Date: Wed, 12 Nov 1997 23:14:40 +0100 (MET)
From: rolf.martens-AT-mailbox.swipnet.se (Rolf Martens)
Subject: M-G: Mao Zedong (et al.) on Tibet in 1952


Mao Zedong (et al.) on Tibet in 1952
[Posted: 12.11.97]

This goes to some newsgroups and also to the Marxism-General 
mailing list managed by the Spoon Collective (see http://
jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU/~spoons/).

As a contribution to the debate on Tibet, I'm posting an extract
from "Selected  Works of Mao Tsetung, Volume V", China, 1977,
which I sent earlier in other contexts on 05.06.1996 and (as
"UNITE! Info #17en") 08.10.1996. It shows the policy of China on
its province Tibet when that country was still socialist. And it
contains some information which I think is unknown to many 
today - for instance, the fact that on May 23, 1951, there was
an "Agreement Between the Central People's Government and the 
Local Government of Tibet on Measures on the Peaceful Liberation
of Tibet". - RM


Extracts  (by RM, '96) from: 

"ON THE POLICIES FOR OUR WORK IN  TIBET - DIRECTIVE 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
OF CHINA", 

April 6, 1952 

(in "Selected  Works of Mao Tsetung, Volume V", China, 1977):


They [our army units in Sinkiang] have now gained a firm 
foothold and won the warm support of the minority nationalities. 
They are carrying out the reduction of rent and interest and 
will proceed to agrarian  reform this winter, and by then we can
be sure of even greater support from the masses. Sinkiang is 
well connected with the heartland of the country by motor roads, and 
this is of great help in improving the material welfare of the 
minority nationalities. 

As for Tibet, neither rent reduction nor agrarian reform can 
start for at least two or three years. While several hundred 
thousand Han people live in Sinkiang, there are hardly any in 
Tibet, where our army finds itself in a totally different mino-
rity nationality area. We depend solely on two basic policies to
win over the masses and put ourselves in an invulnerable posi-
tion. The first is strict budgeting coupled with production for 
the army's own needs, and thus the exertion of influence on the 
masses; this is the key link.

We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai 
and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful 
of bad elements in order to achieve a gradual, bloodless trans-
formation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a 
number of years; on the other hand, we must be prepared for the 
eventuality of the bad elements leading the Tibetan troops in 
rebellion and attacking us, so that in this contingency our army
could still carry on and hold out in Tibet. 

It all depends on strict budgeting and production for the army's
own needs. Only with this fundamental policy as cornerstone can 
we achieve our aim. The second policy, which can and must be put
into effect, is to establish trade relations with India and with
the heartland of our country and to attain a general balance in 
supplies to and from Tibet so that the standard of living of the
Tibetan people will in no way fall because our army's presence 
but will improve through our efforts. 

If we cannot solve the two problems of production and trade, we 
shall lose the material base for our presence, the bad elements 
will cash in and will not let a single day pass without inciting
the backward elements among the people and the Tibetan troops to
oppose us, and our policy of uniting with the many and isolating
the few will become ineffective and fail.

It is our opinion that the Tibetan troops should not be reorga-
nized at present, nor should formal military sub-areas or a mi-
litary and administrative commission be established. For the 
time being, leave everything as it is, let this situation drag 
on, and do not take up these questions until our army is able to
meet its own needs through production and wins the support of 
the masses a year or two from now. In the meantime there are two
possibilities.

One is that our united front policy towards the upper stratum, a 
policy of uniting with the many and isolating the few, will take
effect and that the Tibetan people will gradually draw closer to
us, so the bad elements and the Tibetan troops will not dare to 
rebel. The other possibility is that the bad elements, thinking 
we are weak and can be bullied, may lead the Tibetan troops in 
rebellion and that our army will counterattack in self-defence 
and deal them telling blows. Either will be favourable to us.

As the top echelon in Tibet sees it, there is no sufficient 
reason now for implementing the Agreement (Note: This refers to 
the Agreement Between the Central People's Government and the 
Local Government of Tibet on Measures on the Peaceful Liberation
 of Tibet, May 23, 1951.) in its entirety or for reorganizing 
the Tibetan troops. But things will be different in a few years.


Apparently not only the two Silons (Note:..) but also the Dalai 
and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement 
and are unwilling to carry it out. As yet we don't have a mate-
rial base for fully implementing the Agreement, nor do we have a
base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in
the upper stratum.

To force its implementation will do more harm than good. Since 
they are unwilling to put the Agreement into effect, well then, 
we can leave it for the time being and wait. The longer the de-
lay, the stronger will be our position and the weaker theirs. 
Delay will not do us much harm; on the contrary, it may be to 
our advantage. Let them go on with their insensate atrocities 
against the people, while we on our part concentrate on good 
deeds - production, trade, road-building, medical services and 
united front work (unity with the majority and patient educa-
tion) so as to win over the masses and bide our time before 
taking up the question of the full implementation of the Agree-
ment. If they are not in favour of the setting up of primary 
schools, that can stop too.

The recent demonstration in Lhasa should be viewed not merely
as the work of the two Silons and other bad elements but as a
signal to us from the majority of the Dalai clique. Their peti-
tion is very tactful because it indicates not a wish for a break
with us but only a wish for concessions from us. One of the 
terms gives the hint that the practice of the Ching Dynasty 
should be restored, in other words, that no Liberation Army 
units should be stationed in Tibet, but this is not what they 
are really after. They know full well that this is impossible; 
their attempt is to trade this term for other terms.

At present, in appearence we should take the offensive and 
should censure the demonstration and the petition for being
unjustifiable (for undermining the Agreement), but in reality we
should be prepared to make concessions and to go over to the
offensive in the future (i.e. put the Agreement into force) when
conditions are ripe.   

[So far the extracts from the directive of the CC of the CP of
China on the province of Tibet, 06.04.1952.]



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