File spoon-archives/marxism-psych.archive/marxism-psych_1997/marxism-psych.9706, message 15


Date: Wed, 18 Jun 1997 06:30:24 GMT
From: Chris Burford <cburford-AT-gn.apc.org>
Subject: M-PSY: Habermas and the colonisation of the lifeworld


I found Andrew's comments on Habermas and the colonisation of 
the "lifeworld" helpful (see below for post under thread title
"Serotonin and capitalism'.

This confirms my understanding that Habermas was using the 
term previously used by Schutz and Husserl.

Andrew explains:
>>By lifeworld is meant those knowledge
structures that are generally unaccessible to the conscious mind, that are
implicitly known, and are taken-for-granted. (There is controversy over
the degree of conscious accessibility. Some ethnomethodologists believe
that breeching can reveal deep tacit knowledge. Some phenomenologists
believe deep belief structures can be tapped through introspection. And,
of course, there is revelation by therapeutic unmasking.) These deep
structures orient us towards particular ways of behaving.
<<

I am not sure what ethnomethodologists are, but this passage 
rings quite a lot of bells for me. Members of the intelligentsia,
like most of ourselves, are used to prioritising coherent verbalised
communication lacking glaring logical inconsistencies. Psychologists,
however confirm that the great majority of communication is non-verbal.
And in the evolution of primates, I see nothing reductionist in 
regarding that as the basis. 

Just as we see with our eyeballs only a narrow range of the 
emissions of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and call them light,
so at any one time what we "see" consciously and coherently is
a sample of a far larger fuzzy sphere of remembered experiences
and significances.

If Andrew is right that "A lifeworld means that
there exists an objective unconscious knowledge structure that orients
behavior" then both Marx and Freud were on the right track in 
emphasising this. The law of value works largely through
unconscious processes in capitalist society  even
while the participants think they are conscious and 
businesslike. (Why then did Habermas did not accept the law of value?)

Andrew's next comment gives a lot of work potentially to 
be explored on marxism-psych:
"Another contribution is that explains why the tacit acceptance
for exploitative and oppressive social systems is so difficult to
dislodge; e.g., individuals socialized as slaves acceding to slavery, or
more relevant for us, acceding to capitalism."


He continues:

"The logic of capitalism is what colonizes the lifeworld, the individual
unconsciously accepting capitalism as the "legitimate" (this word doesn't
really fit, but I hope what I mean is understood) system."

The word "colonise" has destructive connotations to me, but it is 
not clear from this comment, how destructive. I wonder reading this,
how much Habermas's approach here is compatible with green economics
which emphasises how  capitalism externalises costs onto
the environment, polluting the environment, and whether this
idea can legitimately be extended to the destruction and pollution
of the subtlety of humanity's psychosocial world ~ lifeworld?

Andrew emphasises,
"It should also be made clear that the central concept Habermas places 
against the concept of lifeworld is "system." The lifeworld is reproduced
through communicative action within normative systems. The synthesis here
is not Marxist. He draws upon Mead's theory of symbolic interaction (so
named by Bloomer), which is the most dialectical of the other views he
draws upon. This would make for an interesting discussion; Mead's theory
is a microversion of Marx's in many respects.  "

Does a 'microversion' imply at the psychological level? 

We have to consider how this thread continues, as it started on 
marxism thaxis, moved to marxism-psych where it drew some
further responses on Habermas, and has gathered this 
interesting response from Andrew on marxism-and-sciences.

I will copy this reply to both, and perhaps Andrew can decide
if he also wishes to subscribe to m-psych, which is quite a low
volume list, and we can see what further responses there are in
either place.


Chris Burford

London.


____________________________________________________

Date: Sun, 15 Jun 1997 11:55:07 -0400 (EDT)
From: Andrew Wayne Austin <aaustin-AT-utkux.utcc.utk.edu>
 
To: marxism-and-sciences-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
cc: marxism-psych-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: M-SCI: Serotonin and capitalism

Chris,

It is not Habermas' term, although he does spend some time defining it in
his theory of communication, so taking in the philosophical legacy of the
term helps. Habermas is using the term most like Schutz did in his
phenomenology of the everyday world. By lifeworld is meant those knowledge
structures that are generally unaccessible to the conscious mind, that are
implicitly known, and are taken-for-granted. (There is controversy over
the degree of conscious accessibility. Some ethnomethodologists believe
that breeching can reveal deep tacit knowledge. Some phenomenologists
believe deep belief structures can be tapped through introspection. And,
of course, there is revelation by therapeutic unmasking.) These deep
structures orient us towards particular ways of behaving.

The positive contribution this construct makes is, at least, twofold.
First, it gets around the Weberian problem of only seeing social behavior
as that which is subjectively (or intersubjectively) oriented. For Weber,
an behavior is not action unless it is subjective. A lifeworld means that
there exists an objective unconscious knowledge structure that orients
behavior. Another contribution is that explains why the tacit acceptance
for exploitative and oppressive social systems is so difficult to
dislodge; e.g., individuals socialized as slaves acceding to slavery, or
more relevant for us, acceding to capitalism.

The logic of capitalism is what colonizes the lifeworld, the individual
unconsciously accepting capitalism as the "legitimate" (this word doesn't
really fit, but I hope what I mean is understood) system. As I said, these
structures make it difficult to bring the proletariat to an understanding
of objective class relations and interests. For Habermas, in his
neo-Weberian tendencies, the logic of capitalism is, more or less,
bureaucratic rationalization (Marcuse and other critical theorists made
this point also).

It should also be made clear that the central concept Habermas places
against the concept of lifeworld is "system." The lifeworld is reproduced
through communicative action within normative systems. The synthesis here
is not Marxist. He draws upon Mead's theory of symbolic interaction (so
named by Bloomer), which is the most dialectical of the other views he
draws upon. This would make for an interesting discussion; Mead's theory
is a microversion of Marx's in many respects. There has been academic
suppression (through a cultivated ignorance) of the dialectical and
historical side of Mead. Habermas draws upon Schutz and Husserl's
phenomenology. For systems, Habermas drawns upon Parsons and Durkheim, as
well as Luhmann, who has also developed a theory of communication
(Parsons' theory is a reworking of Weber's theory, and a synthesis with
Durkheim and Pareto).

Probably more than anybody wanted to know who didn't know it already. I
would not include in this concept anything having to do with biology.
Habermas' scientific worldview is on the other side of fence in this
respect. Thank god.


Andy


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