Date: Tue, 10 Jun 1997 22:02:23 -0700 From: Mark Jones <majones-AT-netcomuk.co.uk> Subject: M-I: Party, People, Army.... The Barbarossa timetable began to falter. Hitler was nervous about the undiminished resistance of Soviet forces encircled in the German rear. The Wehrmacht had advanced more than 200 miles and their lines were extended.To Guderian's wrath the Panzers had to sit tight while large Red Army formations in the Minsk-Bialystock pocket were eliminated. During the delay Zhukov and Defence Commissar Marshal Timoshenko rushed new forces to the Smolensk area. Here, on the banks of Dniepr, the Red Army planned to stop Hitler's blitzkrieg on Moscow. At the same time catastrophe continued to envelop the Red Army. Leeb's Army Group North avalanched on Leningrad- the city's population was dumbfounded by the suddenness of the threat, which left the civilian and military authorities paralysed in disarray. On the central front Guderian was already forcing the Dniepr, and at Kiev three doomed Soviet armies were sucked into a vortex as Army Group South swept around them. The Red Army had suffered major losses of men and materiel: the disastrous consequences of Stalin's pre-war strategy which only envisaged offensive operations on enemy territory were increasingly apparent. The bulk of fuel, ammunition and other stores had been- at Stalin's instigation- kept on or near the front, and were now lost. Compounding the critical shortage of ammunition and weapons and the extreme muddle and confusion both on the fronts and in the Defence Commissariat, was the absence of any prearranged defensive strategy. Tactics were improvised and making a virtue out of necessity, the High Command took advantage of the decimation of its forces to remodel its huge and unmanageable prewar force structures into smaller more mobile armies. The Germans estimated that the 'mass of the operationally- effective Russian Army has now been destroyed'. This however was not the case. Despite its losses the Red army was by no means a spent force, as was soon revealed to the Germans in the battle for Smolensk. By 20 July Panzergruppen II and III had taken Orsha, Smolensk, Yelnya and Krichev. But slowly what Halder called the 'fierce and dogged resistance' of the Soviet soldiery was beginning to meld the desperate, fragmented battles of the first weeks into a continuous resistance which here and there made it possible to take the initiative. Two armies encircled west of the Dniepr managed to extricate themselves, withdrawing to the eastern bank. Towards the end of July a flurry of fierce Soviet counter-attacks drove in the German bridgehead over the Dniepr at Smolensk. The Germans, pushing on to Roslavl to the South, managed to encircle and maul Soviet 28th Army. Yet time was passing; Barbarossa's apocalytpic timetable began to slip. At immense cost the Red Army was absorbing the first shock of the blitzkrieg. Planes of the Red Airforce ('Stalin's falcons') were also fighting back. The skies were filled with dogfights, and there were many instances of Soviet planes ramming enemy aircraft. One of the first exploits was that of former Moscow factory-worker, Captain Gastello who, in a story known to every Soviet schoolchild and subject of many songs and poems, plunged his burning plane onto a column of German fuel lorries. But already in the villages west of Moscow people were living as slaves to the Germans. Army Group Centre ploughed on towards Moscow;by now 28 Soviet divisions had been destroyed, another 70 suffering more than 50 per cent losses. Still more grievous losses were to come. On 29 July a fierce row about strategy broke out between Stalin and Zhukov during a Kremlin meeting. Georgy Zhukov, victor of Khalkin-Gol in the Soviet-Japanese border conflict of 1939, was one of the Red Army's few battle-tested leaders. Surveying the status of each sector of the Front Zhukov concluded that in the Moscow and Leningrad areas the Germans had sustained too serious a level of losses to resume the offensive in the immediate future. He proposed withdrawing behind the Dniepr and strengthening the fronts to the South of Moscow.This meant weakening the Moscow defences at least until reinforcements could be brought in from the Far East- 'So then, you want us to give the Far East to Japan', Stalin said. Undeterred, Zhukov made plain it would also be necessary to abandon Kiev. At the same time he wanted to counter-attack in the Yelnya-Smolensk direction, to relieve the potential pressure on Moscow. 'What counterattacks?' Stalin exploded. 'What nonsense!' 'If you think the Chief of the General Staff is only able to talk nonsense', Zhukov snapped back, 'then he has no business here'. And Zhukov asked to be relieved of his duties forthwith and sent to the front 'where I shall be of more use to the motherland'. 'Don't get heated', Stalin said, 'but now you mention it, we can manage without you'. Zhukov was sent to organise the counter- attack at Yelnya which he himself had proposed. Within days, as Zhukov predicted, Guderian swung south on the exposed Central Front. Throughout August and into early September the carnage of Smolensk spilled North and South as the Germans tried to find a way round stubborn Soviet resistance; Zhukov's counter-attacks meant that in effect the Wehrmacht found itself fighting defensive battles.At Smolensk Barbarossa had become a dead letter; already the vaunted Wehrmacht had lost more than half its tanks and one-third of its infantry. Vehicles, spares, ammunition and even food were in short supply; winter was approaching, but the Germans had no winter clothing. As early as mid-July GHQ had ordered footwear to be seized from captured Red Armymen. German boots, superbly constructed from soft leathers, with a special box for the great toe, were marching boots with which socks could not be worn. The 32 nails in each sole were rods which would conduct the 20, 30 or 40 degrees of Russian frost into the feet of German footsoldiery as winter deepened. In early September, as the Ostheer paused for resupply, Hitler and his General Staff took stock.Hitler insisted, over their opposition, that operations in the Leningrad sector and the economically-vital Ukraine must now come first. Another month slipped by before Bock's army group was ordered 'to end the war' by taking Moscow. More than 90 per cent of Soviet young men aged between 18-21 when the war started died during it; the inferno before Smolensk consumed 100,000 of them- three Soviet armies- before burning itself out under the clear skies of a glorious autumn. Zhukov had been right in his confrontation with Stalin at the end of July: right in thinking the Japanese would not attack in the Far East and right in his appreciation of the balance of forces along the immense western front and how this would affect German intentions. Zhukov had wanted to withdraw beyond the Dniepr and then commence spoiling counter-attacks. Stalin meant to hang on to Kiev, the key to the Ukraine, at all costs yet was too alarmed by the threat to Moscow to divert the necessary forces from there. Stalin had scant confidence, anyway, in the ability of the Red Army to conduct orderly retreats or wage defensive battles. At this stage of the war Stalin was crushed by omnipresent defeat, by fear of German superiority and doubts about the loyalty and capabilities of the Red Army and its leaders (visitors to the Kremlin were shocked by the aged, crumpled figure which greeted them, almost unrecognisable from the ubiquitous posters and portraits).Stalin's early policy of static defence, which led to one army after another being encircled and annihilated, and the equally desperate policy of the counter- offensive pursued regardless of circumstances, were both immensely costly in men and materiel.From these baleful beginnings however a synthesis grew out of Stalin's strategic preoccupations and Zhukov's operational genius. It first saw the light of day in the counter-offensive before Moscow, but before then the crisis of Leningrad had to be dealt with. Stalin called Zhukov to the Kremlin on 8 September, told him 'You were right about the Yelnya salient business' and gave him new instructions: the northern front was collapsing and 'if the Germans seize Leningrad and link up with the Finns, they could strike Moscow from the northeast. Then the situation will be even more complicated'. Next day Zhukov flew from Vnukovo to the beseiged first city of socialism. There he found chaos, demoralisation and disintegration. A few days after his arrival the Germans completed their encirclement of the city. 700,000 German and Finnish soldiers were investing the city; they were stopped on the last defensive perimeter with the inner city directly behind, by remnants of the Red Army and by tens of thousands of untrained, ill-equipped but determined Home Guard volunteers. The city itself had become an armed camp, with its own arsenals, shipyards and factories providing a stream of tanks, artillery and small arms and ammunition. As the front neared, frantic preparations for a seige had begun. Military facilities were hidden and camouflaged, as were architectural masterpieces, hospitals and schools. Civilians worked round the clock digging trenches and bomb shelters. Rationing was introduced. Nearly a third of the city's three million population was evacuated; whole research institutes down to the doorman; offices, theatres and factories went East by train. Treasures from the Hermitage and other museums were carted off in hundreds of freight wagons. 92 entire factories were transshipped beyond the Urals. The last two evacuaion trains slipped through Mga station in the early hours of 29 August; by noon the Germans had arrived there. On 8 September the took Schlissselburg on the shores of Lake Ladoga, cutting off the last land route. The blockade had begun. Hitler had planned to take the city and raze it, exterminating the populace. On 12 September they began a final assault. Civic buildings and plants were prepared for demolition as the defenders dug into their last emplacements; in Smolny Zhukov tore at the Military Soviet, throwing the profusion of operational maps off the table and beginning anew, with dire threats to shoot 'forthwith' any slackers or cowards. In the words of a survivor, Daniil Granin, himself a historian of the seige- "Workers from Leningrad's Narva district dug and fought to the last because they understood only too well that everything depended on them... with Stukas howling overhead, and the rye fields and villages burning all around: the heat, the choking smoke, the sour smell of explosives, and the rattle of German machine guns everywhere- and we, who were no soldiers at all, had to fire back and let the tanks come in close..." --- from list marxism-international-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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