From: Hans Despain <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Fri, 10 Mar 1995 10:28:18 GMT-700
Subject:       Re: Despain & texts on dialectics 


Tony Smith is does not find my interpretation of his book: 
*The Logic of Marx's Capital: Replies to Hegelian Criticisms* 
justified, I myself also *do not* find my interpretation justified as 
Smith is reading my comments.  I wrote on March 9, that "I find that 
Smith's argument, with its ground in the non-metapysical 
interpretation of Hegel, though capable of offering better 
ontological grounds, remains rooted in first (seemingly) Hegel's 
external teleology, and second some sort of dialectics of nautre, 
which appears to be out of phase with both Hegel and Engels."  Smith 
continues by insisting that he has not committed Marx's systematic 
dialectics to either Hegel's ontology, historical dialectics, nor 
dialectics of nature.

I think I did not make myself very clear on this issue.  Smith is of 
course absolutely correct to point out that he explicitly 
distinguishes between systematic dialectics and historical 
dialectics, and in fact this is central to his interpretaion. 
Moreover, no where in Smith is it explicated that Marx is rooted or 
committed to any sort of Hegelian "external teleology."  I do not 
mean and did not mean that Smith had committed Marx's method or logic 
in this way, and in fact he certainly has not.

My comments where more general then this, and especially in reference 
to Bhaskar.  Tony Smith is mentioned two times in Bhaskar's 
*Dialectic*, both with the comment that Smith only expounds Marx's 
and Hegel's "epistemological dialectics."  Now, my reference is not to 
say that any of the writers or authors of the non-metaphysical 
interpretation are committing Marx to Hegel's ontology, I am simply 
trying to understand myself what must be the ontological grounds that 
Marx might have been committed, to justify the use of dialectic 
as a systematic ordering of categories?  And for that matter, what is 
Hegel's?

Also I like Smith believe that Marx is *not* commmitted in any 
explicit and possibly not in any implicit way to dialectics of 
nature.  Engles and others have attempted to commit Marx to some 
dialectics of nature.  This is exactly why they are out of phase with 
one another.  I don't know that Bhaskar can accomplish this task, nor 
do I necessarily believe that this is so cruical for dialectics, I 
merely have question on the issue.  It seems to be a special case of 
the possiblity of naturalism.    

Marx seems to have some sympathy for this issue, but I agree with 
Smith that this does not commit him to dialectics of nature in any way 
for his use of dialectic as a system of categories in *Capital*.  

I am also not sure that Hegel's *external teleology* need be given a 
historical interpretaion?  Hegel argues that external teleology 
allows humans to achieve further self-consiousness and self-
determination.  It is in this sense that it seems Marx must be 
committed to a similar view to argue for "socialism" and against the 
alienating forces of capitalism.  Perhaps I am not correct about 
this, but it is something I am working on now.  My premise is that 
Marx must be committed to some ontological potentiality to justify 
his position.  Maybe this is more metaphysical then I would like to 
believe, or maybe it has to do with a interpretation of human nature. 
But I think that it is more likely that Marx is committed to some 
sort of ontologicial potentiality.

The connection that I see to Hegel is to his external teleology.  As 
I have said this need not mean that Marx adopts a historical 
interpretation.  My view is that Hegel's external teleology is always 
progressive, but Marx's notion or perhaps reformulation of 
alienation, developed by way of Feuerbach, allows that Hegel's 
"external teleology" need not necessarily be progressive.  

I draw an anology from interpretations of evolution to make my 
point.  Similarily to Darwinian evolution, many thinkers are 
committed to a view of "survival of the fittest."  However, one need 
not have such a view to have a theory of evolution.  It can be 
completely accidental to, and contingent on, how spieces survive and 
evolve.  Similarily, to be committed to an "external teleology" it 
need not necessarily be progressive.  In fact Marx's theory of 
alienation makes such a view contingent on many social factors 
involved, and perhaps accidental.  Fellini has mentioned in pervious 
posts, that perhaps the term teleology (external or otherwise) is not 
the term to use, I think he is correct about this.  But my intention 
is to suggest that it is still adopted and developed from Hegel, 
which does not mean that it remains Hegelian.

Finally I would like to say that Smith's book has been extermely 
valuable to myself.  It and the non-metaphysical interpretaion of 
Hegel have had great influence on my views.  Smith's book should be 
on the top of anyone's reading list.  My question to Smith on his 
excellent presentation of the epistemological logic of Marx, is what 
is the ontological or perhaps metaphysical commitment to justify the 
use of systematic categorial dialectic, shouldn't there be such a 
ground or justification?

Therefore, my issue with Smith's book is not that he has committed 
Marx to any historical dialectics or dialectics of nature but that in 
fact he has not done so, this in my opinion leads to many questions 
on these issues.  There are many philosophical problems and issues 
that remain unresolved.  I don't know that Marx meant to resolve such 
issues, but it does seem to me that Bhaskar intends to attempt this 
task.


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