Date: Mon, 4 Nov 1996 21:04:04 -0500 (EST)
From: Justin Schwartz <jschwart-AT-freenet.columbus.oh.us>
Subject: Re: M-TH: Re: subject, social theory 



JL and I were discussing whether Marx has a social theory.

On Sat, 2 Nov 1996, j laari wrote:

> In a matter of fact, in the times of Marx there wasn't such a stable
> and obvious (well, I'm not so sure about that obviousness) distinction
> in German as there is today; that between "gesellschaftlich" and
> "sozial". 

This is not a distinction I am familiar with.

> I've seen this distinction delivered in English as "societal/social". In

Gee, I thought "societal" was just an ugly variation on "social."

> this sense Marx's theories and conceptions during the project of
> critique of pol. economy concern mainly "things societal": viewpoint
> is on the whole society with an emphasis on economic relations and
> structures. Of course he speaks of "things social", too, but it isn't
> his main concern. In a sense discourse on "social" developed after
> Marx.

So what are these "things social"?
> 
> On the other hand, for example sociologists concentrate on "social
> interaction" (as if interaction isn't always social) - its forms,
> structures etc - without any necessary emphasis on economic relations
> and processes. 

So are "things social" social relations considered in abstraction from the
economy?

In a sense, you can't have theory of society (societal)
> without economy, but it's not a problem todo social theory without
> references to economy.

Well, it can be done. That doesn't mean it's a good idea.

> My point is that the concept of "social" has been defined more or less
> clearly and in distinction to economic, cultural, political,
> historical etc. It doesn't mean that culture, history etc. should be
> ignored but that main emphasis is on (forms, structures, processes of)
> social and its specifics.

So "the social: is in abstraction from not only the economy but also all
that other stuff? What's left when you take that all away? Talcott
Parsons, maybe?

> Also "societal" does not exclude cultural, political and historical
> dimensions of reality though it puts emphasis on economic one. So if
> I'm explaining something and I write about "these societal.." then I'm
> using viewpoint (not necessary reasoning) very close to Marx, for
> example meaning that 'capital relations entered into some forms of
> everyday life or ordinary culture.' But if I'm writing about "these
> social.." then I simply might mean that object of study is being
> studied in all its relations to other relevant phenomena (relevant
> from the viewpoint of study and its theoretical presuppositions).

It all its relations? That's too many for me, as Huck Finn woiuld say.

> 
> You might say that I'm presenting again pretty cryptic views. Sorry
> for that. It takes few years to 'internalize' the basics of "own
> discipline" and after that, so it seems, it's hard to explain in few
> words the basic concepts and their differences.

I would say this is pretty cryptic. I guess I have no idea how theyt do
sociology in Finland. What would I know, I was only trained as a political
scientist, philosopher, and now as a lawyer.

> What about: his historical theory was basically societal? (And not a
> treatise in political history or in history of ideas.) That's what I
> like to be more accurate description of his thinking. However,
> historians may disagree...

Well it certainly wasn'y mainly political history or history of ideas, for
sure. > 

<Snip>

> 
> I meant "abstractly" in the sense of analysing some particular
> (historical) form of consciousness without attention to its social and
> societal 'genesis' and 'environment'.

Certainly Hegel doesn't do taht. Except in one mode. If you look ath the
PhG, he tells the same story each time two ways, once historically and the
other "conceptua;lly," as he calls it; maybe you mean by "abstractly" what
H means by the Logic of the Concept. Excepot that's an odd usage. Hegel
thought that was being concrete.

 By the way, I don't find
> consciousness particularly important or interesting factor when
> discussing "subject": one point with whole subject-theoretical
> discussion have been to describe and map psychic functions and
> processes etc. that act "behind" consciousness.

Well, no doubt unconscious and supra conscious factors do some work. "We
don't take a man at his own valkuation," as Marx says. But Since peoplea
ct on what they think and want, consciousness surely matters insofar as we
think of subjects as agents.

> 
Snip
> 
> How knowledge is possible? And that was Hegel's proect? 

Sure. Read the intro to the lesser Logic or consider the last chapter of
the PhG.

And Marx, a
> good pragmatist? I'm not convinced.
> 

Well, this being deliberately provocative. But I do think there are many
parallels. See Sidney Hook's Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx.

 > 
SNIP
> 
> Sorry. I try this way: Marx considered human beings in societal
> relations, and thought that it's these relations where humankind gets
> its historical determinations. Hegel thought that "spirit" is kind of
> self-generating formation which expresses itself in world. That sounds
> awful but I hope I was able to express a basic difference somehow.
> Now, intellectuals.

So far, so good.

> 
> Valentin Volosinov once wrote that language is "practical
> consciousness." I'm not sure, for me it seems to be "theoretical
> consciousness." Change or break in social thinking that took place in
> 19th century has concentrated on practical activities as major factor
> in defining the "true nature" of humans. We learn to do several
> things, but we don't necessary learn to describe what we do, to
> discuss our practices.

Plato pointed this out, arguing that craftsmen therefore had no knowledge.

 Thinkabout artisans and their skills, for
> example. Craftmanship is learned by working under the supervising
> "master." Important nuances are learned by comparing good and bad
> results of work simply by touching the products: is it really flat,
> smooth (whatever) "asks" a joiner by applying his fingers to object
> his working on - kind of "unconsciouss" dimension when learned and
> automatized as part of work process. It takes time to learn such
> sensibility and whatever we are doing, we don't have to think
> consciously all the time our work ("now I'm taking this knife and put
> it on object and mark it by using such and such a force"). Marx was
> among the first ones to draw theoretical conclusions of it. The
> importance of practice both as "ontologically" and
> "epistemologically".

OK, that's part of whyt he was a proto-pragmatist.
> 
> However genius Hegel was in some respect, he truly was an
> "intellectualist" on this question. Surely there is the dimension of
> discourse and language ("ideality") to being a human subject, but
> there's also practical dimension I tried to characterise.

But see his discussion of the slave in the Master anbd solave chapter of
the PhG. This probablyt influenced Marx.

By "practice" (some) marxists
> have generally understood political activity, but for Marx there was
> also practice of this sensual-practical activity. It's important in
> social scientific sense pertaining to "subject."

This is very important for the young Marx and is key to his
alienation-based objection to capitalism.

 And especially it's
> important in relation to recent discussions on subject as "speaking
> subject" (being of language) or as "subject of desire" etc... Language
> isn't the whole truth however important it is social theoretically.
> "Desire" as such is nearly incomprehensible, I believe, until it's
> structured in life practices.

Hm. No doubt. 

> 
> 
> "Where did you get the idea that Marx views subjects as a unified
> whole? The main point of the theory of alienation is that alienated
> man and woman is not unified. Our lives are not what we do when we
> work, etc."
> 
> I wrote about "marxism". Your note about alienation is good, I really
> didn't thought about it at all. Subject-theoretically, I guess, that
> wouldn't be counted because it doesn't put emphasis on 'internal'
> dynamic and structuration of subject. However, I won't swear that. I
> like dimension of alienation in relation to subject.
> 
Sure it does. Reread, for example, the 1944 manuscripts on Alienated Labor.

> Funny thing is that I happen to know marxists, ex-marxists etc., who
> strongly oppose every effort to "introduce" any such idea into social
> theory and sociology. Why? Because they believe it means loss of
> 'agency': if there's no 'unified (preferably wholly self-consciouss)
> subjects' then there's no real revolutionary agents, no real citizens
> etc.

Well, there fools everywhere.

 According to them, it's nearly irrational to suppose some
> "unconsciouss" psychic processes because that would take
> responsibility away from subject, etc... It seems there's a vision of
> Freud's supposed biologism behind these fears. I had an impression
> that such trends aren't particularly rare in USA either.
> 
No, not at all.

> 
> " Anyway, what's this "what's it like" question? Are we doing
> phenomenology a la Husserl? Why w\ould we wantto do that? "
> 
> No, not Husserl this time. No phenomenology. Rather a question of what
> kind of basic (mainly) psychic structures, functions etc. there should
> be in order there to be husserlian subject (with intentional
> consciousness etc.).

I dunno. That's too deep for me. I used to do tahts ort of stuff, then I
swore it off. I never get anywhere with Kantian type transcendental
questions. Doesn't mean some folks can't make hay with them.
 > 
> inventing, creating. Question is, how we should think of human being
> to be in order that all to be possible? There are biological,
> historical, whatever factors making their marks on us (as several
> sciences eagerly witness), and yet we aren't machines, mechanical
> predetermined things. So how it is possible that we can "swallow" all
> those "determinations" and yet act as if they don't exist?
> 
> That's "what's it like" question.

That's Kant's question about the possibility of freedom in a deterministic
world. Try thinking aboyut it. It will tie your brain in knots. I follow
Rousseau, who in discussing freedom swore off metaphysics. Kant tried to,
but his version of swearing off metaphysics is worse than the real thing.

> 
SNIP 
> 
> No I'm not saying that Marx looked at only economic perspectives.
> 
> My point has been on social theory. I hope I've explained this time
> the difference between "social" and "societal". Marx had to do with
> "societal", not with "social". 

No, alas. I stuill don't get it. 

As social theory Marx's thinking isn't
> particularly good. But there's no reason to blame him for that because
> modern social theory proper developed after Marx. Instead I do see a
> reason to blame those contemporary marxists who are not respecting
> such a basic conceptual distinction as that of "social" and
> "societal". When used carefully, it clarifies arguments, reasoning.
> Unfortunately it seems I haven't been very succesful in presenting
> this distinction more accurately.

So, maybe try once more.

--jks




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