Date: Mon, 23 Jun 1997 21:05:27 -0700 From: Ben Seattle <icd-AT-communism.org> Subject: M-I: (POF-7) [2 of 2] Centralism in the Service of Democracy ===========================================7d. The Gohre Incident: Centralism vs. Localism and Opportunism =========================================== Lenin devoted several pages of "One Step Forward" to a struggle, only a few months earlier, in the German social-democratic party over the selection of a certain ex-parson as the party's candidate for election to the Reichstag. Gohre, the author of a fairly well-known (at that time) book, "Three Months as a Factory Worker", was one of the extreme opportunists condemned alongside Bernstein at the party's Dresden Congress (September 1903). A local section of the German party, nonetheless, soon after decided to select him as a candidate for the Reichstag. The central and regional bodies of the party put their foot down--and said that Gohre was too much of an opportunist--and therefore not fit to represent the German social-democratic party in the Reichstag. This turned into a big public fight between the opportunist and revolutionary wings of the German party over the meaning of democracy within the party. The opportunist side in this debate was taken up by Wolfgang Heine and the revolutionary side by Karl Kautsky (who himself would become a traitor to the German workers only ten years later). Heine wrote against the party's "insistence on *discipline* in the sphere of ideological production, where absolute freedom should prevail" and said this "demonstrates the tendency towards bureaucracy and the suppression of individuality". Heine ended up foaming at the mouth against the tendency to create "*one* big all-embracing organization, as centralized as possible, *one* set of tactics, and *one* theory". Soon enough, even the German equivalent of the "Wall Street Journal", the "Frankfurter Zeitung", had gotten into the act and condemned the revolutionary wing of the party as "dictators" demanding "blind obediance" and "servile subordination" who aimed to crush "all distinctiveness of personality" and transform party members into "political corpses". Isn't it interesting that a German bourgeois newspaper would take such an active interest--in the question of what constitutes a healthy internal life in a revolutionary party dedicated to its overthrow ? [Now before presenting the refutation made by Kautsky (and quoted approvingly by Lenin) I want to make a comment here about the kind of language used by Heine and the German bourgeois newspaper. Any real communist party, that has strong living links with workers and upholds the cause of the workers against bourgeois interests, can expect to be attacked like this. And often. At the same time, there also exist sectarian formations who could probably be described in these terms--and the description would be accurate. So one moral here, so to speak, is that if you read about some party, trend, group or organization being described as being similar to the Catholic Church at the time of the Inquisition--such descriptions mean very little without a strong knowledge of the circumstances involved--because the charges could originate from reformists who resent being branded as reformists--or the charges could be accurate descriptions of an organization which is sectarian--or, not uncommonly, both sets of circumstances could exist--because reformism and sectarianism are about as common in the left as water is in the ocean--and often all sides will simply point to the weaknesses, hypocrisy and bankruptcy of others and conveniently ignore their own. Anyhow, that's the end of my comment. We will now resume our story.] Kautsky (and Lenin) reply to Heine ---------------------------------- Karl Kautsky replied: "democracy does not mean the absence of authority, democracy ... means the rule of the masses over their representatives, in distinction to other forms of rule, where the supposed servants of the people are in reality their masters". That is is short answer. I would like to give a lengthy quote here from Lenin (who, in turn, quotes Kautsky, demarked here by single quote marks) because the relationship between centralism and democracy has been so thoroughly abused and mutilated by so many "Marxist" and "Leninist" organizations--that I believe the air needs to be cleared. These questions are fundamental. Real progress, by communists in the 21st century, will be helped by clearing up some of this incredible muck and confusion. In addition, Lenin makes a number of remarks which, if quoted out of context, would make it appear that he opposed the idea of "bottom-up" methods of organization. Yet "bottom-up" methods of communist organization are going to become extremely important in the period of the internet. All organizations in the real world use some combination of both "top-down" and "bottom-up" organization, but the relative weight, importance and significance of "bottom-up" methods will greatly increase in the period of the coming communications revolution. Here is Lenin's comment on the matter: "... the important thing here is to note the undoubted tendency to *defend autonomism against centralism*, which is a fundamental characteristic of opportunism in matters of organization. ... "Bureaucracy *verses* democracy is in fact centralism *verses* autonomism; it is the organizational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the organizational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy. The latter strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and 'democracy', carried (by the overzealous) to the point of anarchism. The former strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the center in relation to the parts. ... "It is highly interesting to note that these fundamental characteristics of opportunism in matters of organization ... are ... to be observed in all the Social-Democratic parties in the world, wherever there is a division into a revolutionary and an opportunist wing (and where is there not?). ... "Kautsky traces at length the disruptive role played by opportunist autonomism in various countries; he shows that it is precisely the influx of '*a great number of bourgeois elements*' into the Social-Democratic movement that is strengthening opportunism, autonomism, and the tendency to violate discipline; and once more he reminds us that 'organization is the weapon that will emancipate the proletariat', that 'organization is the characteristic weapon of the proletariat in the class struggle'. ... "It is not surprising that Kautsky arrives at the following conclusion: 'There is perhaps no other question on which revisionism in all countries, despite its multiplicity of form and hue, is so alike as on the question of organization.' Kautsky, too, defines the basic tendencies of orthodoxy and revisionism in this sphere with the help of the 'dreadful word': bureaucracy *verses* democracy. We are told, he says, that to give the party leadership the right to influence the selection of candidates (for parliament) by the constituencies is 'a shameful encroachment on the democratic principle, which demands that all political activity proceed from the bottom upward, by the independent activity of the masses, and not from the top downward, in a bureaucratic way. ... But if there is any democratic principle, it is that the majority must have predominance over the minority, and not the other way round....' The election of a member of parliament by any constituency is an important matter for the Party as a whole, which should influence the nomination of candidates, if only thru its representatives... 'Whoever considers this too bureaucratic or centralistic let him suggest that candidates be nominated by the direct vote of the Party membership at large ... If he thinks this is not practical, he must not complain of a lack of democracy, when this function, like many others that concern the Party as a whole, is exercized by one or several Party bodies.' " [ibid] The passage above is interesting from several directions. But what I would like to draw attention to for now is the part at the end, where Kautsky talks about "the direct vote of the Party membership at large". What both Kautsky and Lenin are saying here--is that if it had been possible to consult the entire party membership about Gohre's candidacy--then the local section of the party could have been overruled by *the party as a whole* instead of being overruled by the party center acting as *the representative* of the will of the party as a whole. This is a very key section for two reasons. Centralism allows the party membership to determine its destiny --------------------------------------------------------------- First--it helps to clarify why it is that the principle of centralism represents a *greater degree of democracy* than the principle of what Lenin calls "autonomism" (ie: autonomy for each local area). Centralism is the *means* (the *only* means possible at the time) for the majority of the party's membership to have *effective control* of the party's activity as a whole. Without this *effective control*, there can be no meaningful democracy within an organization. Without centralism, in Lenin's time, the party would not have had a meaningful life as *an organization* with control over its own destiny. Instead there would have been various local circles, united only in name and (unable to develop a greater degree of life as a unified whole) comparatively easy prey to the spontaneous tendency to fall into reformism. (It is somewhat irrelevant, for our purposes here, that the German party fell prey to reformism anyhow, in spite of its centralism). In the early 1970's in the U.S., there developed amongst many radical groups in the anti-revisionist movement (ie: that section of the movement inspired by Mao's criticism of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union)--the idea that building a unified communist organization could best take place via the path of "pre-party collectives"--in which each local organization would develop its own practice and learn primarily from its own experience. According to this line (which turned out to lead to disaster) each local organization would in this way accumulate experience and maturity in the course of the class struggle--and be in a better position to understand the tasks involved in building a party--when the time came that they would eventually merge. The only problem was--that they never "eventually merged". Rather, as local circles *isolated from one another*, most of the groups one-by-one died out, spontaneously falling victim to the pressure of reformism or to one or another amateurish practice which sapped their strength and led to demoralization. One of the lessons here, is that in the conditions of the low level of experience and political consciousness which characterized the movement in the U.S. at that time, the imperative was to unite into a single national organization or die. In the first decade of the 21st century, there will probably be a great many communist organizations, of various sizes, many quite small, which will spontaneously emerge in the conditions of greater consciousness unleashed as the communications revolution begins to pour oxygen onto the fires of the class struggle. These groups will *not* face the same imperative of "merge or die" which faced groups in the U.S. in the early 70's. The primary reason for this is that these groups will exist in an "information dense" environment in which many of the functions of centralism will be handled by a looser communications network. There will still be a strong imperative to merge, as we will discuss below, but the consequences for being more slow to respond to this imperative will be less severe. Going beyond Centralism ----------------------- And this leads us to our second point. This passage by Lenin helps us to see the possibilities which are only now opening up to us--courtesy of the coming revolution in communications. We are very rapidly approaching a stage where consultation with the entire membership (even of a very large party, like the German party, of a million members) over such a question as the nomination of Gohre--would be very easy. This is truely something new in human history. And it affects everything else. In 1903, the average member of the German party would not have had a typewriter, telephone or xerox machine (much less e-mail or the web). Communication with the party membership was by means of a newspaper, a "one-to-many" kind of communication (ie: as opposed to the internet, a "many-to-many" kind of communication). Now I hope what I say is not misunderstood. I am not saying that it would have been impossible for the German party to have effectively and successfully fought reformism without the internet. Lenin's Bolsheviks proved it could be done (in a period where even their one-to-many newspapers were illegal). Rather, the issue here is that, in an era of many-to-many communications, less centralism is *necessary* in a proletarian party--because more direct and advanced types of democratic functioning are possible. Again, this is not the same as saying that proletarian parties will not require centralism at all. Any time a large party must be capable of sustained, coordinated activity characterized by bold, decisive actions in a war (whether a political war or a military war) of quick decision--there will be a need for a high degree of centralization. In this respect, centralization is like closing one's fingers into a fist. Making one's fingers into a fist--so that one may strike rapid, powerful blows at an opponent--is often necessary for a workers' party preparing itself to overthrow bourgeois rule. But just as no one can successfully go thru all of life with their fists closed (because, for example, an open hand is required to use tools) no party in the modern world can perform all of its functions in a centralized manner. This last point is particularly important. Much of a party's work, including theoretical and intellectual work, can only be centralized to a certain extent. Some sectarian trends make a fetish of centralization and, using the struggle against reformism or bourgeois ideology as an excuse, attempt to use "information isolation" (and other fetishistic forms of centralism) to shield their supporters from *coming into contact with ideas* which would expose and destroy the guiding mythology that glues the group together and justifies its peculiar practices. *This* kind of centralism, in the period of the coming revolution in communications, is going to face rapid extinction. ======================================7e. Summary: stages in the development of inner-party democracy ====================================== A quick summary of the historical forms of communist organization may now be useful: 1) Local circles: Unified Marxist party can exist in name only. Sporadic communication between local groups because of illegality and amateurish practices. An activist in one group may have no possibility to influence the activity of another group because the influence from one group to another is largely by chance. Every locality left to its own to continually reinvent the wheel. Optimal conditions for spontaneous collapse due to repression, demoralization or the influence of the predominant reformist conceptions. 2) Centralized party: Party center chosen by members. Local sections subordinate to party center which represents (hopefully) the will of the majority of the party membership. The second form is the historic form generally associated with communist organization. We have seen several variations on this: a) The typical party of the Second International ------------------------------------------------ Best represented by the German social-democratic party, with pronounced revolutionary and reformist/opportunist wings. The *reformist wing* aspires to convert the party into a party of the liberal bourgeoisie and limit its activity to the pursuit of those reforms which are acceptable to the bourgeoisie and consistent with capitalist rule. The *revolutionary wing* aspires to maintain the party as a party of the working class which works for reforms in order to win the support of workers necessary for the overthrow of capitalist rule. The struggle between the revolutionary and reformist wings at times flares up but at other times is relatively subdued. Because the revolutionaries and reformists are dependent on the party apparatus, newspapers, etc. and because the struggle between them is not brought to the average party member in a clear, consistent way which relates to both the daily tasks of party-building and the long-term aims of the party--the polarization between the two wings is *insufficient to engage the full attention of the average party member* and enlist his or her participation in a contest of strength. In this circumstance, a center develops in the party which at decisive times (in order to "preserve party unity") pays lip service to the revolutionary wing but which in practice tolerates the reformist wing and is in defacto alliance with them. Historically, *all* parties of this type eventually fell under the domination of the reformists, betrayed the workers and became vehicles of the liberal bourgeoisie. Many of these parties did finally achieve state power, where they played a useful role for the bourgeoisie in deceiving the workers. b) The "parties within a party" model represented by the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 1903-1911 ------------------------------------------------- Here the revolutionary and reformist wings create their own organizations, their own leading central bodies, their own illegal newspapers and press, develop their own tactics and refine their respective ideologies. The two parties within a party compete for the loyalties of workers while they simultaneously cooperate in numerous ways at the insistence of their supporters. (This cooperation was conducted by the Bolsheviks in such a way that it created greater clarity about the nature of their differences with the Mensheviks, and for this reason was to the Bolshevik's advantage.) In this circumstance, everyone who wishes to be taken seriously and have influence must take a clear stand as to which side is correct on which issues. No predominate center emerges and only charlatans and clueless clowns (ie: Trotsky) can ignore the reasons for the polarization. The revolutionary pole eventually wins predominate support amongst the workers while the reformist pole wins greater support amongst the intermediate classes and sections. Eventually the true nature of the opposing aims of the different parties becomes more clear to very large numbers of workers and the parties dissolve their formal relationship prior to taking their respective positions on opposite sides of the barricades. c) The Bolsheviks from 1912 to 1921 ----------------------------------- Often called the Leninist party "of the new type", this party has no reformist wing. The reformist section which aspires to compromise with the bougeoisie stands *outside* the party. This is a vastly more clear set of circumstances for workers but is only achieved via a *lengthy and highly complex process* of struggle and differentiation. The party still contains a wide assortment of views on various issues, but in respect to the fundamental issues *which separate the reformists from the revolutionaries* -- there is *unanimity*. Membership in the party does not require agreement on everything from A to Z, but rather requires agreement on A to J (which are considered fundamental) and permits disagreement on K to Z (which are less clear or decisive). d) The Bolsheviks from 1921 --------------------------- The emergency conditions and extreme crisis which exist by the end of the civil war in 1921 necessitate a number of emergency measures within the party to shut down the organized contention of views which in other circumstances would be considered normal. After the death of Lenin in 1924 Stalin makes these emergency measures permanent (as we will see in the next section) and develops the concept of a "monolithic party" (with a single line and set of views from A to Z) as supposedly applicable to all communist parties at all times. This model of oranization had many advantages but the organizations which were based on it all (whether in the short or the long term) ultimately degenerated. Nor should this be a suprise. I think that, in the circumstances of the coming revolution in communications, a new type of networked communist organization may emerge: =========================7f. Distributed Authority ========================= A communist organization which emerges from an "information dense" network would develop ways of performing many of the functions of a party center in a "distributed" manner. The struggle between the revolutionary and reformist lines would act to polarize all participants in the network and create conditions favorable to the eventual emergence, within this network, of a single revolutionary organization which would draw up boundaries around itself (similar to a membrane, or a series of membranes) to clearly differentiate itself from both: (a) the reformist activists and organizations, and (b) those nodes in the network which were undecided or unclear on this decisive matter. *Cooperation* as well as *competition* between the various participants and nodes of this network would be a permanent feature of its functioning and "norms" would emerge which would help to keep this cooperation and competition along lines that were *principled* and in the interests of the working class. Such a unitary organization, as would eventually emerge, would be ideologically united, in the first place, on those issues which separate communism from reformism. Unity on other issues would be partial--but the predominant tendency, over time, would be to sort out other decisive issues as the need to do so asserted itself. The tendency would be for the single revolutionary organization which emerges to develop *that degree of centralization* which would correspond to its tasks. In periods of intense class struggle constituting a war of quick decision, a single center would of necessity emerge but would not necessarily be permanent. But the fundamental struggle (within the network) between the reformist and revolutionary orientations (reflecting the struggle, in society at large, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) would take place on a permanent, continuous basis, whether the revolutionary pole had a single center or multiple centers, and whether or not the revolutionary and reformist poles were separated by a clear boundary. The "information dense" environment of this network would create optimum conditions for the differentiation thru struggle of the reformist and revolutionary orientations. This struggle would both: (a) *reflect the class struggle* in society at large--and (b) *directly link up to the masses* who would recognize this network (and the struggle taking place within it) as a vehicle for *their* aspirations--and who would therefore actively "take sides", in a most energetic manner, in the "internal" struggle of this network. The concept I am trying to develop here is what I call "distributed authority", in which the more direct forms of democracy made possible by the communications revolution--would allow the struggle between the revoltutionary and reformist paths to be waged in a more *distributed* fashion--without so great a need for this struggle to be directed by or channeled thru a single center which, historically, has proven itself to be a faulty component, a chokepoint or bottleneck, vulnerable to incompetence, corruption and many other failings. Digestion --------- In searching for an appropriate analogy, I am (if I take the liberty of "theoretical license") struck by the similarity of this "communist organization" within a network--to a living organism, similar to a form of "artificial life". Like an living organism, it would ingest various forms of energy and nourishment (activists and their organizations), digest, transform and assimulate what is healthy, and expel what cannot be put to use. Since communists have no difficulty working (on their own terms) with reformists, those parts of the network which are reformist to one degree or another (or which are not conscious of the necessity to fight reformism--which for our purposes is pretty much the same as reformism) would in a great many (if not most) cases, still be available for a large variety of joint work with the communist section (which would need to always struggle to maintain its integrity and independent class stand as the basis for this cooperation). What would help to make this possible is the "information dense" environment, characterized by "transparency" (ie: more or less the condition that pertinent information circulates quite widely and rapidly and, as a consequence--unprincipled manuevers and charlatanism become exposed more rapidly than Madonna in front of a camera). In these circumstances, sectarianism (which, as we shall see, is reformism's best friend) tends to melt away. This would be an environment which (facilitating great clarity on the nature of the struggle against reformism) would be able to (more than has ever been possible in the past) both exploit and guide the natural spontaneous "bottom-up" and "self-organizing" tendencies of groups of activists who wish to pour their energies into the struggle to rid humanity forever of the capitalist system--and create in its stead a world of joy and abundance for all. (to be continued) <>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<> Next week: 1921 and 1924 -- Lenin's organization faces crisis and suffocation <>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<>--<> --- from list marxism-international-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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