Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 19:40:22 +0100 From: Hugh Rodwell <m-14970-AT-mailbox.swipnet.se> Subject: M-TH: Iraq -- "Peace in Our Time!" Me and my mate clarified the terms of our bet today (after a not too successful attempt to cash in after the Annan deal). There's a time limit now -- end of June. And there are no conditions on the whys or wherefores of anyone backing off or not: if the US/UN drops bombs or missiles on Iraq, I win, if not, my mate wins. Now why has the US backed off despite the agreement not being watertight? It's probably a bunch of causes adding up to a decision to order a temporary delay. * They want a fresh run at public opinion. Right now they see opinion inflamed against them and getting rapidly more so, both at home in the States and abroad, particularly in the Arab countries. The obvious enthusiasm that has greeted Annan's deal must be very galling to them. * They want a fresh run at head-of-state opinion to overcome the resistance of France, Russia and Arab leaders. Albright said openly she thinks it will be easier to get support for military action if Iraq fails to comply with the agreement. She's obviously counting on this and will be planning all sorts of provocations to make it happen. I think she's wrong, but we'll see. * They consider it expedient to be seen giving time for the agreement to be implemented. * The Lewinsky case is off the boil ... What are the consequences of this? * The US is weaker than was thought, and isn't ready to ride roughshod over powerful home and foreign opposition -- yet. * The arguments about double standards -- one for Israel, another for Iraq -- cannot be ignored. * Knowledge of the genocidal effects of war and sanctions has spread too widely to be dismissed. * The double game of keeping Iraq on its knees while keeping Saddam H in power is becoming very difficult to maintain. Clinton made a Freudian slip and referred to Iran when he meant Iraq, underlining the imperialist strategy of divide and rule. This is greatly helped by ignorance and bigotry, but a lot more people are seeing the role of oil and the total lack of US concern for "democracy" in the Middle East now. And popular opinion in the Middle East is hardening more than ever against the US, with Iran defending Iraq, and even reliable puppets like Mubarak refusing to support the US openly. * Imperialist hatred of diplomacy is underscored -- you can just feel the contempt they are oozing for "signatures on pieces of paper". So whatever happens will be due to material relations of force, and more people than ever before will be aware of this. Secret diplomacy is still possible, but commentators in their competition are edging closer to the real pressures being applied in negotiations. * The spread of immediate news coverage everywhere is not just to the advantage of the imperialists, who got a lot of mileage out of their control of the media during the Gulf War. They have been forced to supply live news broadcasts to the ordinary men and women on the aircraft carriers for instance, and this will not necessarily be a morale booster -- just imagine the response among enlisted troops to that Columbus exposure of administration impopularity. Also it's no longer possible to take actions directly dependent on the suppression of unfavourable news -- there has been much complaining recently of the new pressures being put on regime advisers and diplomats now that the public is rapidly and fairly well informed. Government monopoly on news is much much more limited than it used to be, and it's not certain that diplomats can provide more useful commentary and analysis than people on the BBC or CNN or the Net. The ability of a worldwide public to follow the progress of Annan's diplomatic mission to Iraq is a form of indirect constraint on the US administration. A further interesting aspect is that some military people are starting to kvetch about the *cost* of keeping troops and equipment on war alert. This will presumably have a speeding-up effect on the new imperialist timetable for provoking Iraq into giving it an excuse to get stuck in. There is one aspect my friend reminded me of that I haven't been emphasizing enough, and it is the circumstance included in the following passage of the LIT/CI declaration on Iraq that I posted less than two weeks ago (seems like ages!): >These arguments [the Iraqi "danger", the "menace" of Saddam H] are not >just >absurd because of the obvious detorioration in Iraqi strength (even >the government >of Israel has had to declare that Saddam is not a threat >as he no longer possesses >the military might he had in 1991 [Clarin, 5 >Feb 98]), but also because of the >current attitude of Hussein himself. > >The attitude of the Iraqi government is very different from the one it had >in 1991. >Today it is no longer on the offensive calling for a war against >the Yankees and their >Zionist allies. Today it is not only doing >everything possible to reach a negotiated >settlement, even accepting such >humiliating conditions as opening up its >governmental palaces to >inspection, but it is also declaring quite specifically that it >will not >attack Israel even in the form of reprisals in the face of an invasion. To round off: there'll be a brief stalemate or time-out now to let the euphoria greeting Annan's Peace-in-Our-Time homecoming subside (he really should have waved a sheet of paper with the agreement on!), and then the tectonic plates of conflicting material interests will start chafing as usual and the tensions will pile up till it's time for the earthquake needed to reduce them again. June is a long way away. I'll be very surprised if I don't win my bet. But I'll be very happy if I lose, because the conditions that have to be met for me to lose all work in our favour. Cheers, Hugh --- from list marxism-thaxis-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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