Date: Fri, 3 Feb 1995 22:02:58 -0300 From: Juan Inigo <jinigo-AT-inscri.org.ar> Subject: Re: populism For the last month I've resisted the temptation to enter some discussions that were running through the list. I'm working against the clock reshaping some old drafts (and worst of all, translating everything to english) to make a presentation (From simple commodities to capital-commodities: the transformation of values into prices of production) at the March conference of the International Working Group in Value Theory. But this Peronist issue probably reaches closer to me than to anyone else in the list, so I just can't let it go by. As you can see, contrary to Louis' message, this is plenty of spleen. Louis Proyect writes > Maybe what >I'm trying to say is that categories cloak rather than reveal the essence of >Juan Peron and the Peronista movement Indeed. Even the most concrete forms are turned into pure abstractions as soon as they are isolated from their own necessity, that is, from their determinations. So, as Peronism is "the" main political concrete form that the argentine national process of capital accumulation takes on realizing its specific necessity since the '40s, we need to face it by following this necessity in its development: 1. The specificity of this national process of capital accumulation arises from the genesis and appropriation of a particularly large amount of agricultural ground-rent, compared with the amount of industrial capital that can be placed into action as normal (average) individual capital in the national ambit. 2. Since the beginning of the 20th century and up to the '30s, a part of this rent was used to pay the external public debt, while industrial capital expanded its accumulation basically in agriculture and the processing of agriculture products in an individual scale according to world-market. 3. Starting from the '10s, but mainly in the '40s and '50s, this rent was used to generate a mass of small industrial capitals able only to produce for the domestic market. At the same time, the most concentrated private capitals (mainly English) related to the previous phase appropriated a part of the rent and left the country as they were turned into state property at prime prices. 4. From the '60s on, these processes followed: a. Normal industrial capitals that operated as such in the world-market, fragmented themselves as small capitals to produce for the domestic market on the basis of the same rent of land, that compensated the fall in the surplus-value that these capitals extract from their direct wage-laborers due to their domestic restricted scale. b. A process of concentration and centralization of industrial capital took place, always restricted to domestic production c. For a time, the national scale of production went on growing 5. In the early '70s (73-74) a violent increase in the ground-rent produced the appearance that the national process of accumulation had no specific limit to its growth 6. As soon as the rent dropped, the national process of accumulation started to clearly show it was going to mean the consolidated pauperization of an increasing part of the wage-laborers and of the overproduced petit-bourgeoisie. Hence, the ferocity of the military dictatorship that opened this process. 7. The concentration and centralization of capital went on through private external indebtedness, afterwards turned into public debt. 8. The ground-rent started to grow again in the '90s as the main cycle of capital accumulation advanced, but there are now two partners to share it: nationally fragmented industrial capital and external creditors (of course, the land owners have always appropriated a part, sometimes almost all, sometimes a smaller part, of the rent). 9. In the '90' these two partners advanced in their appropriation of ground-rent by purchasing at bargain prices the industries nationalized in the '40s. 10. As the expansion of the national process of industrial capital accumulation has specific limitation in the amount of the ground-rent it can appropriate, and given that it has to share this ground-rent with the external creditors (who have titles to claim for an important part of, if not for more than, its total amount), even at the top of a short cyclical boom as we are today (rather, yesterday), progressive consolidated misery is a face, specially a kid's face, that is here to stay. Mexico less peasantry is almost here. The core of phase 3., phases 5. and 8/9. took political concrete form through peronists governments (Peron himself in the first to phases). Some comments about Jon Beasley-Murray and Louis N Proyect posts: >Peron practically created >the working class >The unions of Argentina emerged with Peron's help. These are two of Peronists dearest myths. The argentine industrial working class (let aside its even earliest development) emerged as a concrete form of (2.). The Socialist Party (1894) and anarchist groups at first plus Syndicalism and the Communist Party latter, were the political specific expressions of this working-class. The brutal repression on the Centenary (1910), what is still remembered as the "Semana tragica" (tragic week) (1909-10), the strikes in the meat-industry in the 30's, the electoral majority of the PS in Buenos Aires (where the industry was mainly located at that time) during parts of the 20's and 30's, the more than one million affiliates to the General Confederation of Workers over a total non-agricultural working population of three million during the 30's, are just some of the most visible manifestations of the existence of the industrial working-class and its unions during (2.). The rise of (3.) produced a violent expansion in this working-class and this transition from (2.) to (3.) took political shape in the complete "peronization" of the working-class, with the unions as its immediate political organization, that is still effective. Argentine unions were at that time and currently are orthodoxy peronists, what here means right-wing (and of course this is just another meaningless category when abstracted from its content), organizations whose leitmotiv is "Ni Yankees ni Marxistas, Peronistas." >the >Peronist coalition certainly included leftists and revolutionaries, This of course depends on what one calls leftists and revolutionaries, which are just two other categories that cloak rather than reveal the essence. In this case, the essence remains in the role those "leftists and revolutionaries" played in the reproduction of the specificity of the Argentine capital accumulation process. And this specificity in itself - beyond its opposite appearance - negates the development of society's material productive forces, as the ground-rent is used to allow the fragmentation of capital. "Montoneros," which was the "political formation and guerrilla groups who dominated the Argentinean left," of course talking about (5.),, was founded and mainly commanded by the former members of an ultra-nationalist right-wing ultra-catholic group, "Tacuara." Their leitmotiv "una Patria socialista" (a socialist fatherland) show how "Montoneros" was a necessary political form that (5.) and (6.) took mainly among the petite-bourgeoisie and some upper-sectors of the wage-laborers. Many of its surviving members (the middle and lower cadres were brutally decimated) are officers in the present-day peronist government, that personifies phases (8./9.). These phases in the process of capital accumulation take political form in a peronist government, as they are necessarily personified through the complete complacency of the unions. >Peron was the >representative of a wing of the bourgeoisie that was at war with another >wing of the bourgeoisie that was comprador and pro-imperialist. He was the main personification of the transition from (2.) to (3.) >Peron is also interesting because of his economic nationalism. Peron is one >of the few examples in Latin American history of a government leader who >was able to put up a stiff resistance to Wall Street and British imperialism. >This is one of the reasons he was hated so much by American opinion >makers who branded him as fascist. This was the necessary political form that the transition from (2.) to (3.) and specifically the second process pointed out in (3.) took. >There were progressive aspects to Peronism. That is what made Isabel >Peron's election campaign in the 1970's so disorienting to the left in >Argentina. The left tied their fate to her's and when she was defeated, the >ensuing demoralization made it a lot easier for the coup to prevail. Isabel Peron was imposed as Peron's vice-president to blockade any attempt from the "left" (if you are going to call Montoneros that) to intervene in Peron's government and succession. Certainly, this was disorienting only for those who were day-dreaming with the patria socialista. But they had time to elaborate their demoralization: Montoneros were expelled from Plaza de Mayo (the square facing the government house that is full of symbolism for peronists) by Peron himself almost two years before the coup. The only "leftists" group that supported her was the minuscule Maoist PCR. 30.000 missing people say that what happened in Argentina in those days went far beyond demoralization. It is again about the necessary concrete political form of the inflection point through which capital accumulation went from phase (2.) to its present form. Argentine society is certainly a lesson about how some regressive social potencies reach their most developed concrete forms as the apparently fully conscious revolutionary action of those who personify them. Juan Inigo jinigo-AT-inscri.org.ar ------------------
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