Date: Mon, 3 Apr 1995 23:47:19 -0400 From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com> Subject: Re: Is history progressive and directional? I'm not sure how coherent my response to Justin will be, but I think this discussion is important, so here goes. To begin I want to juxtapose two pararaphs from Justin's reply to my remarks on his initial post. He writes first that: >A key claim that I left out of my brief restatement is that there is an >asymmetry between domination and its opposite or negation, emancipation, >the limitation or abolition of domination. If resistance succeeds in an >emancipatory direction, the formerly dominant group ceases to exist as >such--there are no more slaveowners--and therefore no longer can generate >regressive resistance that tends to establish new forms of domination. >Emancipation therefore tends to be progressive, although this is not >inevitable or guaranteed. And at the very end of his post he adds: >Well, this connects up with my larger project. What is our basis for >thinking domination to be wrong, specifically unjust? After all, the >dominant groups say that it is just. We disagree, but is that just because >we belong to subordinate groups, or identify with them? Why do either of >the latter constitute to condemn domination? My argument about progress is >part of a case that there is more than that to the condemnation. >Domination is unjust because of the asymmetry I mentioned: the justice of >the dominant groups will be destabilized while that of the subordinate >groups will not. If, as I argue, stability of a certain sort is necessary >for justice, then emancipatory justice wins. So it would appear that his argument hinges on the existence of this asymmetry between dominance and emancipation. Emancipation tends to be cumulative and stable, while domination tends to engender emancipatory movements which will eventually suppress one set of exploiters after another. Perhaps it is because of the abbreviated nature of Justin's exposition, but I find it unpersuasive to argue that the superiority of justice as defined by emancipatory movements hinges on its greater stability compared to justice as defined by the dominant groups. Assuming, for example, that one accepts that the transition between capitalism and feudalism is part of the general progress from societies exhibiting greater degrees of dominance towards socieities exhibiting greater degrees of emancipation, Justin's argument would imply that capitalism is superior to feudalism because it generates a greater degree of stability. Stability in whose sense, though? Maybe this is not the sort of stability Justin had in mind, but in some ways at least feudalism could be thought to be more stable (though not without its own internal problems, of course) than capitalism, which constantly revolutionises the means of production, etc. I am also not sure why Justin equivocates regarding the strength of the historical tendency towards emancipation, as when he says that "emancipation therefore tends to be progressive, although this is not inevitable or guaranteed". Is not the core of the argument that there is a direction to history? If it is not inevitable then how is it directional in any relevant sense? I can accept that there are reasons to preserve emancipatory gains and that their preservation can constitute a cumulative historical process. There are similar reasons for preserving technological gains that respond to perceived needs amongst a given population. But I am not convinced that this is enough to impart a "direction to history". One can identify the links in the historical chain and the new possibilities that arise with each new socio-economic system without being committed to the proposition that the actual sequence of historical events embodies a direction. Justin also argued that: >Right, but at the level of abstraction at which I'm dealing this doesn't >matter. The only question is whatever group there are, let them >be what you will, can correctly be classified as dominant or subordinate. >The argument is that subordinate groups, whatever they are, will resist >the oppression of dominant groups, whatever _they_ are, and the latter >will defend their dominance, whatever its basis. This is where I think that Fellini was right to pick up on the rational choice aspect of Justin's argument. For Justin's argument to hold, the individuals who make up the various groups must eventually act in defense of their "interests" (which are shaped by their location within a social structure where some groups are dominant and others subordinate). The "rational" impulse to act in one's best interest must ultimately prevail over any counter-vailing tendencies (which can range from deliberate ideological obfuscation, to "irrational" impulses, to general processes of social conditioning). I would want to take issue with Justin's claim that at the level of abstraction that matters one can dispense with any consideration of the content of these interests. For Justin's argument to work the relationship between dominance and emancipation has to be an "absolute" one. For him, there just is domination and there just is emancipation, and, in general, it is a clear cut matter to decide what is what. The example of competing interests between groups of workers that I offered in my last post was designed to suggest that this is never the case. Furthermore, I think that this type of argument can run into a "Rawlsian" objection. It is possible that under certain circumstances the preservation of an inegalitarian system based on the domination of some groups over others could be in the "interest" of a majority of the dominated themselves. It depends on the alternatives that are available in the real world. Are the least well off in a given society better off with a smaller share of a larger pie or a larger share of a smaller pie? It depends on the size of the pie and the size of the share. Are workers better off to pursue a strike that will cause a plant to shut down or to give in before attaining their goals? It depends on how important those goals are, and the consequences of the plant shutting down. When does it make sense to take a leap of faith towards a socialist future knowing that many people will lose their lives along the way? When the alternative is worse, and we have a chance of succeeding. The thing about each of these situations is that the outcomes depend on many contingent factors, including our conscious, motivated, intentional behaviour. Part of my difficulty with any notion of "directionality" to history is that it always seems to imply that history is happening without us. Even Justin's version, which does try to incorporate people's actions into his case for a direction to history, would seem to me ultimately to succumb to this difficulty. It says that for there to be a direction to history people have to be able to defend their interests. All I need to do then is to resist domination and in the end history will work out OK. In the final analysis this would also seem to imply that understanding the world around us is irrelevant to the outcome of historical evolution. I find this especially problematic with regards to a system such as socialism which, in the Marxist tradition at least, has always been associated with the self-conscious self-emancipation of the working class. To me this implies that in order for socialism to come about, those who are fighting for it need to know both what they are fighting against and what they are fighting for. The ability to define and implement an alternative to capitalism would seem to me to involve more than simply "resisting domination". Howie Chodos --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005