From: "Jukka Laari" <jlaari-AT-dodo.jyu.fi>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 1997 16:22:14 EET+200
Subject: M-TH: re: materialism vs idealism (was: master-slave)


Greetings!

James Lawler replied few weeks ago to my older post. I told James
earlier that I had read his clear and crisp reply but haven't yet
found time to reply him. Then I rushed into some urgent duties (as
making questions for exams) and, unfortunately, forgot his post
again... until it popped up this morning. However, in the meantime I
finally realised what I should have said in the beginning of the whole
discussion on materialism versus idealism. I will come to that later.

On Phenomenology: It seems that we agree on the specific nature of Ph.
but James managed to present it perhaps in a more modern way than I
did:

" It is not really a history of thought, not in any straightforward
sense at least. Using Foucault's metaphor, it is an archeology of the
consciousness of the modern individual (of Hegel's day), which has the
purpose of leading that consciousness from what can be regarded as its
immediate state, in which truth is supposedly accessible by direct
experience, to the point at which that consciousness is capable of
addressing issues in a scientific manner. For the latter it is
essential to be able to master general categories of thought, having
their own specificity or logic -- as opposed to the initial view that
truths are accessible through direct sensation. "

Nice formulation. Remind me to steal it...

Then James turned to Hegel's Phil. of Right: "The study of society in
the Philosophy of Right begins with the 'category' of property. As
Tony Smith puts it, this is a definite form of social activity. Hegel
analyzes this starting point for the study of modern society." (Etc. -
there's no need to duplicate his presentation.) As I said earlier I'm
not in a position to judge Phil. of Right, but James' presentation was
clear.

Now, materialism vs idealism: It was originally (in late August, in
September?) my mistake not to express it clearly that I've understood
the whole question concerning the 'basic question' of metaphysics and
ontology. Is that what is (Being) of material or ideal nature? And
what is the relationship between nature and thought? Dialectical
presentation, when considered methodologically, grasps the movement of
the object and as such is neither materialist nor idealist, as James
reminded. Therefore political or social philosophy (or Hegel's Phil.
of Right as was the case on thaxis earlier this autumn) isn't
necessarily the proper context to judge some author's stance. Instead
we should concentrate on his or her 'metaphysical' views. On what
ground he or she builds 'the system' or theory? What are the basic
postulates?

In the case of Hegel that cannot be anything else but "Logic" (well, 
of course Ph. is of some relevance, too), where he equates Being with 
thinking. That is, he denies the relevance of (for example) 
Schelling's criticism that when concentrating only on thinking of the 
opposition (or difference) of nature and thinking one is already 
committed to 'one-sidedness', that one cannot later include nature in 
'the system' except as a concept only. We may today say to Schelling 
that Hegel's point was rather to show the 'intersubjective' nature of 
thinking and mind, but that doesn't change a thing: the result would 
only be sort of collective idealism ('objective idealism'?), 
unsubstantiated - perhaps a quasi-mystical - collective 
consciousness.

Behind Schelling's and Hegel's dispute was the question of identity of
nature and thought, and the beginning of The System (from where it
must begin?). They saw that somehow the Absolute Identity of nature
and thought, so to speak, must be the basic reference or ground of The
System. (That 'Absolute' is of course Spinoza's 'substance', question
of which was another grand theme for post-kantians along Kant's
'trancendental ego'.) Here Phenomenology is also relevant. Secondly,
these are issues that fill the contemporary theoretical map: questions
of 'identity', of 'subject', of 'sensibility' or 'sensuousness' and
such have their origin in post-kantian disputes of which the most
powerful stances were those of Hegel and Schelling. I must simplify
strongly if I want to clarify my point.

Hegel relied on Descartes: experience of 'Cogito', of 'I think', is
undeniable. Reducing it to brain states (or waves, whatever) means to
ignore the basic experience of philosophy. So, according to Hegel, the
only reasonable standpoint of philosophy is that of self-conscious,
reflective 'ego'. Well, Hegel redefined 'reflection' by referring to
others: 'ego' becomes to recognise itself in reflection only, in
relation to other - actually it becomes itself in reflection. Hegel
began with Cogito and tried to show that it comes to realise its
status as part of Spirit, as he wanted to call it. In short: it's only
at the end of the process that Absolute is realised and identity
between nature and thinking is proved. They are supposed to be One.

Schelling didn't accepted that. He went on to build another kind of
story. It begins with Absolute. Here Schelling is in pains even to get
at the standpoint of Cogito. Actually, the presentation of the genesis
of spirit is the most difficult one. His effort was eventually skipped
because it sounded like a madman's story - 'One becomes Two'... After
Freud's 'metapsychology' that can be done on different ground. Much of
what's been called 'post- structuralism' has concentrated on that,
mainly because they've tried to give a materialist justification to
theory (but that's another story). So there's no return to Schelling,
but he made at least one strong objection to Hegel's 'social
theoretical Spirit': is it really so that 'subject' (as we say today)
becomes to its being only through 'other'? How one can recognise the
'other' if it haven't already recognised itself as one (or self,
whatever)? That's the problem.

Also (quasi-schellingian) subject theoretical efforts have made
contributions to dialectics by elaborating different 'registers' of
the category of subject; universality, particularity, singularity
(individuality)...

One basic point with the issues involved is that both Hegel and
Schelling shared the conviction that no philosophical theory shouldn't
rely on empirical arguments. Reason for that: one point is to
guarantee the possibility of knowledge. Knowing must be based on
necessary grounds. Empirical knowledge, however, isn't necessary.
Also, it's for 'subject' and if we try to theorise subject empirically
we enter circulus vitiosus (reason why Freud's 'metapsychology' as
'speculative' effort to theorise the necessary structures and dynamics
of mind has been so important in 20th century). That's why Hegel and
Schelling took such painful efforts (as 'metaphysicians' before them).
Spinoza with his 'causa sui' was important to post-kantians because he
had tried to deduce a 'monistic', necessary System.

Hegelian reflection theory (not Freud who came 100 years later) has
showed that development does happen in social world. Now Schelling's
question has been renewed, perhaps because 'pure social theory' may
lead into justification of totalitarian system. It may turn out that
both 'subject' and 'social' theory are questionable. What will we then
do? A western dialectician would say that this is a beginning of new
dialectical circle. But that won't be an answer to original
ontological question. A nagarjunian dialectician would say that
Nagarjuna has demonstrated the 'emptiness' of subject nearly 2000
years ago... He might add that 'hair-splitting leads nowhere'. That's
not an answer (etc). I believe that Marx has already showed the
direction: both hegelian social theory (idealism) and schellingian
subject theory (materialism) should be dismissed.

Concentration on (slightly modified) 'praxis' is the answer: it
fulfills the criteria for a necessary theory, because (a) it is
universal (references to wage-labour and such ought to be deleted of
course) from which the rest of the theory is then deduced, (b) it
includes both nature and thought, as well as (c) subject and social.
After all, what would be more universal than 'sensuous activity' Marx
spoke about? I think it was called 'practical materialism' in
seventies... By the way, if anyone knows the Milano School from
seventies I'd appreciate all information (I've been told, they even
had a journal). They were tackling this practice problem...

Jukka L


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