Date: Sun, 8 Jun 1997 21:14:49 GMT
From: Chris Burford <cburford-AT-gn.apc.org>
Subject: M-I: Re: Perfidious Germany


I understand that Louis Proyect accepts the perfidious or
at least vacillating nature of British diplomacy against Nazism
in 1938 and 1939. 

As to whether the volume concerned demonstrates an awareness by 
the Soviet government of the perfidious nature of Germany,
I think that is clear. But these debates need to move on from 
the polemical to a historical battle, still earnest with 
probably quite counterposed positions but with detailed appeals
to evidence. That is why I have published the reference to this
book of 1976, which I presume must be available in US reference
libaries and I would urge one or more members of the list to 
hunt it out. 

The authenticity of documents is one question.
It appears that the German's captured papers of the French foreign
ministry.

Interpretation of documents then has to follow. Including the
relative significance. This selection is not chosen to demonstrate
any internal debate within the Soviet Government of the sort 
that can now be investigated. However the volume was published in 
its second printing in 1976 20 years after the circulation of 
Khrushchev's secret speech. It is a scholarly work, not a polemical
one, and I am sure by this date the Soviet publishers would have known
that Sovietologists in the West would have pulled apart any 
spurious documentation. Indeed it is interesting that this part of 
Soviet history has not hit any headlines since the opening of the
Moscow archives. I suggest that it does not show the Soviet Union 
in a bad light, but more, as this volume suggests, a very extensive
degree of conciliation, particularly by the English.

The overall picture produced by the selection of documents is 
coherent and all the sources, Soviet, German, French, English,
American, etc suggest to me a high level of understanding
among all participants of what was going on, secretive though
each document is. 

The Soviet side had every reason to expect a rapid military thrust by
Germany into Poland, which would be taken over, as Czechoslovakia
had been, (and of course Austria annexed). Poland adamantly refused
even to acknowledge requests via France to discuss how Soviet
troops could enter and cross its territory in the event of 
a German invasion. There were strong reasons to expect that
the British would prefer to let Germany have a fait accompli
in eastern Europe in return for an understanding that Germany
would not touch the British Empire. Britain was not exactly in 
a position to object to the concept of colony or subject
people as such. The geopolitical interests of Britain
and Germany were not necessarily fundamentally counterposed.


_______________________

Two days after Hitler's liquidation of the Czechoslovak state,
(15th April 1939) the People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the USSR (I think that was Molotov) presented the 
following to the British Ambassador in the USSR, the same
proposal being given to the French Ambassador the following day:

"As we regard the French proposal as an acceptable one in principle
and wish extend [sic] M. Bonnet's idea, and as we also [sic] desirous 
of placing relations between the three states on a solid foundation,
we are endeavouring to combine the English and French proposals
in the form of the following propositions which we are submitting
for the consideration of the British and French Governments:

1. That England, France and the USSR conclude with one another 
an agreement for a period of five to ten years, by which 
they would oblige themselves to render mutually forthwith all
manner of assistance, including that of a military nature, in case
of aggression in Europe against any one of the contracting
Powers.

2. That England, France and the USSR undertake to render all 
manner of assistance, including that of a military nature,
to all Eastern European States situated between the Baltic
Sea and the Black Sea and bordering on the USSR, in case of
aggression against these States.

3. That England, France and the USSR undertake to discuss and 
to settle with the shortest possible period of time the extent
and forms of military assistance to be rendered by each of these
States in fulfilment of paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. That the English Government announce that the assistance promised
by it to Poland concerns exclusively aggression on the part of 
Germany.

5. That the treaty of alliance which exists between Poland and 
Rumania be declared operative in case of aggression of any 
nature against Poland and Rumania, or else be revoked altogether 
as one directed against the USSR.

6. That England, France and the USSR undertake, following the out-
break of hostilities, not to enter into negotiations of any kind 
whatsoever and not to conclude peace with the aggressors separately
from one another and without the common consent of all three 
Powers.

7. That an agreement on the above lines be signed simultaneously
with the convention to be elaborated in accordance with paragraph 3.

8. That the necessity be recognized for England, France and the 
USSR to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey for a special
agreement on mutual assistance.

__________________________________


My understanding from skimming the book is that this proposal
failed particularly in the context of lack of interest from
England. On 5th August Molotov signed the following mandate
to engage in detailed military negotiations:]

People's Commissar for Defence of the USSR, Marshall of the Soviet
Union KY Voroshilov, Head of the Soviet Military Delegation,
which includes the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army,
Army Commander IB M Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar for the 
Navy, Fleet Commander II N Kuznetsov, Chief of the Red Army Air
Force, Army Commander II AD Loktionov, and Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff of the Red Army, Corps Commander IV Smorodinov,
is empowered to conduct negotiations with the British and 
French Military Missions and to sign a military Convention
on questions pertaining to the organisation of the military
defence of Britain, France and the USSR against aggression
in Europe."



About this, on 7th August the French Miliary Attache in 
the USSR, Palasse, wrote to the French War Minister,
"The fact that the Mission includes the People's 
Commissar for Defence of the USSR and the People's
Commissar for the Navy, the Chief of Staff and his
deputy, and the Commander of the Sovet Air Force shows the
great importance which the Soviet Government attaches to 
these talks."


___________________________________


On August 9th the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
received the following telegram from its Charge d'Affaires
in Germany:

"As the campaign over Danzig is being stepped up tensions here 
are mounting. This is felt both in the press and in conversations
with diplomats whom I met today at the Bolivian Minister's 
reception. The situation is being compared to last year's
pre-Munich period. The Germans are openly spreading rumours
(true, through non-responsible channels) that Poland is going
to be dealt with within a matter of days, and it is asserted 
that England will not intervene."


On 12th August 1939 the Soviet Air Attache to Britain sent 
the following telegram to the General Staff of the Red Army:

"According to verified information, Germany is carrying out
war preparations which are due to be completed 
by August 15. The call-up of reservists and the formation of 
reserve units are proceeding on a large scale and under cover.

On August 15 the 'Spannung' order is expected to be 
issued throughout Germany. These are very serious mobilization
measures.

In preparation is a strike against Poland by units of the 
1st army: the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 13th, 17th, and 18th Army
Corps and Armoured Divisions, all oriented eastwards. Only
defensive measures are being taken in the west.

German military circles are anticipating that Poland will be 
offered another chance to reach a peaceful settlement. In any 
event, it has been decided to resolve the question this year."

_________________________________________________


Thus the Soviet Government knew that Germany was going to thrust
into Poland. It had no guarantee of an effective 
alliance against this, and found the Polish government refusing
all discussion. The question was whether Germany was going to 
occupy all of Poland or only half. And whether the Soviet Union
would be fighting Germany effectively on her own. The 
period of the "phoney war" that actually occurred after Sept 
1939 illustrated the problem and the politics behind it.

The German Soviet non-aggression treaty is therefore
evidence for not against the degree of seriousness with 
which the soviet government took the threat of Nazi
aggression.

It seems to me that other questions arise: why 
the discussions were purely military? Whether the concept
of the united front was still so undeveloped that
they did not have a way of neutralising Polish hostility
to the Soviet Union. This is a question of leftist and
rightist errors towards the united front policy.

Concerning whether the Soviet Union was caught by surprise
when Germany did attack, there is no evidence here. There is 
some evidence that confirms the strategy of Germany was to 
secure eastern Europe, then defeat or neutralise France
and England and only then attack the Soviet Union. We know
that plans to invade England were almost implemented. 
Whether Stalin was negligent in failing to anticipate the timing 
of this attack would need other evidence.



Chris Burford

London




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