File spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international_1998/marxism-international.9801, message 321


Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 21:10:25 +0000
From: Mark Jones <Jones_M-AT-netcomuk.co.uk>
Subject: M-I: Lenin as insurrectionary leader # 2 of 2


Lenin sat down at the map of operations spread out on a table. Antonov-
 Ovseenko began outlining the general plan of operations, pointing
 positions held by our forces and the positions and strength of enemy
forces that he knew hardly anything about.
  His lack of information and the condition of Antonov-Ovseenko himself
 were all too obvious, although Lenin pretended not to notice anything
and  fixed his eyes on the map. After the report, to which he listened with
great attention and without once interrupting the speaker, Lenin began to ask
questions with the keenness of a profound strategist and military
leader. Why was this point nor guarded, had the strategic importance of this
station been taken into consideration, why had this step been taken and
not  another, why had the support of Kronstadt, Viborg and Helsingfors not
been assured, why had that point not been worked out in detail or this
opening blocked. Owing to his weariness Antonov-Ovseenko's answers
to Lenin's poignant questions were far from satisfactory. The impression
created was that we were not fully aware of the seriousness of our
position  at the front, that we were not capable of weighing up the situation
fully, in short, that we were not to be trusted to conduct operations against
 Kerensky.

Lenin continued asking questions and each of them, in reality, contained 
the answer of a masterly strategist -- he was telling us what we had to
do.
  
'How is the railway line Gatchina-Lissino-Tosno defended? What forces
 are there on that line, are they reliable?' he asked. Not only the
question itself but the tone in which it was asked told us of a tremendous
anxiety  to strengthen that line and in that way make it impossible for the
enemy  to seize the Petrograd-Moscow Railway which would mean that Moscow
 would be deprived of Petrograd's help.

 His question about where the Red Guards from the Lessner, Putilov,
 Baltic, Tube works and other big factories were operating showed that
 Lenin regarded it as very important that the armed forces of the
workers should be on the decisive sectors.
  
'Why has the cavalry not been brought from Novgorod and sent into
 Chudovo and Volkhov districts to defend that highly-important railway?
 'Are the soldiers and the Red Guards ensured all the necessary supplies

 How do you propose to arrange this'
'What task has been allotted the garrison of Luga?'
'Have you thought of demolishing the railway bridges and lines, and
has provision been made for it so that the enemy will be prevented from
 advancing? 'What about the artillery?'
  
Lenin's questions so clearly showed the essence of his strategic and
 tactical plan, which was so obviously calculated to rout the Krasnov-
 Kerensky gang rapidly and effectively, that we were anxious to do only
one  thing: to end that conference and immediately set about putting Lenin'
 ideas into effect. The trouble was, however, that the front had no
commander-in-chief. It was no use depending on Antonov-Ovseenko - he
 simply had to be put to bed.
  
I did not feel it convenient to place the question of the command
before Lenin in such a sharp form: it would have looked as if we regarded
 Antonov-Ovseenko as responsible for our failures whereas it was
perfectly clear that all of us, workers of the Military Organisation, including
myself, were responsible for the failures.
  
We had made a large number of mistakes, we had not been as active a
 the situation demanded and had not made use of all forces and means a
 our disposal for the defence of Petrograd. We had been following the
 masses but had done nothing to make ourselves the military leaders, the
 strategists of the masses.

 There were only two ways out of the situation: either tell Comrade
Lenin that we were unsuitable, that we could not take responsibility for
 operations, or somebody else must undertake the command.
 I asked for an interval of a few minutes and called into another room
those members of the Military Organisation who were present at the staff
conference which Comrade Lenin had interrupted. I told the comrades
that we had made a great mistake in nominating Comrade Antonov-Ovseenko
 Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd Military District, that he had been
 several weeks without sleep and was so worn out that he had lost the
energy necessary for the task.
 I asked which of the comrades thought he could assume command of the
front. No one answered.
 I thereupon put forward my own candidature and said that in face of the
 great danger I considered it my duty to the Party to take upon myself
this terrific responsibility, ignoring all the conventions and the
'awkwardness' of self-nomination. The Military Organisation of the Party, whose
 chairman I was, were used to me, we worked well together and I was sure
 that they would help me much more actively than another whom the y did
 not know. Krylenko, Mekhonoshin, Nevsky and other comrades gave me
 their hearty support. I asked Antonov-Ovseenko his opinion. He was
 against my candidature, he said that I could not do any better than he
had done. The other comrades, however, did not agree with him.
  After that I returned to Lenin and told him that I would undertake the
 task of clearing up the situation at the front.
  Without another word Lenin ordered me, in the name of the
 government, to take over command of the front as Commander-in-Chief of
 the Petrograd Military District. I told him that next day I would
report on what measures I had adopted during the night and then asked for
 permission to get down to work.

 Lenin went away. No doubt he had had a very clear conception of the
confusion prevailing even before he came to us. At a conference of
regimental representatives of the Petrograd garrison Vladimir Ilyich
spoke very sharply of the faults of our command.
 'This cannot be denied. On account of this we have lost some ground.
Those faults, however, can be overcome. Without losing a single hour,
single minute, we must organise ourselves, organise a general staff; it
is essential that it be done today... The political and military task is:
the organisation of the general staff, the concentration of all material
forces, the provision of everything needed by the soldiers; that must be done
without losing a single hour, a single minute.
 Lenin went away and we settled down to work with renewed energy. In
the first place I transferred our headquarters to the Smolny -- all the
threads led to that place -- and set about regrouping our forces
according to a plan that had formed in my mind on the basis of the questions and
remarks made by Vladimir Ilyich.

I appointed Comrade Yeremeyev as chief of staff. The Military
Organisation personnel were ordered to go immediately to army units and
arrange for those that still remained to leave for the front next day
and to call to arms the workers of all the factories, stopping some of the
factories if there was no other way out. They were to make the first call on the
Putilov Works and the big factories in Viborg, Vasilevsky Island and
Moscow districts.

At that moment I was given a note from Comrade Antonov-Ovseenko in
which he said he would do everything to help me. I proposed that he
sleep well and then go to the front to set up a central command, organise
communications between units and their bases and the centre, and the
delivery of supplies and munitions.
Representatives of our district Party organisations, district Soviets
and factory committees were called to headquarters and instructions were
given to send those workers incapable of bearing arms to dig trenches, and to
requisition shovels for this purpose. The line of trenches was mapped
out and engineers mobilised from the 6th Reserve Sapper Battalion and from
the factories.
 We felt desperately in need of a highly-qualified military specialist
as a consultant, but could not find one. The most suitable man would have
been the commander of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, but he had been
wounded and was unable to take part in the work. In drawing up the plan
of operations and in carrying it out we had to depend on untried people
We decided to entrust the plan of operations to a battalion commander
from the Izmailovsky Regiment. When they had studied the plan the
commanders of the regiments and other units immediately began to reform
as brigades. Brigade commanders were appointed.

Early in the morning of the 30th Dybenko appeared at the Smolny. He
was ordered to occupy a certain sector of the line and take command of
the left group. Without losing any time Dybenko set out with a
detachment of sailors for the positions.

 Very soon the sailors Lenin had sent for arrived from Helsingfors. They
occupied the positions allotted them on the coast. The cruiser Oleg and
the destroyer Pobeditel stood by to defend the approaches to the Petrograd-
Moscow Railway in fulfilment of Lenin's instructions.
 That same day thousands of Petrograd workers went out to dig trenches
and six regiments, made up to strength, left for the front.
The arrival of these regiments at the front, the appearance of the
artillery organised by Comrade Sklyansky who had just arrived, the strengthening
of the front by the Helsingfors sailors who cemented the units together,
the direction of operations directly at the front by Antonov-Ovseenko -- all
served to bring about a sharp change at the front. The turning-point had
come and in this a decisive role was played by the help Vladimir Ilyich
gave us.

 At 12 o'clock noon Lenin again visited our headquarters -- it was now
quartered in the Smolny -- and insisted on a table being placed in my
office for him so that he could be kept up to date on all instructions and
reports. Soon he sent V. Bonch-Bruevich, an executive of the Council of People's
Commissars, to help me and he brought with him his secretary and wife
V.M. Velichkina. Every five or ten minutes Lenin kept sending somebody
to help me -- in the matter of supplies, mobilisation of the
workers, demolitions. Airmen, agitators, doctors, gunners, all came to
me... Vladimir Ilyich was gradually carried away by the work and,
without apparently noticing it, whenever he left my room, gave direct
instructions to one comrade or another. The work was kept going at top
speed, every cog in the Petrograd defences was kept turning, but Lenin 
was still not satisfied. It seemed to him that things were going too 
slowly, without sufficient determination, without the necessary energy, 
and he himself, parallel to me, in his own office, began calling 
representatives of one organisation or another, or from this or that 
factory, asking for information on the number of men capable of carrying 
arms, on technical equipment on what, in general, they could provide for 
the front, and in what way this or that factory could be of use for the 
defence. Then came his order to the Putilov workers to put armour-plating 
on railway engines and wagons, place guns on them and send them to the 
front. He proposed to Narva District that they requisition cab-horses 
and harness to take the forty guns that stood ready at that factory to 
the front.
 Representatives of the Baltic Fleet came on some business or another
and Vladimir Ilyich instructed them to check up on the readiness of the
crews to put to sea at a moment's notice and to report at such and such a
time.

 The officers of the Motor Transport Company arrived. Lenin arranged
with them for the company to send all its lorries to the front and
instructed them to send out soldier-drivers to mobilise in Petrograd 
a sufficient number of lorries to transport munitions to the front.
 'Give them credentials with special authority', he said.
 The motor transport people took hurried leave of Lenin to carry out his
instructions.
 
Lenin began sending commissars to different factories and organisations
to take everything that was necessary for defence.
 
Several times in the course of three to five hours I had 'tussles' with
Comrade Lenin, protesting against his 'predatory' methods of defence
work. He apparently took notice of my protests, but in a few minutes
they were forgotten and ignored. In actual fact there were two headquarters:
in Lenin's office and in mine. Lenin's office was a sort of mobile staff
since he also had a table in my office, but the more often Lenin went to his
own office where all kinds of operatives were being constantly sent for on
his instructions, the clearer it became that separate, casual instructions
were merging into one single chain, into a regular system, welded together by
some invisible but clearly felt general plan.

 It is true that these instructions did not have anything to do with
operations or the army units and were, in essence, merely the mobilisation 
of everything and everybody for defence. Nevertheless this seeming
dualism got on my nerves to such an extent that I demanded very sharply
and quite unjustly that he release me from my post of
commander-in-chief.

Lenin lost his temper completely as he had never been known to do
before.

'I'll hand you over to the Party court, we'll shoot you! I order you
to continue your work and not to interfere with mine!'
I had to submit...

Only next day did I appreciate the significance of the tremendous work
Lenin had done, especially after I had analysed the conference he had
called of representatives of working-class organisations, district
Soviets factory committees, trade unions and army units. Vladimir 
Ilyich ordered me to attend that conference.
 
'The workers of Petrograd', said Lenin at the conference, 'are going as
volunteers to the Pulkovo Heights, without commanders, without
transport, without food and supplies, often without warm clothing. It is
our duty to organise assistance for these heroes.'
 And Lenin, addressing himself in turn to the leaders of the Party group
and factory committees of the Putilov Works, the Arsenal, the Obukhov
Works, the Tube Works and other factories, appealed to them to make use
of all the resources of their factories for the defeat of the
counter-revolution that had raised its head. And he there and then gave 
an example of initiative in dealing with this problem.
 
'The Putilov workers make cannon but there is no way of getting
them to the Front -- there are no horses. Nevertheless a way out of
the situation can be found: a branch railway line passes the Putilov
Works where the guns can be loaded on to wagons and sent to the
front-line positions.
 
'We have not got enough artillerymen. Can we not find the necessary
gun-layers and gunners at the Arsenal, the Obukhov Works and other
factories? Of course we can!
 
'We should take those cadets who fought against Soviet power by the
scruff of the neck and force them to fight against the Cossack officers.
 'The Bolsheviks of the Baltic and Neva shipyards and the naval port
must ensure that the naval vessels undergoing repairs there be
commissioned without loss of time.'

 Later when I thought over that conference I realised more and more that
Lenin had a special ability to concentrate our forces and resources to
the extreme limit in time of need. We had dispersed our forces, mustered and
then distributed them again without any plan. As a result our actions
were not co-ordinated and this led to irresolution and lack of initiative
among the masses. They did not feel the iron will and the iron plan 
where, as in a machine, everything fitted perfectly and worked smoothly in its proper
place. Lenin hammered one single idea into everybody`s head:
everything must be concentrated on defence. Out of this basic idea he
evolved a plan which could be understood by all, a plan in which there
was a place for everyone, for his factory and for his fighting unit.
Everyone at the conference had a clear conception of his own plan of
future work and saw what contribution he could make towards the defence
of the Republic. Therefore, each one was fully aware of the
responsibility placed upon him by the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Lenin strove constantly to get the people to understand that the leaders
could not do everything for them, that they themselves, with their own
hands, would have to build a new life and defend their own state; in
this he proved himself to be a real people's leader, able to show the people
the way forward and induce them to take the first step forward fully
conscious of their aim, instead of following blindly behind the leaders.
After the conference Lenin spoke separately to those of the workers'
representatives who had come late.

That day Lenin's method of selecting all organiser became clear to us;
he not only made the comrade personally responsible for the work given
him, but also told him that he really would be held personally
responsible; this was method that Lenin usually adopted with the
People's Commissars under him, as well as with all Party and Soviet
officials.

With this in mind, Lenin tried to show everyone at the conference with
whom he spoke that he had noted his name and would see to it that the
job he had given him would be carried out. He wrote down the names of
those comrades and exactly what they had to do by a certain day and
hour.

Everything that Lenin did in those days was for all of us the first
school of state administration, a broad and peerless school of practical
education.

 Next day, I tried to estimate all that Lenin had said and realised that
to make a good practical leader one must not fix all one's attention on one
separate question, but be able to see the connection between his work
and all the active forces of the revolution.
 
Immediately after the conference, workers' detachments, lorries, carts,
guns, improvised cavalry, the squadrons of the 9th Cavalry Regiment
began pouring day and night through the Moscow Gate and along the
Moscow Highway.

 Cars with messengers and liaison officers raced to and from the front
line. A real workers' and peasants' war, embracing gigantic masses of
people, developed to defeat the counter-revolution.

 All Petrograd was on its feet. Under such conditions victory was
certain.

The enthusiasm with which the workers went to the front, their desire to
fight, their readiness to give up their lives for the happiness of the
Republic made heroes of those who, for the first time in their lives, held a
rifle in their hands. This enthusiasm welded the front into a single whole.
 That day many of the units, with great fortitude, began flanking
movements on the front. The heroic Red battalions had no experienced
commanders, they were often cut off from their bases, tormented by
hunger and cold, and menaced by the most terrible thing of all -- to be
encircled by the enemy. Many of the Red Guards wore light, torn boots
and their working clothes. They had to carry huge supplies of cartridges
on their backs as transport had not yet been organised. The scene
of the fighting was a swampy plain with a few elevated points. The daily
rains made the terrain of each hollow almost impassable. Some of the
troops moved up to their knees in water the whole day. A detachment of
sailors stood in icy water a whole night waiting to attack Kerensky's
armoured train.

 The enemy were suffering appreciable losses. We struck blow after blow.
 Our troops would have brought matters to a head by 1 November but
for the fact that we had an insignificant number of cavalry, scarcely
enough for reconnaissance, while the enemy forces consisted mainly of cavalry.
This made it possible for them to transfer troops rapidly to any
threatened point and, as our reconnaissance was nor functioning properly, we got
that false impression that the enemy possessed greater forces than they did.
Then, as formerly (and also later, during the Civil War), our agitators
played an important role in the defeat of Krasnov. They made their way
into the enemy's ranks and exposed to the Cossacks the real objects
which the opposing sides pursued in the newly begun war. The Cossacks lost all
desire to die for a cause alien to their interests. After five days of
fighting, exhausted by our constantly increasing attacks, the Cossacks
surrendered. 

Kerensky fled The Cossacks arrested Krasnov and sent a delegation to the
Gatchina Soviet (that had just been arrested by Krasnov with the
surrender on condition that they be allowed to return to the Don.
 I proposed to the Gatchina Soviet that they send the delegation to us
in the Smolny. In the meantime, however, Dybenko, on his own initiative
sent representatives to Krasnov to demand his surrender. Krasnov got
Dybenko to agree to his departure to the Don together with the Cossacks
who would retain their arms. An agreement consisting of eight points was
drawn up between them.

 In this way Dybenko had tied the hands of the government. We were
opposed to the Cossacks being allowed to return to the Don with their
arms, as we had no reason to believe that they would fulfil their
promise not to fight against Soviet power. I insisted on Dybenko's being 
tried by court-martial and the agreement with Krasnov renounced.
 
Lenin shared my opinion. Other comrades, however, who considered
themselves well informed with regard to the mood of the Cossacks
demanded that the agreement be ratified on the grounds that the Cossacks
would under no circumstances permit themselves to be disarmed and
would fight to the last man since they would not want to return to the
Don 'dishonoured' and that they would not be accepted their without their
arms. They argued that it was to the advantage of Soviet power to accept
Krasnov's surrender and thus put an end to Kerensky's offensive because
every delay in crushing the revolt would strengthen the impression
amongst the masses that Kerensky had greater forces and greater
possibilities for resistance than was actually the case, while the
speedy crushing of the revolt, on the contrary, would raise the prestige of
Soviet power. The rout of Kerensky's revolt outside Petrograd would deprive him
of the forces necessary to launch revolts against Soviet power in other
places. The situation at the front and in the army units would also be
undermined by the defeat of Kerensky.

 The impression created by the statements of the seventeen Cossacks
delegated direct from the masses of the Cossack troops participating in
the revolt gave these arguments still greater strength. The Cossacks said
that they had not been fighting against the working-class government or
against the new regime but against the Bolsheviks who, they had been informed
had seized power with the aid of the Germans, German gold and German
prisoners of war for the purpose of betraying Russia and selling her to
the Germans. As they learned more about what had been happening in
Petrograd they began to understand the real nature of the October
Revolution and a conference of Cossacks from the various units demanded
that a delegation be sent to the new government. Until then they had
considered it their duty to support Kerensky. The delegation defended
Krasnov, a slippery demagogue who knew how to play on the feelings of
the Cossacks. The delegates insisted that Krasnov, too, had only been
doing his duty and could not disobey orders given by Kerensky in
Gatchina when the revolution in Petrograd was still unknown to the troops at the
front. The Cossacks agreed to arrest and hand over the other officers
but insisted that Krasnov go with them.
 
The question was placed before the Petrograd Soviet which was in
session at the time. The Soviet took a decision to allow the Cossacks,
headed by Krasnov, to proceed to the Don under arms. The Military
Revolutionary Committee issued them a pass to the Don Region and
Krasnov and the Cossacks gave their word of honour that they would not
fight against Soviet power.

 It is an interesting fact that the 1st and 4th Cossack regiments,
quartered in Petrograd, at first wavered when Krasnov sent delegates to them
asking or their support, and then decided to come over to our side. The
presence of the Cossacks in our ranks had a serious moral effect on the
insurrectionists and did a great deal towards demoralising them. This
greatly influenced the outcome of the struggle.

The Petrograd Cossacks, who had elected their own Cossack Committee
also spoke in favour of allowing Krasnov and his Cossacks to leave for
the Don under arms.

After the departure of the Cossacks (some of them who did not wish to
return remained in Petrograd), the local Soviets of Gatchina, Peterhof,
Krasnoye Selo and Tsarskoye Selo dealt very speedily with the cadet and
officer groups that had taken part in the revolt.

After Kerensky's offensive against Petrograd had been defeated we
received almost daily reports that Kerensky's supporters were raising
revolts first in one place, then in another, and that in some places
they even succeeded in restoring the old regime. All this, however, was their
death agony. The revolution was celebrating its victory, or as Lenin put it,
Soviet power marched in triumph throughout Russia...



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