Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 03:44:15 -0500 (EST) From: Andrew Wayne Austin <aaustin-AT-utkux.utcc.utk.edu> Subject: M-I: Re: M-SCI: Dialectics of Nature (Special fun word game at end!) Siddharth, It sounds like you have a problem with Marx. Virtually every term I used in my post based on the Latin "socius" is found through and through Marx's work. It seems as though you are unhappy that Marx was a social scientist and a historian. Okay, but then why make Marx something he wasn't? When Marx talks about the precision of natural science he is referring to a set of logical (deductive) and empirical (inductive) procedures that produce heuristic frames, theoretical statements, and conceptual formats that correspond with observable reality. He is not suggesting that the social world is the natural world. This is a common error made by nonhistorians and nonsociologists (those who choose to remain ignorant of these areas, anyway): they neglect the historicity of language and other social contexts and processes (a consideration that is demanded by the system of historical materialism!). When Marx was writing, social philosophy (political economy, sociology, etc.) was just becoming accepted as science (Comte attempted to scientize his theory of society in the Law of Three Stages, Spencer was scientizing social study by making the social system identical with biological systems, and there were others). Marx therefore had to refer to his methods as being rigorous, i.e. in the mode of natural scientific method, in order to assert the scientific character of his analysis, which was in fact scientific. To lift text that is nearly 150 years old out of its historical context suggests that some basic instruction in social science is in order. This argument brings me to once again confront the strawman my opposition is constructing (and they cannot really even dispose of this "carefully" constructed nemesis!). I have not denied the importance of, and in fact I have advocated, rigorous scientific theorizing and procedure. This has never been my argument. Siddharth finds it odd, I gather, that of all the superstructural elements that Marx identified, he left science out. Moreover, at least I see this implication, Siddharth believes Marx did this so he could somehow assert he was using an eternal objective procedures for prying apart the totality of social formations. Yet, as Moishe Postone pointed out (in an earlier quotation), that because Marxian theory recognizes its historical specificity, it can analyze itself and its methods in an epistemologically consistent manner, locating "itself historically by means of the same categories with which it analyzes its social context." Thus Marx, by refusing to reify logic, was able to see his logic determined by the social formation he was analyzing, and therefore employ critique as a method for accounting for this variable in the analysis. This leads Marx to emphasis praxis, the unity of theory and practice. It is impossible for subjects to extract themselves from the social and material reality they are producing, and that was produced for them by past generations. Siddharth treats social relations as a superficial feature of society, taking a backseat to productive forces. But in Marx's system the relations and the forces of production are deep structures, deeply interpenetrated, only analytically separable. For example, the struggle to reclaim a portion of the surplus workers produced that lead to a reduction in the workday, and put real limits on the amount of surplus that the capitalist could extract everyday (absolute surplus value/product), led to an intensification of the organic composition of capital (relative surplus value production) through the introduction of labor-savings machines. Here it is the reverse of the order that Siddharth apparently lays such stress on: a struggle at the level of social relations of production forced a change upon the forces of production. Siddharth appears to posit a structuralist position devoid of human agency. We might remind him that even the forces of production are also intrinsically human and humanized. Social reality is not as simple as physicists and biologists would like to make it, and their models are inadequate to capture the complexity and subtly of the social world. In the 1700s the social world was supposed to be law driven, mechanical, like the eternal clock that unwound the universe in God's absence. In the 1800s the social world was an organism, its parts interrelated in a teleological manner, evolving under internal differentiation driven by functional imperatives and adaptation to its environment. Marx, by constructed historical materialism, put social science on its own theoretical and methodological footing. He defined the paradigm of social science. Ideology prevailed, ultimately, and forced historical materialism to the margins, and structural-functionalism, the mother of all organic analogies, reified and superimposed on the world by bourgeois ideologists, dominated until its inability to explain social reality proved it undoing. What Siddharth and others do by taking Marxian social science and mapping it upon the natural world, is the same thing bourgeois ideologist do in reverse. Rather than forcing upon social reality natural science conceptual systems, dialectical materialists force upon the natural world the Marxian conceptual system--but even more than that: they claim that this method reveals objective reality independent of social relations, when objective social relations are what Marxian social theory is trying to make subjective! In doing this they violate both the form and content of Marxian thought. Other than correcting these mistakes that Siddharth makes here, which I think are instructive for the larger debate, his contribution adds nothing new to the debate. Andrew Austin PS. How long did it take you to count all those times I used the root "socio"? Just a wee bit obsessive, aren't we? PSS. For those of you who are still mystified by mathematics, who assume, like Kant, than certain mathematical and logical systems exist *a priori*, just substitute the word "numbers," in the sentence "numbers existed prior to humans," with "words," rendering: "words existed prior to humans." Sounds goofy, doesn't it? Try it with lots of sentences. Here are a few: "Mathematics existed prior to human beings." (substitute "linguistics.") "Mathematical systems existed prior to human beings." (sub "mathematical systems." "The Dialectic existed prior to human beings." (substitute "The Syllogism" or, maybe better, "God.") "The universe operates according to a logic." (substitute for "logic" the word "idea" or, maybe better, "God.") Think of more. It's fun! --- from list marxism-international-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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