Date: Sat, 26 Jul 1997 04:52:18 +0200 (MET DST) From: rolf.martens-AT-mailbox.swipnet.se (Rolf Martens) Subject: M-G: UNITE! Info #45en: 6/12 4-gang history '76, pal '97 UNITE! Info #45en: 6/12 4-gang history '76, pal '97 [Posted: 26.07.97] [Continued from part 5/12] MY DEBATE POSTING 6, 29.12.1996 Debate on China, 6: 3/4 Actual 1976 events & fake [Posted: 29.12.96] [Continued from posting 5] =A47. 07.04.1976: THE MEETING OF THE PB OF THE CC OF THE CPC AND ITS *TWO* VERY IMPORTANT AND CORRECT DECISIONS. ALSO, AN IMPORTANT ERROR BY THE PB. In your posting 2, Jay, you once more reproduce, *only*, one of the *two* crucial resolutions of that meeting of the Political Bureau. You did the same in you posting, arguing against my pre- sentation of things, on 05.08. But at that earlier time, you might perhaps be excused for excluding the other, since its at least equally great importance hadn't then yet repeatedly been pointed out (by me). *Now*, however, when you're *still* pretending it "just isn't there", that's one more instance of the obvious dishonesty in your recent postings. In PR #15/76, where both resolutions were published, the one you're deleting was even the one that was presented first, in red print, on the front page. It reads (cf Info #22en part 5/12): "On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Commu- nist Party of China unanimously agrees to appoint Com- rade Hua Kuo-feng First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China." You in your posting 2 only repeated part of the other, which reads:=09 "Having discussed the counter-revolutionary incident which took place at Tien An Men Square and Teng Hsiao- ping's latest behaviour, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China holds that the nature of the Teng Hsiao-ping problem has turned into one of antagonistic contradiction. On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Political Bureau unanimously agrees to dismiss Teng Hsiao-ping from all posts both inside and outside the Party while allowing him to keep his Party membership so as to see how he will behave in the future." Those two resolutions must be viewed together, if you're to get the correct picture. By the first, Hua - and again, no "4-Gang member", for instance - was appointed First Vice-Chairman, a post that had not existed before but which (according to PR #2/77) Mao Zedong suggested be instituted. Mao himself, Clare Hollingworth writes, was too ill to attend that meeting. The two decisions proposed by him however were quite correct, the facts show: Appointment of Hua (a continuation of the February deci- sion i.a. *against* the 4-Gang) and dismissal of Deng on account of his Rightist wind. *But* that direct reason for this dismissal which was at least implied in that second resolution, there having been a so-called "counter-revolutionary incident", was a *false* characterization of the recent events. So Deng in part was "hung" for a "crime" which he had *not* committed. This, as I already have pointed out, could not but in fact *help support* his (openly-)Rightist deviation, make the people less eager to oppose it. Not only this; the PB had now called an essentially quite just action by the people "unjust". Clearly, this must have made many among the masses worried, and wondering what was going on, in the following months. This (al- though subordinate) part of the second resolution obviously was a result of the 4-Gangs's having managed to sway the PB on this point. The people in Beijing must have felt a great hatred for those - whoever they were - who had caused the suppression and also the vilification of their just demonstration in April. There had also been similar demonstrations in other cities (la- ter PR:s). Another thing that was not correctly done by that PB meeting was its taking upon itself to appoint Hua and dismiss Deng to/from *governmental* posts as well. This, as pointed out by a Swedish embassy employee in a book (quoted in my Info #22en part 5/12), was really, according to China's constitution, the business of the National People's Congress. My guess concerning this irregu- larity is that it was done behind Mao Zedong's back. As in the case of the other and more important error, the 4-Gang may have been to blame in part. But the other PB members present did con- cur, so they carried responsibilty for it too. The comment you made, Jay, on that important Politbureau meet- ing, may show how you're still at heart thinking, only it's ob- vious, isn't it, how wrong and contradictory that is. You wrote, on the resolution dismissing Deng, "your *only* one" of the two: >it was an unanimous decision. The decision was not the result >of splitting, intriguing and conspiring by the "gang of four." >It was the result of Chairman Mao uniting the many to defeat >the few. Obviously, however, there were present at that Politi- >cal Bureau meeting in April 1976, who did not consider that >they were in antagonistic contradiction with Teng Hsiao-ping, >or that he should be removed. But did they raise their voices >in dissent? No, they voted unanimously along with the entire >Political Bureau. >Hua Kuo-feng said nothing. Neither did Li Hsien-nien nor Yeh >Chien-ying, nor any of the others who were so free and loud >after Mao's death in criticizing the 1976 struggle to beat back >the Right deviationist wind. So you're thinking that Hua Guofeng was *already* a capitalist- roader in *April 1976*, and that some of the others present were too? You said this directly too in another comment directly above these lines, likewise referring to the situation in April: >Hua Kuo-feng and the other capitalist roaders in the Party set >themselves against the line of Mao Tse-tung and the other >revolutionaries in the Party. They were intriguers of the most >despicable sort. But Hua was precisely the leader that Mao at that time had the greatest confidence in, a fact on which you're silent. The one you're calling "intriguer" had been suggested by Mao Zedong in February for the most responsible posts and was now, again on Mao's proposal, confirmed even more in this, by the PB. You're arguing then, firstly (and genuinely believing?) that Hua Guo- feng managed to fool Mao, who was now old and ailing? But that doesn't fit with what you're saying about Mao's role in connec- tion with the *other* PB resolution, the only one you admit there was: >It was the result of Chairman Mao uniting the many to defeat >the few. So here, when (rightly) repudiating Deng, Mao *wasn't* that ailing, in your judgement. Your thinking doesn't fit together. Secondly, you're arguing that Hua in Feb-April etc, 1976, fooled not only Mao but also the other genuine Marxists. In other words, that there, in the main, only *were* fools and/or revi- sionists in the PB of the CC of the CPC at that time. But that too absolutely doesn't hold water. This is again the (open) Avakianists' fairytale that China at that time "to a large extent" was under the influence of revi- sionism, and this, the facts show, precisely is a big lie. Above all, people in other countries too could, and still today can, see that China precisely was following Mao Zedong's brilliantly correct and successful line in foreign policy, based on his all- sidedly correct analysis of the situation in the world. Hua Guofeng later *did* become a crook. So most definitely did Li Hsien-nien. When judging what they were aiming at in April '76, one must go by such reasoning as I've done above. Your ideas on it, Jay, absolutely don't fit. They are, perhaps, caused by such prejudices as you've "inherited" from the "RCP" etc, who since decades have had Hua down as "always a crook", the 4-Gang as "always heroes". It's a CIA story actually, refu- ted by the facts. >From foreign M-L (with or without quotes) parties, there were a few messages after that PB meeting, congratulating Hua on his appointment and supporting the CPC on its two decisions. (Some were reproduced in PR #16/76 etc.) It may be noted that the KPD/ML(NEUE EINHEIT) in Germany, a party which I was in close contact with in 1974-1990 and which, as I've pointed out, during a long time, also after the overthrow of socialism in China, really represented Mao Zedong's correct proletarian revolutiona- ry line, in its message (not published in PR) which correctly supported the two resolutions, did *not* see through the CPC PB:s error on there having been "a counter-revolutionary inci- dent" but mistakenly concurred in that judgement too. A rare mistake by the NE, showing how complicated things then were. I on my part didn't understand the April '76 events in China un- til a couple of years ago. But I think it's not difficult for others to do so today, as soon as certain vital facts become known to them. =A48. LATE APRIL - AUGUST 1976: UNCLEAR SITUATION. THREE POINTS OF ADVICE BY MAO TO HUA ON 30.04. In May-August 1976, the unclear situation that had arisen after the April events continued to exist. Hua Guofeng, the leader whom Mao Zedong had proposed for the top posts, continued to be in charge. At the same time, the partial success of the 4-Gang, indirectly favouring Deng too (see =A47. above), was causing dis- quiet among the masses. Mao on 30.04. (according e.g. to PR #52/76) had written down for Hua Guofeng the advice, concerning how to handle the con- crete situation then: *"Take your time, don't be anxious."*, *"Act in line with past principles"* (a line that the 4-Gang were later massively to publicize a "slightly" distorted ver- sion of, to discredit Hua and as part of their attempt to usurp Party and state power), and *"With you in charge, I'm at ease"*. That last line (whose set of Chinese charcters, I've read some- where, could more literally be rendered as "You run business, my heart rest") was later much publicized in China as showing Mao's confidence in Hua. Such obviously he had. =A49. 09.09.1976: MAO ZEDONG DIES The passing away of Mao Zedong on 9 September 1976 of course was a tragic event which had a great impact in China and even inter- nationally, because of this Marxist leader's historical role, which he had continued to fulfill even in his last months when he in part had been incapacitated by illness. People in many countries paid him their last respects. In the PR issues fol- lowing his decease, a great number of messages of condolence, from heads of state and from foreign parties, were published. =A410. OCTOBER 1976 (06.10.76): THE BIG BLOW AGAINST THE REACTIONARY PHONEY"LEFT" 4-GANG This is the event whose character the Avakianists above all have concentrated their lies on. Suppressing all information that was available internationally at the time, they from 1978 on have been concocting the upside-down story that this was *not* essen- tially an important victory for the proletariat against one of the reactionary cliques but was "a counter-revolutionary coup d'état", supposedly by pro-Deng Xiaoping forces. I've already massively refuted that falsification of history, by my Internet series "'The Four' & events in China 1976" in May- August of this year, posted again on 03.11.96 as "UNITE! Info #22en", in 12 parts. I refer to those postings once more. Again, you, Jay, in your posting 2 in our present debate, are pretending that all those things I pointed out in them, all those documents I reproduced to show their veracity, simply "aren't there". You do point out something that I didn't touch on: The fact that, from issue #42 on of the PR (i.e. from 15.10.76 on), its editorship had changed, and you give a number of details showing that from that same time on, important changes took place in the editorships of several main publishing media in China. That's certainly quite true, and wasn't a bad thing either but, in the main, undoubtedly a good one. The 4-Gang had had a com- paratively great influence precisely over the media. Now on 06.10 the whole Gang had been arrested for trying to usurp Party and state power. It was logical that their (rather few) follow- ers were weeded out. It's necessary above all to see: Under which line was the 4-Gang dealt that blow? And that - in the first and crucial phase, Oct '76, - *was* the all-sidedly correct line of Mao Zedong, the do- cuments show. The criticism against the other deviation, that of Deng Xiaoping, was being continued too, then, during this phase. =A411. OCTOBER 1976 (CTD.): YOUR 2-3 ARGUMENTS, JAY, FOR "CAPITALIST-ROADERS' HAVING TAKEN CONTROL" AT *THIS* POINT, DON'T HOLD WATER. - YOUR ARGUMENT 1: "LINE CHANGED" In your posting 2 you advanced three arguments for the Avakian- ists' fairytale's in fact being true, that the big blow against the 4-Gang was a "counter-revolutionary" event: Firstly, you wrote that that blow was a "purge" - well, one may call it that; in this case in the main absolutely a just one, although there was at least one murky point even as early as in October; I'll come to that - and you argued: >The line put forward by the Chinese Communist Party and the >Peking Review before the purge and that put forward by the >CCP and the Peking Review after the purge are completely >different and opposite lines. No, that's *not* true. The general line, including Mao Zedong's genuinely internationalist proletarian revolutionary line in foreign policy, which is the part of the general line that could, and still can, be checked on most easily from afar, was *still* being upheld, in October '76. The contents of the foreign-policy line can be seen in the UN speech by Foreign Mi- nister Qiao Guanhua on 05.10.76, i.e. immediately before the big blow. I reproduced it as "UNITE! Info #18en" (in 3 parts), on 05.10.96. PR articles show that this line was continued after the blow too. Only later did the foreign-policy line gradually change and shift colour, so that towards the end of 1978, for instance, So- viet social-imperialism was not called by that scientifically correct term any more, and more than ten years later again, the now ruling revisionist Deng Xiaoping clique in China was actual- ly calling the Soviet Union a "socialist"(!!) country, as if that clique had "effected another October revolution" in the So- viet Union! But in October the line was *not* changed. As the only "diffe- rence in line" to "point at", you brought forward what you cal- led "a complete reversal in attitude" on one matter: >A most important and obvious difference in the line of Peking >Review was a complete reversal in attitude towards the struggle >to beat back the Right deviationist attempt. Throughout 1976 >until the death of Chairman Mao in September, the central em- >phasis of the Chinese press was the campaign to beat back the >Right deviationist attempt and deepen the criticism of Teng >Hsiao-ping. ................. >In the first issues of Peking Review after the purge, the >struggle to beat back the Right deviationist attempt and criti- >cize Teng Hsiao-ping was mentioned but was not elaborated on or >deepened, the emphasis being, rather, on the criticism of the >"gang of four." So you're saying there was a "shift of emphasis". You admit that the criticism of Deng Xiaoping was (still, at that time) being continued. That's one important fact. But such a shift of emphasis, which there in fact was, too, *un- der the changed circumstances*, does *not* mean that the correct line has been changed. During the preceding months, since April, the emphasis in the PR (for instance) had indeed still been on criticizing Deng Xiaoping, *despite* the fact that, by the *un- just* suppression of the people's demonstrations, for instance, *the 4-Gang*, who were the main movers behind this, had started to become at least as great a danger as Deng's clique. And with their (obviously real) attempt, in September-October, at seizing power in the state and the Party, they did become the greatest danger to the proletariat at that time. [Continued in posting 7 - now in part 7/12] --- from list marxism-general-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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