to call it a civil war. For
instance, the American Civil War did not start in Canada or Mexico but
right here in the United States' (0pen letter to the youth of Uganda, 8
June 1994).

Another source states that the RPF was established as a result of an NRA
demobilisation exercise, for which Uganda received foreign funding. 'They
demobilised by crossing the border in completely equipped units, taking
their insignia off their shoulders as they crossed.' (Interview with
British East Africa expert from Institute of Development Studies, Sussex;
quoted in 'RPF is the Ugandan army, says expert', Economist Intelligence
Review 19 August 1994)

The RPF's initial gains were reversed by the end of the month once the
government forces were strengthened with Zairean and Belgian troops, and
1000 French paratroopers (in accordance with the defence pact signed
between Habyarimana and the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing in
1975). A ceasefire was agreed on 27 October. At this point Belgium
terminated its support for Habyarimana and shifted allegiance towards the
RPF, allowing it to set up office in Brussels. This left France as
Habyarimana's sole Western supporter

The ceasefire proved to be short-lived and a prolonged war ensued. Its
protracted character arose primarily from the fact that both sides received
substantial Western assistance. After the 1990 invasion, the French
reorganised the Rwandan armed forces. Under Lieutenant Colonel Chollet, the
forces were expanded from 5000 to 30 000. Falcum 50 planes and pilots were
supplied (see L Martens, 'Genocide in Rwanda', in N. Abdullai (ed.)
Genocide in Rwanda,) France supplied, or kept operational, most heavy guns,
assault vehicles, helicopters, Milan and Apila missiles They also gave
Habyarimana his ill-fated Mystere-Falcon jet (New African. June 1994).

In contrast to the French, the American and British roles were indirect.
Although both have trained RPF soldiers. their support has been mediated
through Uganda. The RPF was overhauled under the new leadership of Paul
Kagame. coming fresh from America. Hostilities were renewed using guerrilla
tactics. Western supplies came through Uganda, delivered mainly through the
army. By the time of the June 1992 ceasefire, the RPA controlled the whole
of the border region with Uganda. International Red Cross personnel have
alleged that Ugandan NRA trucks disguised with Red Cross insignia entered
Rwanda with arms.

On 29 April 1991, three NRA officers publicly declared in an open
memorandum addressed to Museveni that they had formed an underground
movement to overthrow his government in Uganda. This factional conflict
shed new light on Uganda's intervention in Rwanda. Among their grievances
against the Museveni regime, the three NRA officers cited 'sinister secret
plans for Rwanda operations'. According to them, Museveni had concluded a
top secret meeting at Entebbe State House on 15 April 1991, in which plans
were approved for clandestine action designed to provoke Rwanda's
neighbours into taking action against the Rwandan government. Two crash
course training camps, under the authority of Museveni's brother, Salim
Saleh, would prepare 600 elite troops to disguise themselves as Rwandan
soldiers, and terrorise Tanzanian and Zairean villagers along the borders
with Rwanda during the last week of May. ('An open letter from Ugandan NRA
officers and men', Kampala, 29 April 1991)

(This tactic has a precedent in the repertoire of Uganda's military
politics. NRA guerrillas waging war against the Ugandan state were accused
of adopting it in the Lowero triangle during the early stage of their war
against Milton Obote's regime, implicating Obote in atrocities.)

Faced with mounting odds, Habyarimana continued to make concessions. In
April 1992. the ruling party. the Mouvement Republicain National pour la
Democratie et le Development (MRNDD), agreed to form a coalition government
with four other parties for a year, until elections were held. In January
1993 another power-sharing agreement was made. Yet, at the same time, the
RPF continued its offensive, interspersed with ceasefires. Uganda gave
solid support for an RPF takeover. The Ugandan army sent troops in twice in
July 1993 to fight alongside the RPF. Tanzanian authorities tape-recorded
president Museveni as he was commanding the RPF soldiers not to sign a
peace agreement with the Rwanda government. Rather, he said, the RPF should
return to the battlefield and resume fighting immediately. In his own
words, Museveni said: 'Don't sign the peace agreement. I want you back at
Milindi immediately' (The Shariat, 6-12 September 1994 quoting Tanzanian
newspaper The Mirror, May 1994, and the Ugandan Monitor).

By 1993 Rwanda was polarised by the war and by the impact of 'structural
adjustment' austerity. The advancing RPF, the weakening Kigali government
and rising economic tensions (defence was the only ministry to be spared
massive lay offs). demarcated the battle lines. Sections of the MRNDD
organised the militias to break with the negotiation process and prepare
for the showdown. The RPF's territorial gains gathered pace, generating
wave upon wave of refugees. Both sides were terrorising civilians and
committing atrocities. In March an international commission of enquiry
found both sides responsible for abuses including rape, summary executions,
abductions of civilians and looting (Federation Internationale des Droits
de l'Homme, 'Commission Internationale d'Enquete sur les Violations des
Droits de l'Homme Commises au Rwanda depuis le 1 Octobre 1990').

The RPF failed to win support among people living in the areas it captured.
Its relationship with these people was well described by Ludo Martens
leader of the Belgian Labour party: 'The RPF is conducting a war for the
people and not a people's war.' But, as revealed in a comment by one of the
RPF's own commanders at the time, 'the people' were not convinced of this
role as liberator: 'Here, once members of the population sight you they
just give the alarm and welcomed you with a machete in their hands. (New
African, September 1994) Although the RPF grew in size as the war
progressed, it did so in large part with Rwandan Tutsi refugees from
Burundi. Its advance across the country generated no social base for itself
among local inhabitants. It placed severe restrictions on the populations
under its control, and made no attempt to establish civilian
administration. Most of its captured regions became depopulated
spontaneously. Evidently, most Rwandans chose to leave these areas and risk
the actions of the militias. rather than accept RPF authority.

A major RPF offensive was launched in February 1993. Again, thanks to
French assistance in the form of 680 troops. Habyarimana's regime survived.
But his bargaining power was exhausted. In August 1993, the Rwandan
government capitulated, signing the Arusha Accords. Under the accords it
was agreed to create a transitional government of 22 ministers, five of
whom were to be RPF supporters; to set up a commission to oversee the
return of the refugees and to ensure their security; to establish new armed
forces, with the RPF contributing 40 per cent of new troops and 50 per cent
of the high command: and to organise legislative and parliamentary
elections in 1995. How two armies engaged in three years of warfare could
be fused and placed under joint command was not detailed. It is doubtful
that it was intended to happen. The Arusha Accords were the cumulative
impact of a three-year Western assault which broke the back of the
Habyarimana government. The RPF was let in for the kill.

Under the agreement that pretended to resolve the conflict, the
polarisation of Rwanda was complete. On the one side was the beleaguered
Rwandan government, its National Guard (boosted with weapons worth $5.9m
>from South Africa and $5m from Egypt), the militias (including the infamous
Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi), and France. On the other side was the RPF,
Uganda, Britain, the USA, Belgium, the United Nations, the IMF, World Bank
and most of the Western media.

The government distributed Kalashnikovs among municipal authorities. These
authorities then joined forces with the militias to attack civilians
suspected of being RPF supporters. Killings and mass arrests followed. For
its part, the RPF executed suspected government collaborators, displaced
thousands from their villages, and press-ganged people into becoming
porters and labourers (Nation, 2 May 1994).

The abrogation of the Arusha Accords was hardly surprising -- the Rwandan
government had not prepared for suicide. By February, only one of the
institutions agreed to in the Accords, the presidency, was in place. The
United Nations and Western governments began to wield the big stick again.
The French forces departed Rwanda in December -- signalling the
government's complete isolation. A 1000-strong United Nations force
entitled Unamir arrived in the same month. Unamir had 370 Belgians as its
major contingent. To underline Belgium's switch of allegiances for
Habyarimana's benefit, the Belgian contingent escorted an RPF battalion
into premises given by the UN in Kigali. This battalion was to be used
ostensibly to protect RPF parliamentarians. In practice, the UN was handing
Rwanda over to the RPF on a plate. Then came one last squeeze: Habyarimana
was threatened with a Unamir pull-out and a final RPF offensive if he did
not comply immediately with all the accords.

On 3 April the ambassadors of France. Belgium and Germany met Habyarimana.
The German ambassador expressed satisfaction with the result: 'We can no
longer talk of stumbling blocks. I think everything is on the right path. I
personally expect the establishment of institutions in the course of this
week.' (BBC summary of world broadcasts AL/1963 A/2, 5 April 1994. quoted
in African Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. p. 87). Two days
later the UN Security Council voted to extend the Unamir mandate. The next
day Habyarimana was assassinated, his plane shot down as it approached
Kigali airport. The most bloody chapter of the war had begun.

The International Tribunal for Rwanda: a Western showtrial 

According to John Shattuck, the American Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 'the establishment of criminal
responsibility for genocide is crucial if we are to differentiate victims
>from aggressors, foster social reconciliation and overcome the cynical
argument that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved' (Testimony before the
House of Representatives subcommittee on Africa, 22 February 1995)

In fact. the effect of the Tribunal, from the first, has been to accelerate
developments in the opposite direction, with the emergence of revenge
killings, the criminalisation of the refugee population, and the
reconstitution outside Rwanda of the former government. The distinction
between victims and aggressors has become useless. Instead of
reconciliation, Rwanda is polarised to an unprecedented degree. In place of
social reconciliation and the establishment of the base for a unified
national identity, the differences between Hutu and Tutsi have been made
stronger and more sharply delineated than ever.

The United Nations holds to its own dogmatic interpretation of the bloody
strife unleashed in Rwanda in 1994. According to the United Nations
Commission of Experts report, extremist militias from the majority Hutu
tribe attempted in a three-month campaign to exterminate the Tutsi minority
before they were defeated by a Tutsi-led guerrilla force (see J. Preston,
Washington Post, 11 November 1994). Why the militias suddenly decided to do
this, and how the Tutsi-led guerrilla force arose, are not explained. In
the United Nations' official interpretation, the context of the war -- a
struggle for state power between opposing political forces -- is ignored
altogether. Instead of trying to understand what happened, the United
Nations has adopted the sanctimonious and inflammatory terminology of
'extremism' and 'genocide', in order to forestall any real investigation of
the conflict with swift punishment. Mandating the Tribunal to prosecute the
alleged orchestrators of the genocide. the United Nations Security Council
is conducting a show trial in order to serve interests which are far
removed from those of the people of Rwanda.

Parts 3 & 4 of this article follow in separate posts







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