Date: Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:47:20 -0700 (MST) From: fellini-AT-keynes.econ.utah.edu Subject: dialectics and teleology Ralph Dumain asks what I mean by "social engineering". It was identical to Jane Flax's characterization of Marxism. If there is an 'essential human nature', and if we can know exactly what it is, then all else is just an engineering problem, to perfect humans and hence society. But like Guy Yasko, I too believe that >>>Flax's characterization of Marxism ignores the strain of anti-Enlightenment thought in Marxism.<<< Also, I agree with Dumain in this (with one reservation below): ------------------------Dumain----------------------------- >in their account History itself is ultimately rational, >purposive, unitary, law governed, and progressive. In the >Marxist view, events in history do not occur randomly; they are >connected by and through an underlying, meaningful, and >rational structure comprehensible by reason/science. This is partially true, and partly a distortion. Only a Hegelian would claim history is "rational". Marxists would deny that history is "purposive", though some might admit some kind of telos in human development without being classical teleologists. History is not deemed to be merely progressive, but dialectically contradictory, such that civilization and barbarism are dialectically connected and "progress" together, hence the necessity of social explosions. The Marxist view recognizes both chance and necessity, randomness and structure. --------------------------------------------------------------- My reservation is the same with Howie Chodos's: >>>I do not understand the difference between "no pre-given purposes", which Marxism precludes, and "an implicit telos in history" which it can endorse?<<< Neither do I understand the difference. To me, they are exactly same. In answering this, Dumain writes: ------------------------------Dumain--------------------------- "Pre-given" implies teleology, which implies some form of objective idealism. My phrasing "implicit telos" would refer to an inherent logic of self-realization, not pre-ordained, not of History, but of real people developing historically. I wanted to be open-minded about this latter possibility, not because I think it applies to Marx, but because it does apply to the Hegelian Marxism of C.L.R. James _________________________________________________________________ If Dumain uses the "implicit telos" in the sense that only "real" people can have purposes, so that only humans can realize their own purposes, I agree, but I believe this should not be called "teleology". I think such an argument endorses the idea of "praxis", the conscious activity of people through which individuals reproduce and/or transform social structures, institutions or relations. But still, I have two problems with such a reasoning. First, we may still have a kind of "social engineering" approach, in the sense of the realization of human essence (as the unity of particular and universal) or the eradication of the contradiction between human essence and existence. I am not quite sure about the "perfectibility" of humans, though I am not willing to reject this altogether. Second, and more importantly, it is possible to incorporate this kind of reasoning into a teleological (in the sense of a pre-given purpose of history) setting: the movement of history is aimed to reach the unity of human essence and existence. Even one can argue that a "dialectical" reading of history is teleological, as in Flax's characterization. In this regard, I think, we should not forget that Hegel's whole system is teleological and dialectcis is quite essential in realization of the 'telos'. So, my problem is whether we can rescue dialectics from a teleological reading. And I suspect that Marxists may not have been quite successful to do this. Only in this sense I said that they only substite Hegel's Spirit with "matter", "history" or "class consciousness". BTW Dumain, I am not endorsing the view that the scope of Marxism should be restricted to social theory. But I am not still quite sure if 'replacing "spirit" with matter is radically different from history or proletarian class consciousness" within the above framework. In this regard, I have two comments: First, what Darwinian theory of evolution (and chaos theory for that matter) shows that there is no "purpose" in nature. Again, there is no "progress" from the simplest to the most complex organisms in nature. Both necessity and chance play important role in nature. But once you accept these, I do not know why should we still retain a 'dialectics of nature'. In Marxism, in regard both to both nature and society, we should get rid of the idea of rational, progressive and teleological development. If anyone can do this without dismissing dialectics, then I would be very happy to hear it. Probably what Bhaskar is doing is similar to this in his "dialectical critical realism". Second, as Hans Despain correctly argues, there is a problem in distinguishing between idealism and materialism in Marxism. I agree with him in that Marx's position is not a "mater ------------------
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005