Date: Fri, 24 Jan 1997 16:35:33 -0500 (EST)
From: Viraj Fernando <viraj-AT-interlog.com>
Subject: M-I: Dialectics of Nature





Ralph Dumain's contribution to the debate I feel is of vital importance and
his point of view must be taken into consideration by both sides seriously.
As I understand it, he holds the balance.

There is Andrew Austin and Jason Schluman on one side and Siddartha
Chatterjee on the other side (Adolfo, Jay and harriette mostly poured out
indignation and outrage at Andrew and hardly  participated in the debate at
a philosophical level).

Before challenging Andrew, one must first of all try to understand what he
says and  then verify it against Marx ( unfortunately Engels or any others
can not help us here because, it is the contention that Engels' tendency to
popularise Marxism is the root cause of this whole problem). However, the
reality of the list is that one has to respond within hours and as a
consequence it does not allow much time for studying and verification. What
we get is mere reflection. I would suggest Siddartha, to do study Andrew
more carefully rather than getting trapped by the time scale of the list.
Take your time. Also it does not matter who is right. We are all trying to
get a correct perspective of  Marxism.That is what is important.

>For a fairly straightforward explanation of his dialectical
>method in his own words, see Marx's "Postface to the Second Edition" 
>(1873) of *Capital* VI. 

 Andrew: Unfortunately I do not have the above text, could you kindly fax me
the above (to 416-281-7679). I will then transcribe this and post it to the
list. (Or if you can post it direct it will help a great deal).

There is nevertheless a problem here. Jason points the finger to Engels'
graveside speech as if Engels buried  Marxism along with Marx. Then goes on
to quote Anti Duhring (which gives the impression that this book was written
after Marx's death). The problem is this, Marx considered Engels to be a
co-founder and collaborator in the development of Marxism; Anti-Duhring was
read by Marx in the draft before going into print. If Engels' views were so
fundamentally opposed to Marxism (as laws of dialectics being applicable to
Nature, Human History, and Thought), then would Marx have allowed such
misreprentations to go unrefuted? As collaborators, they had a division of
functions which they carried out with great understanding. 

The basic problem here is to understand, what Marx referred to Nature in
relation to History, and what Engels referred to Nature as opposed to History.

As I understand it, in the first context, history is only an extension of
the biological existence of man. And in the second context it concerns
existence of matter independent of man.

It is a contention of Andrew that Marx never delved into the concept of
matter. We should remember that Marx's doctoral thesis was "The Difference
Betwen the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature" and this could
not have been a mere academic exercise without leaving imprints in his later
thinking and works.

However Andrew's criticism of  the opposite side (which he calls dia -mats),
in so far as ontologizing dialectics into matter, it  is squarely based on
"Theses on Fuerbach".

                                    I 
 
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach 
included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in 
the form of the _object or of contemplation_, but not as _sensuous human 
activity, practice_, not subjectively.  Hence, in contradistinction to 
materialism, the _active_ side was developed abstractly by idealism -- 
which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.  
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought 
objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as _objective_ 
activity.  Hence, in "Das Wesen des Christenthums", he regards the 
theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while 
practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical 
manifestation.  Hence he does not grasp the significance of 
"revolutionary", of "practical-critical", activity.  
 
 
                                   II 
 
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking 
is not a question of theory but is a practical question.  Man must prove 
the truth -- i.e.  the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his 
thinking in practice.  The dispute over the reality or non-reality of 
thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely _scholastic_ 
question.  
 
 Andrew Austin wrote:
>That if there is an ontology to be found in social and natural forms it is
>to be found in the relation between subject and objects, and subjects and
>subjects, not in the objects and subjects themselves. We must not
>ontologize nature, or history, or human essence, for these phenomena are
>in continual flux. What is real and permanent is our relation to nature,
>history, and human essence. Relations form the inner core of social
>reality. 

 Andrew's contentions are not without problems, in the above he admits the
possiblity of ontology of natural forms.  But later on he restricts it only
to social systems. Perhaps I am mistaken and request clarification.

> In the instance of a social system (the only entity to which I
>will apply the dialectic) units within the system must stand in systematic
>relation to one another to constitute a system.

If this be the case, then the list "Marxism and Sciences" must be closed, as
it would be doing a great disservice to Marxism. The very existence of this
list is for the purpose of discussion of dialectics of  nature.

As far as I can understand, Marx's position was:

a) Nature-History:   History is biological existence extending into social
existence. We must see ourselves as natural beings and social beings at one
and the same time.

b) Nature- Matter:  Matter exists independently of our consciousness,
however our notions, concepts, theories regarding matter are based on social
practice. The properties we attribute to matter are our interpretations of
what they are. Science of matter is a product of human society.

General laws of motion are applicable to both the cases, but we must not
forcibly introduce dialectics into phenomena.

"Crass empiricism turns into false metaphysics, scholasticism, which toils
painfully to deduce undeniable empirical phenomena by simple formal
abstraction directly from the general law, or to show by cunning argument
that they are in accordance with that law" - Marx (Theories of Surplus Value) 
( I am quoting this second hand).


And I think the above coincides with Ralph Dumain's  position.

Ralph  indicates that over the past two years time and again he tried to
clarify this: 

>At various times over the past two years I have tried
>to clarify the problems in the attribution of contradictions to
>natural processes, and have tried to demonstrate that objective
>contradictions in natural processes can only be spoken of when all
>contradictions have been as far as possible removed from thought
>and we are left with a situation in which reality can only be
>apprehended by contradictory yet complementary categories, and
>then we can call reality itself contradictory because the
>categories used to describe it and which accurately reflect it are
>contradictory. (Scott Mclemee thinks this is a hilarious word salad).

I think it would be quite helpful at this juncture if Ralph would take some
time to expand on this to make it possible for others to understand what you
say. It would be very important for you to substantiate a few situations
where "reality can only be apprehended by contradictory yet complementary
categories...."


Best regards/ Viraj


 





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