Date: Thu, 31 Oct 1996 17:51:47 +0200 (EET)
From: j laari <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi>
Subject: M-TH: Re: subject, social theory (was: marxist, marxian...)


Justin,

I'll continue... Here are some more hasty remarks...

You wrote:

" JL says that Marx didn't present his work as a social theory but as
a piece of political economy. I think this is wrong on both counts.
When he gave a name to his theory he called it "the materialist
conception of history," which siounds like social theory to me. (..)
Although he wrote a lot about PE, he didn't see himself as doung PE
but as presenting a "critique" of PE, the term is present in the title
of both hid major works on the subject. "


What about "theory of history"? And he also claimed to be an economist
when he was defending himself against accusations of being a
philosopher. But I don't think this to be so important. (Guess he
considered himself first and foremost as a revolutionary, political
person?) What counts is that by your criteria he presented theories
(at least social theory). Well, they might be considered as
philosophical theories, I agree on that. According to my viewpoint,
however, delivering some basic principles as Marx did (the materialist
conception of history, as you rightly write - not histomat) is not a
theory. It's just, well - conception of something. I take "theory" to
mean an effort to present the basic tendencies of an object under
consideration in a systematic categorial or conceptual way.

I do agree that there are lots in common to both history and sociology
(though we can discuss whether social theory is only general
sociologicaltheory or somewhere between economics, history,
politology, sociology & al.; I tend to favour the latter view), but I
don't see it reasonable to wipe out the differences between them.
That's why I'd like to maintain a difference between theories of
history and social, too.

How can I say it more clearly? Marx presented great insights
concerning genesis and maintenance of things social, but that doesn't
count as social theory. Obviously he also had quite coherent view
about what is "historical", "political", "social" etc. but did he ever
presented his views in a systematic fashion - developing categories,
showing their connections etc.? It's as with his methodology. Surely
he promised to write something on it, but finally main "Marx's
methodology" seems to be in one famous introductory manuscript...


You also wrote:

" Now, as to the claim that Marx didn't presenta  theory of the
subject. Well, if that means he didn't think through the nature of
consciousness the way Hegel did, I agree. But there's a clear sense
inw hich he thought that Hegel had got a lot of that stuff right and,
in M's famous phrase, just needed to be set on his feet. So he
develops a lot of analysis trying to explain how the different phases
of consciousness taht Hegel talks about can be explained in their
"material" context. The meaning of "material" is key and debated, but
it certainly does not mean, at least in the broadest sense that M uses
it, "narrowly economic." "


Can we say that "material" means "economic" in its broadest sense, as
practices and institutions aimed at taking care of reproduction of
population?

I tend to agree a lot. Interesting question is to what extent Marx
really thought that Hegel got it right - not only consciousness and
psychic processes, but they and practical (cultural, linguistic,
social and such) skills in toto.

I mean that if one considers for example consciousness 'abstractly' as
Hegel did (did he really so? I'd answer positively), then there is a
danger to misunderstand the whole phenomenon under scrutiny. I would
ask firstly "what in Hegel is right?" Let's call it preliminarily
"Hegel's formal schema" and state that it consists of historicity and
interactional dialectics, to put it bluntly.. I guess everyone accepts
this today.

In a sense Gillian Rose (if I remember her correctly) interprets Hegel
as theoretician of subject(-ivity) who puts the weight on aesthetics,
religion and such things: for G.W.Fr. religion provided "formative
experience" for "masses", aesthetics and philosophy were more
important for only some minor groups. Rose reminds that Hegel's
philosophies of art and religion are important in relation to question
of subject: it's not only a question of, say, "formal structuration of
consciousness." On the other hand, she ignores practical side as
almost every traditional intellectual does.

Now, if we think of KM's view - economy & labour as constituents of
subject(-ivity), to put it roughly - then I'm not sure whether we can
compare these alternatives as one being upside down and other being
OK. They elaborated different sides or dimensions of "what we are made
of." Intellectuals have usually had intellectualist bias and therefore
ignored more practical and fundamental dimension of being a subject.
This was, for me, exactly Marx's great insight - feuerbachian or not.

Another question is whether aesthetic and religious experiences get
their proper meanings in the "totality" where economy in general is a
basic explanatory framework, as you say. I tend to think this is
right. At least on some very general level of phil. of history. In a
more concret analysis it might be fruitful to think of them a bit more
'independent'?

In other words, post-structuralist critique has in its peculiar way
concentrated (as one of its themes) on question of category "subject"
as a unified being: what if it isn't such an unity as we have
traditionally believed? what if we, as subjects, develop several
patterns of different kinds of skills and "psychic formations" in
relation to different practices and spheres of everyday life? That is,
why it seems to be 'natural' in marxism to consider society as
antagonistic without internal fundamental unity, but at the same time
to consider "subject" as unified whole? I tend to be impressed by
freudian idea of "split subject" on these matters.

To me it isn't a necessary either/or situation to think of Hegel and
Marx on subject - they were both one-sided, in a sense. If Hegel saw
subject in an intellectualistic way, and Marx more as practically
situated, then there is a possibility to think that they both had
developed dear category of subject, only from only one point of view.
Therefore I think it's justified to say that Marx was one-sided, too.
Besides, he didn't really made strict conclusion (in a sense of
systematic theory) of his insights. He just turned the idealist
conception of subjectivity as something active on its feet by pressing
that in their practices subjects are creative, innovative etc. Not a
bad conclusion at all, but it doesn't include explanation of what this
active subject is like 'internally', or as our bhaskarian friends
would say, "what it must be like in order to be as a being actively
engaged in the world."


By the way, Rose also says, that Marx didn't understood Hegel's
concept of actuality. Instead he interpreted it in a fichtean way, and
(therefore) he didn't really developed categories of subjectivity,
culture and Bildung (I guess she used word 'formation' which I thought
to be a translation of Bildung, but I'm not sure about it). I tend to
believe there is something to that. Surely Marx never really
explicated his views on all that in a systematic way.

I'm not capable to decide whether or not Marx understood Hegel's
"actuality". I don't think Marx was really aiming at "general social
theory", so it's understandable that there were several categories
lacking from his writings. But I surely do think these issues raised
by Rose, among others, are worth of discussion.  (Ralph once expressed
his wish that there should be discussions on culture and aesthetics on
thaxis. So let's say that this is my modest effort to put these issues
an agenda... provided anyone reads this.)


And finally you wrote:

" If by the claim that Marx is economistic you mean the he thinks the
economy is the basic explkanatory framework, yoiu're right, but that's
not what most people mean. They mean by economistic the proposition
that all events have economic causes or or serve economic functions
that explain them. This is something you will not find supportted in
Marx. "

There is also a question whether we are considering for example
"culture", "economy", and "politics" as (a) *different but related
areas* of social activities or do we consider them as (b) *points of
view into (social-historical) process* where cultural, economic and
political prosesses are in reality happily married (interwoven) so
that only tips of their icebergs are structured as different
(sometimes seemingly, sometimes really independent social)
institutions. In a latter view it surely is legitimate to view social
process as either cultural, economic or political by analyzing
activities and institutions and their relationships in the whole
process just from one angle and, perhaps, ignoring the other angles.
It's just that it isn't 'whole picture.'

I think I had/have in mind "Grundrisse" because there are lots such
illuminating insights into strictly non-economic phenomena in an
economic framework, if my memories are valid at all. There Marx's
viewpoint was economic and he shed light on non-economic 'things' in a
way that can be characterised as based on point of view of economy.
But he didn't elaborated his insights into social theoretical 'whole'
in a sense of theory I understand it.

So if you're saying that Marx shed some 'economic light' on
non-economic phenomena, then I have no problems with that as such.
However, in my mind he didn't had social theory in a strict sense.
Therefore I think it to be justified to say that by giving
constitutive economic determinations to social (or non-economic)
phenomena under consideration without proper social theoretical impact
he could be blamed of economism even in a latter sense you outlined
above. That is, it is justified to call an economic determination
without other (non-economic) accompanying determinations "economism".
I don't think it to be a big sin to present such economisms, but
surely there's something lacking in it.

Jukka




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