File spoon-archives/marxism.archive/marxism_1995/95-04-30.000, message 4


From: Hans Despain <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Sat, 1 Apr 1995 12:34:47 GMT-700
Subject:       Bhaskar


I have dug up some previous posts on Bhaskar, and frankly I am quite 
surprised at the resistence toward his work on espeically this list.  
Adam Brandt claimed that Bhaskar's '-ists,' '-eans,' etc. are doing 
all his critical work.  He asks for example, what is a "dualist overly 
anit-naturalist hue" or how would one recongnise a "superidealist 
epistemology."  He goes on to ask if anyone finds Bhaskar is becoming 
"less useful."  Steve Wright seems to support a critique, and Ralph 
Dumain and Steve Keen find Bhaskar style and content all but useless. 
Allin Cottrell suggest the un-orginality of Bhaskar's work.  Then on 
the other side, Hans Despain, Fellini, Howie Chodos, and Hans Ehrbar 
have been attempting to take Bhaskar quite serious and defend his 
project, often critical.

I am wondering why the above critics are so resistent, and what 
others on the list think of Bhaskar.  There is little doubt that his 
style and language is often difficult to penetrate and understand, 
but I for one have found that Bhaskar is becoming more useful rather 
then less useful.  It is true that Bhaskar uses many '-ists,' and '-
eans' not so much to do his critical work but to reduce repetition.  
But personal it seems that his style and language should be trival 
for an judgement of his project.  Moreover, most '-ists,' and 'eans' 
are somewhere defined and explained.  For example, it seems to me 
that Bhaskar takes 'positivists,' 'empiricists,' and 'rationalists' 
to be widely understood, along with 'Humean,' 'Nietzschean' 
'idealism' and 'empirical realism.'  'Superidealism' seems to be in 
reference to Rotry, and not Hegel, for example.  The point being with 
in context or through some reference investigation I believe it is 
very defensible to say that Bhaskar himself is doing the critical 
work of his argument and not his academic abrevations.  Which 
certainly makes for "thick" reading.

For me it was Bhaskar distinction of 1) ontological dialectics; 2) 
epistemological dialectics; 3) relational dialectics; and 4) pratical 
dialectics; which initiated a claification of defining the endless 
definations of dialectics.  Moreover, his four-term dialectic 
beginning with abscences is quite a (explicit) leap forward from the 
Marxian and Hegelian dialectic.  His notion of abscences is also 
quite enlighting with respect to *negation* which not only benefits 
the Hegelian moment, but perhaps even more the Frankfurt pause.  

I also agree with Ehrbar, on the issue of explicating an 
*alternative*, which is at best negelected by Marx, and at worst 
idealized.  Bhaskar, attempts to argue negelection and idealism need 
not be the choice following epistemological understanding or an 
ethical critique of capitalism.  Thus, *theorizing an alternative* 
becomes quite important, maybe more important then Marx himself had 
realized.  A "non-alienating society" is quite a task, that does not 
immediately nor teleologically follow a critique or a destruction of 
capitalism.

Also something that strikes me from Bhaskar *Dialectic* is "[F]or 
Marxism to progress now as a research tradition it is faced with a 
clear methodological choice between the neo-positivism of analytical 
Marxism, the neo-Kantianism of Habermasian communicative action 
theory, the neo-Nietzscheanism of post-Marxism or dialectical 
critical realism.  (This quartet in fact parallels the options 
outside Marxism as well.)" (352).

In this context I also think Bhaskar is saying more then choosing 
between these four paradigms, I contend that in these pages that 
Bhaskar is aruging that there is room for 1) analytical Marxism 
(Elster and Romer for example); 2) neo-Kantian/neo-Hegelian 
interpretaions (i.e., L. Colletti and T. Smith) 3) neo- Marxism (R. 
Boyer and the French Regulation theorists and SSA American counter 
part); 4) post-Marxism (including Feminists, anti-Racism, and 
Cultural emphases).  The issue of contention being that of their  
ontological commitment. Hence, as these different interpretations 
and emphases now stand, they are out of phase and incompatible with 
one another.  However, they all find the paradigm within their 
reading of Marx, if the ontological commitment is the same, as it 
would be explicitely under Dialectical Critical Realism, then 
possible they could be made compatible, though often reformulated.

Which is not to argue that the above Marxist are compatible, for 
example obviously where I have but Colletti and Smith in the same 
categoization is not to suggest these two incompatible interpretation 
can be somehow made compatible but to suggest that they both find 
there ground or paradigm on the same level of analysis.  It is not 
so much there epistemology that distingish them, though they do, but 
that there (implied) ontological commitment have to be all together 
different.  Likewise, the level of analysis is also not only  
distingishing factor, though it is the most clear.  For example, the 
Regulation Theory is out of phase with Tony Smith interpretation, but 
we can imagine and theorize a compatible "captialist stage analysis" 
or "regional analysis" which is in phase with the epistemology 
expounded by Smith.

Take a look at his figure 4.6, page 353, titled "Levels of Analysis in 
Marxism."  (Which if one is following Ollman's interpretation could 
just as easily be sub-titled "Levels of *Abstraction* in Marxism).  I 
take this as an attempt by Bhaskar to integrate philosophical 
compatiblity and incompatibleity of the different Marxist 
interpretation which (over-)emphasize the *abstract* and *concrete* 
of Marxism, the *qualitative* and *quantitative*, or the *conceptual* 
and *calculative*, *epistemological* and *ethical*.  Moreover, 
because Marx himself, in different moments seems to possess emphasis 
phases or moments.

In this sense, Bhaskar would seem to be against analytical, or 
empirical, or more concrete interpretation at the expense or 
disregard of Marx's philosophical integrity of the *abstract*, though 
*not* against analytical, empirical or more concrete analyses in 
general.  This implies especially grasping to understand Marx's 
*epistemology* (Bhaskar seems to support Tony Smith), and his *ethic* 
of human emancipation and self-determination.  

In my interpretation Bhaskar's system is meant to unite, criticize 
and when necessary abandon specific Marxian paradigms, while at the 
same time attempting to specifically keep the integrity of Marx's 
philosophical system in phase with Bhaskar's Dialetical Critical 
Realism and Dialectical Critical Naturalism.

Hans Despain
University of Utah
despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu


     --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

     ------------------

   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005