Date: Thu, 28 Jul 1994 13:01:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: SCIABRRC-AT-ACFcluster.NYU.EDU
Subject: More on Labor and Logic


     This is a posting in response to the numerous criticisms
that have been made of my presentation of the Austrian
critique of the labor theory of value.  I'll respond to the
comments as methodically as I can.

     First, the very fine response of Paul Cockshott:

     With regard to Peano and the "potentially infinite set
of logics," let me just say that I certainly recognize the
different applications of various logical constructs.
Ultimately, however, if we are to ground our logical
constructs in existential reality, if we are to avoid going
off into pure rationalism, our logical constructs must be
related to ONTOlogical premises.  One of the most distinctive
characteristics of the Aristotelian realist tradition,
carried on in Marx's naturalism, is a tendency toward
SYNTHESIS, a collapsing of the dichotomy between empiricism
and rationalism, experience and logic, fact and value,
practice and theory.  Indeed, when Aristotle first formulated
the law of contradiction, "that the same attribute cannot at
the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in
the same respect," he did not dichotomize the laws of thought
and the laws of being.  He saw the principle of identity as
"true of being QUA being," the undeniable, axiomatic truth at
the base of metaphysics and epistemology.  The dualistic
dichotomies are a thoroughly modern phenomena, formalized in
the thought of Kant.  Hegel and Marx, to a certain extent,
sought to recapture the Aristotelian approach which was not a
static logic disconnected from reality, but a living,
dynamic, process-oriented approach to science.

     Hence, logic MUST be applied to "natural language."  If
problems arise due to "notorious ambiguities of parsing and
semantics," then we must get to the bottom of these
ambiguities.  We must, as Michael Polanyi suggests, "shift
the tacit coefficient of meaning" toward greater and clearer
articulation.  This is especially essential in "socially
contentious" dialogue.  If Habermas's theories mean ANYTHING,
it is that "socially contentious" dialogue must be made
transparent.  To articulate the logical content of an
argument and the meanings of the words used in that argument
is essentially part of the same epistemic achievement.  In
some cases, we will discover contradictions and invalid
formulations which must be overturned.  In other cases, we
may discover `class' biases.  Indeed, there are all sorts of
`class' biases and relational power structures hidden within
contemporary language usage.

     Thus, it is with humility that I applaud Paul for noting
my own imprecision in stating that "The status of the
subjectivist theory is NO LESS UN-empirical than the spurious
notions of `socially necessary' labor time . . . "  I meant,
of course, "NO LESS empirical."  (I'll chalk up the
imprecision to an animated willingness to get my postings out
as quickly as I can ONCE a day, to avoid being consumed by
this wonderful `dialogical' activity!!)

     Interestingly, Austrians have been criticized, like
their Marxist rivals, for offering certain formulations which
cannot be `empirically' tested.  Austrians would genuinely
appreciate Mike Lepore's observation that "the law of value
cannot be tested empirically."  By the way, I am far more
sympathetic to BROAD formulations of the `law of value' than
I am to more SPECIFIC attempts which apply the theory to
relative price differentials.  More on that later.

     As for Paul's observation that "Prices do encode
information, probably about 10 bits of information per raw
price":  I assume that Paul is using a hypothetical figure
here.  It is my belief that prices `encode' an almost
limitless amount of information which is concretized when
encountered by a knowing subject.  A knowing subject, the
social actor in a market context, concretizes the information
transmitted by a price, and makes decisions accordingly.  The
decision to buy a new pair of shoes is sometimes dependent on
factors that transcend "how much money" a person has.  There
are all sorts of preferences, priorities, and tacit factors
that enter into such decision-making, not merely the crude
utilitarian calculus of `economic man.'  (Austrians are
notoriously critical of this calculus-approach to human
action.)

     As for Paul's observation that "new technologies reduce
the labour that is socially necessary," I remain critical of
the somewhat arbitrary notion of the "socially necessary."
Granted, there are certain existential factors, such as sex,
food, clothing, and shelter, which are necessary for the
reproduction of human life.  But the notion of the "socially
necessary" can differ based on WHO is recognizing the social
necessity of the product, and IN WHAT CONTEXT that
recognition proceeds.  Not only do different societies have
different "necessities," different people WITHIN societies
act on the basis of vastly different judgments regarding what
THEY believe is necessary to their well-being.  The richer
approach of the Austrians is far better than the labor theory
of value at grasping these valuational differences, and the
vacillating prices that reflect - and are reflected by -
these differences.

     As for Paul's observation that the inventors are
"fabulous beasts," and that the real contrast is between
workers in design departments and workers in body shops, I
think that he is greatly underestimating the role of the
inventor in the genesis of production and in the creation of
human values.  Invention is the application of theoretical
knowledge to material reality.  I think that the Marxist
"bias" against `capitalists,' sometimes obscures the role of
the `capitalist' as entrepreneurial inventor.  To this
extent, and even within the parameters of a labor theory, the
`capitalist' QUA INVENTOR makes a substantial contribution to
the PRODUCTION process and to all the individuals, both
workers and other `capitalists,' who benefit from this
application of knowledge.

     Finally, I must say that I chuckled when Paul
proclaimed:  "There you go again."  Shades of Uncle Ronnie.
By the way, while this is a forum on Marxism and not on
Austrian theory, I think that some of the participants may be
unaware of the radical libertarian insights that have been
derived from the application of Austrian theory to class
analysis.  These applications are most definitely NOT a
disguise for capitalist apologia.  The libertarians are
developing a class theory that is very challenging, and just
as critical of predatory "capitalists" as anything Marxists
have to offer.  In a related context, I appreciate Samuel Day
Fassbinder's acknowledgment of the libertarian approach to
the "tragedy of the commons."  The developing libertarian
critique of the state-class bias of "public goods" provision
is provocative and productive of vast political implications
that challenge the "stranglehold [of] monopoly."  An
interesting critical primer on THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE
is presented in a book by that name, edited by Tyler Cowen
(George Mason University Press, 1988).

     A quick comment on Steve Keen's posting:  As always, a
reference to Meek is welcome.  Meek's writings often shed
great light on a very contentious debate.

     Now, let me turn briefly to Mike Lepore's very fine
posting.  While it can be argued that the Marxian approach
may grasp certain factors with regard to the "reference
level" of values, I am STILL not convinced that Marxian
economics can grasp the "vacillations" in relative prices.
Please note, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS DEBATE, I have
opposed the theory, NOT ON PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS, but as an
EXPLANATION of RELATIVE prices.  The vacillations in relative
prices within the market economy are NOT accidental to the
market process; they are ESSENTIAL because they never end.
The market economy is a spontaneous, dynamic, PROCESS.  I
believe that the Austrian approach is better equipped to
grasp these price vacillations and their meaning within the
context of dynamic market conditions.

     Nevertheless, I am very sympathetic to any approach to
"the law of value" which recognizes, what I believe, is a
fundamental truth, (and this will surprise some people):  In
a BROAD, PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE, labor can be understood as the
source of values.  While I am critical of the labor theory of
value as an EXPLANATION of relative prices, I recognize, in a
broad, fundamental way, that productive, creative human labor
is the wellspring of values and wealth on the planet Earth.
But my understanding of labor, informed by Austrian epistemic
insights, is far more complex than that offered by some
Marxists.  The value which labor produces transcends purely
"empirical" dimensions.  It encompasses tacit epistemic and
social practices which are not easily articulated or
quantified, and which contribute immeasurably to the
production process.

                             - Chris

============================================================Dr. Chris M. Sciabarra
Visiting Scholar, N.Y.U. Department of Politics
INTERNET:  sciabrrc-AT-acfcluster.nyu.edu
BITNET:    sciabrrc-AT-nyuacf
=============================================================