Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 00:55:47 +0000
Subject: M-G: Ultra-imperialism


Ultra-imperialism revisited



The debates over imperialism began in bourgeois economic science in the
decades of 1880-90. It was already in the beginnings of the XXth century
that the fundamental works of J.A. Hobson, and two austro-marxists, Otto
Bauer and Rudolf Hilferding, appeared. As is known, however, it was Rosa
Luxemburg, Lenin and Bukharin who definitely rescued this fundamental
topic to revolutionary theory.

They were living the embers of the Anglo-Boer War, the Spanish-American
War, the Russo-Japanese war after that, not to mention the threats which
weighed on the heart of Europe by virtue of the great power colonial
rivalries. Some good social-reformist souls at that time proposed a
peaceful and humanitarian capitalism, which would voluntarily renounce
the lust for gunpowder, for overseas conquest, and for inter-imperialist
confrontation.
It was in this atmosphere that the theory of Kautsky grew (taking up
again the previous essential theses of Bernstein), the theory of the
arrival of ultra-imperialism. It dealt with the more or less apologetic
prediction of the formation of a type of voluntary and cooperative
association of the imperialist nations, which would peacefully regulate
their conflits of interest, limiting the cycle of the world economic
process. Lenin attacked violently yet this kautskyite thesis, wich he
clearly perceived as politically ill-omened, recognizing however that,
in pure theory, it was perfectely conceivable: "There is no doubt that
the trend of development is toward a single world trust absorbing all
enterprises without exception. But this development proceeds in such
circumstances, at such a pace, through such contradictions, conflits and
upheavels - not only economic but political, national, etc. - that
inevitably imperialism will burst and capitalism will be transformed in
its opposite long before one world trust materializes, before the
'ultra-imperialist', world wide amalgamation of national finance
capitals takes place." (1)

Eighty years and several world wars (hot and cold) later, capitalism is
still there allright, although its appearance as changed quite a bit.
What has became then of ultra-imperialism? At first glance, this must be
its golden age. We have the G7, with its twice-a-year summits, trying to
regulate and harmonize a universal economic cycle. There is the small
club of the permanent members of the U.N.'s Security Council, the
European Union, NATO, World Trade Organization, IMF and World Bank. The
european powers are themselves more or less formaly embarked in a
process of political confederation. Will harmony finally reign among the
national families of big capital? There is no lack of those who assert
that the capitalists have made the slogan of the Communist Manifesto
their own, having no country anymore.
Curiously, Samir Amin, in one of his latest works (=91Empire of Chaos=92,
Monthly Review Press) following Michel Beaud (=91L=92=C9conomie mondiale dans
les années 80=92, La Découverte, 1989) gives some credit to this thesis,
speaking of an =93internationalization=94 of capital  which still awaits for
(and is being heatedly debated in the absence of) its translation into a
unified political superstructure of the U.S.-Europe-Japan triangle. In
my view, there is an error here. In favour of this thesis is cited an
increase (more than proportional to economic growth) of three factors:
commerce, investments and technological agreements between the three
corners of the triad. A =93multinational technocracy=94 would thus be in
formation: agreements between Toshiba / IBM / Hitachi / Texas
Instruments or Hewlett Packard / AT&T / Motorola / Sony / Philips, etc.,
etc.. But huge trusts and international consortiums were already a
reality on the eve of the Great War of 14-18... There is nothing
extraordinary in certain firms (alerted by their espionage) entering
into technological agreements with others in order to pursue common
projects, naturally with mutual assured advantages. Enemies as
intransigent as General Motors and Honda do so regularly. In certain
high-tech industries this is absolutely indispensable for the setting of
world standards. Very often, these agreements are for the retardment of
the commercialization of already long proved technological inovations.
There can be no doubt that capital, in search for another 5%, would stab
mother and father and extend is hand to Beelzebub in the seventh circle
of hell. The question is this: where is the center of gravity of world
accumulation? In a supposed transnational cabal of capitalist interests
which mocks governments as useless archaeological objects? Or in huge
monopoly groups intimately connected to the most powerful national
states, with which they plot their world competitive strategy and under
whose political, diplomatic and military protection they shelter
themselves in case of necessity? All available evidence poits to this
second scenario (2).
There can never be enough vigilance against certain noisy novelties
periodically trumpeted by bourgeois ideologies. Big =93multinational=94
capital (regardless of all the interpenetrations and crisscrossed stock
ownerships) knows well whom to turn to when it sees a threat to its rate
of profit. Somehow uprooted itself, there is perhaps only a part of the
big british capital (Shell, BP, Unilever, the banks and insurances from
the City, all remains of imperial spoils) that, almost totally separated
>from the british internal market, seeks traditionaly the political and
military protection of the Yankee. That=92s certainly not one of the minor
reasons for the british government=92s resistance to european integration
and its staunch atlantic loyalty.

But lets go back in time a little bit. In spite of the current
realigments (not yet definitely stabilized) provoked by the fall of the
soviet house, the structure of contemporary imperialism is still largely
based in the pax americana which was erected at the end of the Second
World War (the imperialist eras are punctuated by wars). It was the
collapse of the European empires and colonial reserves and of their
monopoly regime; it was the huge expansion of the multinational
corporations of north american capital; it was the dollar as the reserve
of internationally recognized value; the american fleet and american
military bases strategically positioned all over the world. A destroyed
Europe and Japan appeared easy prey for for the energetic yankee
capitalism, which allowed itself the aparent altruism of financing their
reconstruction, trying naturally to impose on them a subordinate status
in world capitalist accumulation.
This strategy resulted in plentiful returns for some time, until, at the
turn of the decade of the 60=92s to the 70=92s, it clearly began to be put
in jeopardy. The large european and japanese capitalists (benefiting
>from the expansionist character of a heavily militarized economy without
having to pay its bills) joined the game. They obtained rates of labor
productivity equivalent to the north american rate or even better. They
took control of strategic and high-tech sectors, creating great
transnational networks of their own. The commercial balance of trade of
the USA went into deficit. The cycle of financing the empire by simply
printing and circulating federal money ended, the external cash
indebtness began ($3.1 trillion in January 1992). While the industrial
fabric and the social apparatus grew old and torn, a consuming,
unbridled schizophrenia continued feeding the hole in the commercial
balance. The global superpower is not ashamed to compete directly with
the less developed countries in search of financing, grabbing up the
disposable capital on the international markets without cerimony,
contributing decisively to maintaining the high rates of interest which
weigh upon the naked and pleading clients of the IMF.
Today we have reached a situation in which the global superpower is
desperately trying to repair its financial health while keeping as its
military protectorates (and under its political, cultural and
ideological influence) the two other poles of capitalist accumulation:
Japan/Korea and a Europe under german economic leadership. The U.S.=92s
military doctrine maintains these two points as their sole =93vital
interests=94, keeping around 150.000 men on each, along with some of their
most sophisticated military material.  Now that there isn=92t any credible
russian threat no more, these deployments can=92t conceal any longer the
real objective that has been its own long ago: to stabilize the
imperialist system. It=92s because of them that, between the three
imperialist poles, we have indeed some economic haggling, but not much
real political confrontation and virtualy no military tension. In last
resort, the americans are always right. If the yankees were to retreat
into =93isolacionist=94 positions (centered on their continent) we would
soon find the imperialist countries at each other throats again, which
could have a seriously disruptive effect in the whole capitalist system.
The cultivated political leaders of the bourgeoisie know this and that
is probably one of the reasons why, with the exception of France, there
hasn=92t been any real resistance to north-american hegemony. The question
however is: can this system (vaguely ultra-imperialistic) last
indefinitely.

In my view, this compromise is false and unstable. Considering the
scenario, probable but not at all assured, of continuing economic
decline of the U.S.A. (for which its military effort will heavilly push
it), an increase in its arrogance and of its demands would be certain.
It would evolve into a role of mercenary power, feeding itself from pure
rape and extorsion of surplus value produced and realized elsewhere. The
superexploitation of labor Latin America would increase. The threats and
actual violence against the arab and moslem world would rise. The global
military presence of the north-americans would be maintained by
institutionalizing some kind of protection duty over the other
imperialist metropolises. The fragile points of this system are: 1) The
armed force being american (although third parties are paying) it is
natural that it would care for its national capital as son and for the
others=92 as stepson, spreading recrimination; 2) The european and asian
bourgeoisies line up happily behind this system... as long as their
internal rate of profit isn=92t pushed too low, because in that case they
can became swollen with patriotic pride and dreams of grandeur; 3) Sharp
economic decline and some external military reverses could create a
revolutionary situation in the United States, sharpening its multiple
internal tensions in an enlarged replay of the final 60=92s. With the
queen in check, all the world structure of imperialist domination would
be suspended in the air, in immediate danger of collapse.

The other scenario is that of regionalization and the politics of
autonomous blocks (E.U., NAFTA, East Asian), with the rearmament of
Japan (danger of collision with China, to which, without doubt, hegemony
in the region will fall at the appointed time) and of Europe (?...).
Each one tills his own fields. The north-american military retreat will
be done gradually, negotiated inch by inch, without leaving power voids.
It is the end of super-imperialism and the return to a typical scenario
of inter-imperialist competition at all levels. It remains to be seen if
the evolution in this direction can be done peacefully. An imperialist
realignment of this magnitude has never been accomplished before without
war (real or virtual, as was the case with the Soviet Union). In
questions of this nature, the eventual good will of the politicians is a
small factor in the face of the colossal power and implacable
confrontational logic of these huge masses of monopoly capital.

A =93high intensity=94 war, however, is not very probable. In the first
place because of the immense destructive power of modern day armaments.
On the other hand, inter-imperialist confrontation has largely ceased to
be frontal and territorial, instead becoming barely even
confrontational, highly mediated through symbols, with all the real
physical struggle given to intermediaries. Things like interest taxes,
exchange- rate parities, trade rules or intellectual property rights may
come to the fore. An enormous and growing importance will be given to
the control of the means of mass comunication. Battles will be fought to
make specific characters or the ethos of particular civilizations
achieve and gain recognition as universal values. Cultural topics linked
to the ruling elites of the most powerful nations, economic interests
translated in a rationalized and semantic organization. Ideology and
spectacle will be the order of the day. Merchandise fetichism will be
taken to paroxistic extremes. Only the pawns will spill real blood of
course, their masters entertaining themselves in more or less tumultuous
debates centered on the axis of the system (=93security=94, commercial,
monetary, financial, etc.).

The case for a single center of accumulation becoming the lord of the
whole globe will remain, thus, certainly as a theoretical hypothesis,
but it is clearly outside of our historical horizon. The dynamic of
imperialism in our time is somewhat similar to that of the continental
plates of the planet. They live in an unstable and conflit-filled
equilibrium, supporting each other against the pressure of the interior
magma over which they sit. It is not inconceivable that they would come
to unite, forming a unitary crust. But stasis does not exist, nor is
there presently sufficient consistency and stability for it.  In the
same way, a new global super-imperialism or an ultra-imperialism agreed
to among various national or regional powers is thinkable in the future.
But for such a political superstructure to have stability, we would
certainly no longer be in good old capitalism but in a different mode of
prodution: ultra-monopolistic, policiary, probably eugenic, based on a
sophisticated and massive machine of ideological conditioning, of the
type of certain negative utopias of science fiction. Before we get
there, it falls to us to renew the hopeful expectation of Lenin cited
above. And fight for its fulfillment.



Jo=E3o Paulo Monteiro

(I sign pieces here in Portugal with the pseudonym =C2ngelo Novo, because
there is an older author - philosopher, social.democrat - with exactly
my name. Since we are in international =93territory=94 here, I guess I might
sign with my own real name. For the records, I am thus officially
recognizing that =C2ngelo Novo and Jo=E3o Paulo Monteiro are one and the
same.)





Notes:

(1) Lenin, =93Preface to N. Bukharin=92s Pamphlet=94, in Collected Works
(Moscow, 1964, english edition), Vol. 22, p. 107.

(2) For example, recently, Chris Harman, =91Globalization=92, in
International Socialism, n=BA 73, Winter 1996.



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