Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 12:19:14 +0000
From: James Heartfield <James-AT-heartfield.demon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: M-TH: Privacy and Marxism


In message <v03102806b0f81648d93a-AT-[128.146.43.57]>, Yoshie Furuhashi
<Furuhashi.1-AT-osu.edu> writes
>
>I have a question for James and Justin. To what extent are rights the
>legal-political form of the "moral subject"? I suppose rights can be in
>some cases legal-political forms of "moral subjects," but aren't rights
>primarily legal-political forms of legally recognized subjects? I say this
>because rights can attach to many kinds of "legal persons," not all of
>which have moral standings. (For instance, corporations have "rights.")
>
Yes the subject (moral or otherwise) in classical political and legal
theory is not synonymous with the natural individual. Individual people
can be subjects, or not (if somebody is certified insane for eg, as L
Althusser found to his cost). More than that, subjects can be
collectives of people: corporations, which have rights and obligations
under law; also trade unions have rights (much contested); and even an
entire people have a right - a right to self determination, as
recognised (in a qualified way) in international law. 

Furthermore, the legal formalisation of right is logically posterior to
the actual existence of the subject. So, for example, in Britain, women
acted as autonomous subjects, protesting at their exclusion from
political and legal rights for many years before their claim to be
treated as equals (in electing Parliament for eg) was recognised and
formalised by Parliament. Similarly, Black South Africans, in organising
to prosecute their interests, brought themselves into being as
autonomous players many years before their rights were recognised in
law. Contmporary scholarship tends to reverse the procedure, arguing
that the formalisation of right in law is prior to the exitence of the
subject and constitutive of it.

In all of this I am just describing the classical concept of right and
the subject. As Marxists, I think our attitude should not be a wholsale
endorsement of it. There are many shortcomings to the subjectivity
achievable under capitalism - principally in the mutual hostility of
subjects, and the alienation of their activities on the market, to the
extent that that becomes a power over them.

However, insofar as rights are important in the struggle for
independence and autonomy, I think we have to take subjectivity
seriously.

> but the rights that only women can exercize
>(such as a right to safe legal abortion) do not seem to become as
>"fundamental" or as deep-rooted and well respected as other rights. Could
>it be that women are still not considered fully autonomous, legally,
>politically, and culturally (you can add morally, if you like), despite the
>seeming "equality" under the law? It seems that when push comes to shove,
>women's "biology" still seems to trump women's moral, legal, political
>autonomy.

My reading of this is that this is clearly a case of oppression - in the
strict meaning of the word: the denial of equal rights. Certainly
women's oppression is rooted in the one-sided development of the market,
but the concept of right is rooted in the market also. To engage in a
critique of the denial of rights you are challenging capital's failure
to live up to its own promises.

I distrust the argument that because rights were originally limited then
the very idea of right is flawed. I prefer the demand for the extension
of rights than their abolition.

>James wrote:
>>> Privacy is a more contemporary coinage (it features for example in the
>>> ECHR). At the moment in Britain the Right to Privacy is claimed by the
>>> rich and famous (Like Earl Spencer) to prevent public scrutiny of their
>>> lives. I take it to be a vulgarisation of the more classical concpt of
>>> autonomy.
>
>Despite Justin's comments, it seems to me that James's remark here is
>rather important. Under capitalism, the rich can buy a much larger and
>better-protected zone of privacy than the working class, and the same can
>be said about abortion.

My view would be that social inequality tends to clash with formal
equality. Re-writing the idea of autonomy as a more narrow concept of
privacy is finally an attack on rights, even if it is presented as a
right. Substantially 'privacy', at least as envisaged in the British
debate around a privacy law is a privilege for the rich, not a right for
everyone.

I am not sure what you mean when you say
>the same can
>be said about abortion.

It is sometimes argued that wealthy women are not oppressed, because
they can use their money to evade the legal limitations on abortion.
That might be true, but the denial of abortion rights to women is a sign
that as women they do not have equal status in society. It is like the
position of blacks in Britain. If they are lucky enough to make some
money, they still get stopped by the police if they are seen driving a
sports car, because the police have an attitude towards black people
that is independent of any consideration about their wealth. But I'm not
sure if that relates to what you mean. 

Fraternally
-- 
James Heartfield


     --- from list marxism-thaxis-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---