From: Hans Despain <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu> Date: Sat, 1 Apr 1995 12:34:47 GMT-700 Subject: Bhaskar I have dug up some previous posts on Bhaskar, and frankly I am quite surprised at the resistence toward his work on espeically this list. Adam Brandt claimed that Bhaskar's '-ists,' '-eans,' etc. are doing all his critical work. He asks for example, what is a "dualist overly anit-naturalist hue" or how would one recongnise a "superidealist epistemology." He goes on to ask if anyone finds Bhaskar is becoming "less useful." Steve Wright seems to support a critique, and Ralph Dumain and Steve Keen find Bhaskar style and content all but useless. Allin Cottrell suggest the un-orginality of Bhaskar's work. Then on the other side, Hans Despain, Fellini, Howie Chodos, and Hans Ehrbar have been attempting to take Bhaskar quite serious and defend his project, often critical. I am wondering why the above critics are so resistent, and what others on the list think of Bhaskar. There is little doubt that his style and language is often difficult to penetrate and understand, but I for one have found that Bhaskar is becoming more useful rather then less useful. It is true that Bhaskar uses many '-ists,' and '- eans' not so much to do his critical work but to reduce repetition. But personal it seems that his style and language should be trival for an judgement of his project. Moreover, most '-ists,' and 'eans' are somewhere defined and explained. For example, it seems to me that Bhaskar takes 'positivists,' 'empiricists,' and 'rationalists' to be widely understood, along with 'Humean,' 'Nietzschean' 'idealism' and 'empirical realism.' 'Superidealism' seems to be in reference to Rotry, and not Hegel, for example. The point being with in context or through some reference investigation I believe it is very defensible to say that Bhaskar himself is doing the critical work of his argument and not his academic abrevations. Which certainly makes for "thick" reading. For me it was Bhaskar distinction of 1) ontological dialectics; 2) epistemological dialectics; 3) relational dialectics; and 4) pratical dialectics; which initiated a claification of defining the endless definations of dialectics. Moreover, his four-term dialectic beginning with abscences is quite a (explicit) leap forward from the Marxian and Hegelian dialectic. His notion of abscences is also quite enlighting with respect to *negation* which not only benefits the Hegelian moment, but perhaps even more the Frankfurt pause. I also agree with Ehrbar, on the issue of explicating an *alternative*, which is at best negelected by Marx, and at worst idealized. Bhaskar, attempts to argue negelection and idealism need not be the choice following epistemological understanding or an ethical critique of capitalism. Thus, *theorizing an alternative* becomes quite important, maybe more important then Marx himself had realized. A "non-alienating society" is quite a task, that does not immediately nor teleologically follow a critique or a destruction of capitalism. Also something that strikes me from Bhaskar *Dialectic* is "[F]or Marxism to progress now as a research tradition it is faced with a clear methodological choice between the neo-positivism of analytical Marxism, the neo-Kantianism of Habermasian communicative action theory, the neo-Nietzscheanism of post-Marxism or dialectical critical realism. (This quartet in fact parallels the options outside Marxism as well.)" (352). In this context I also think Bhaskar is saying more then choosing between these four paradigms, I contend that in these pages that Bhaskar is aruging that there is room for 1) analytical Marxism (Elster and Romer for example); 2) neo-Kantian/neo-Hegelian interpretaions (i.e., L. Colletti and T. Smith) 3) neo- Marxism (R. Boyer and the French Regulation theorists and SSA American counter part); 4) post-Marxism (including Feminists, anti-Racism, and Cultural emphases). The issue of contention being that of their ontological commitment. Hence, as these different interpretations and emphases now stand, they are out of phase and incompatible with one another. However, they all find the paradigm within their reading of Marx, if the ontological commitment is the same, as it would be explicitely under Dialectical Critical Realism, then possible they could be made compatible, though often reformulated. Which is not to argue that the above Marxist are compatible, for example obviously where I have but Colletti and Smith in the same categoization is not to suggest these two incompatible interpretation can be somehow made compatible but to suggest that they both find there ground or paradigm on the same level of analysis. It is not so much there epistemology that distingish them, though they do, but that there (implied) ontological commitment have to be all together different. Likewise, the level of analysis is also not only distingishing factor, though it is the most clear. For example, the Regulation Theory is out of phase with Tony Smith interpretation, but we can imagine and theorize a compatible "captialist stage analysis" or "regional analysis" which is in phase with the epistemology expounded by Smith. Take a look at his figure 4.6, page 353, titled "Levels of Analysis in Marxism." (Which if one is following Ollman's interpretation could just as easily be sub-titled "Levels of *Abstraction* in Marxism). I take this as an attempt by Bhaskar to integrate philosophical compatiblity and incompatibleity of the different Marxist interpretation which (over-)emphasize the *abstract* and *concrete* of Marxism, the *qualitative* and *quantitative*, or the *conceptual* and *calculative*, *epistemological* and *ethical*. Moreover, because Marx himself, in different moments seems to possess emphasis phases or moments. In this sense, Bhaskar would seem to be against analytical, or empirical, or more concrete interpretation at the expense or disregard of Marx's philosophical integrity of the *abstract*, though *not* against analytical, empirical or more concrete analyses in general. This implies especially grasping to understand Marx's *epistemology* (Bhaskar seems to support Tony Smith), and his *ethic* of human emancipation and self-determination. In my interpretation Bhaskar's system is meant to unite, criticize and when necessary abandon specific Marxian paradigms, while at the same time attempting to specifically keep the integrity of Marx's philosophical system in phase with Bhaskar's Dialetical Critical Realism and Dialectical Critical Naturalism. Hans Despain University of Utah despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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