From: Hans Despain <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu> Date: Mon, 20 Feb 1995 18:38:03 GMT-700 Subject: dialectic There seems to be some interest in the topic of dialectic, I would very much like to begin such a discussion. Dumain offers to upload some bibliograpic citations which would be very appricated. Goldstein has immediately suggested a distinction between dialectics of nature (a la Hegel and Engles, I not sure that Lukcas and the Frankfurt school belong in this same category) and dialectic as scientific method (Marx and Lenin). This distinction is, I believe to be actually quite important, and useful. Press offers an introduction to dialectics that is quite useful. I especially like the his commets on simplity and complexity. Dialectics seem to me to be a rather simple method to organize a rather complex world, without taking its simplity of method for granted, while at the same not denying its complexity. In Dumain's post he itemizes the mentions of my post. This is propably quite broad, but to begin with it seems like possibly the best way to start. Therefore, I will take the same approach. However, I will make my post seperate, first, in order to keep the posts shorter so they are more convinently readable; second it is a lot of work to address and post each issue; and especially 3) to encourage a wider, but at the same time more specific discussion. I suggested that possibly the first order of business is to rid ourselves of the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis characterization. Dumain says that he believes no one to take this serious as a meaning of the Hegelian or Marxian dialectic. Boy, this has not been my experience, perhaps it is because I am surrounded by economists and not philosophiers. I have had a request to send someone personally my page on the issue, which I will, and maybe if there is any interest I will share it with the list. Therefore, the first order of business may be the concern of the difficulty of expounding the Marxian dialectic as it both differs and resembles Hegel's. At this point in my studies it seems to me to have more in common with Hegel's then many Marxist thinkers (economists) care to admit. Marx's Hegelian commitment, however, does not mean that Marx adopts the Hegelian *speculative philosophy*, nor is he necessarily committed to Hegel's ontology (although I have many question about this). The implicit ontological commitment to Hegel by Marx is difficult to justify without a commitment to Hegel's *idealism*, as Hegelian non-Marxists and Marxian non-Hegelians are quick to point out. Bhaskar and the non- Metaphysical interpretation of Hegel (K. Hartman, T. Pinkard, T. Smith) give an interpretaion of Hegel that is quite consisent with both Marx's exploitation of method and critique of philosophical commitment. In a future post I will elaborate on what I see to be Marx's ontological Hegelian commitment, which can be termed (following Bhaskar 1993, 1994) ontological dialectic. This is bound to led to paths that will be hotly contested, but the ontological commitment must be addressed. My main intention, however, is in hopes of discussing the dialectic method itself. Thus, maybe it is possible, as best we can, to attempt to keep Marx's dialectic as method and his ontological commitment separate discussions (though they are not necessarily a separte issue). In regards to method, or epistemological dialectic, I believe Dumain to be quite correct to point to section 3 of the gerneral introduction to Grundrisse. The problem with this exposition of Marx's is that those unfimilar with (epistemological) dialectics are not able to reconginize it as dialecitcal. In fact, I have had this section read to me to deny Marx is using dialectic as method. With respect to the method of dialectic the exposition by Marx's is broad and general. Dumain asks how this "dovetails" Hegel? I believe that it is very similar to how Hegel himself broadly describes his method of dialectic in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, which was meant as an introduction to his *Logic*. Hegel argues that the Mind moves from the concrete or its sense-perception of the world and its outside objects, sense-data, to abstract thought. The Mind attempting to understand the sense-perceptions encounters opposition, contradiction, paradox, interconnection, etc., indulging in several states of epistemological experience, which moves the Mind to the internal connections between objects, which are hidden from the external surface, resulting in thought itself, i.e. the Idea. This for Hegel is the first step of the dialectic as method, from the concrete to the abstract. The next step for Hegel is to show that the Idea logically and rationally emerges in the concrete world. This second step moves from the abstract to the concrete. In *Logic*, this second step shows that all the categories are internally connected in a dialectical system of thought. The Idea itself, through the (casual human) power of one's *external teleology* emerges in concrete form, as post-philosophical wisdom. This very much resembles the broad method discription that Marx offers in the Grudrisse. Where Marx says he begins with the concrete chaotic whole moves to the abstract, and from the abstract to the concrete, now in an unified rational whole. The 6 page passage seems to me undeniblly Hegelian. The problem is then to demonstrate how this Hegelian method emerges in the work of Marx. Hegel follows his triadic formula of *universality*, *particularity* and *individuality* to organize and structure his entire method and system. Marx, however, seems only to sometimes use such triadic formulation, while at the same time applying an empirical analysis along with, at times, a very different approach to Historical analysis then Hegel. Marx, certainly rejects Hegel speculative philosophy, along with his commitment to idealism, and the inversions that Hegel analysis mirrors. Hans Despain University of Utah despain-AT-utah.sbs.utah.edu --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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