File spoon-archives/marxism.archive/marxism_1995/95-04-30.000, message 5


From: Hans Despain <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Sat, 1 Apr 1995 16:32:13 GMT-700
Subject:       T. Smith


Those of you who have bothered to read my previous posts surely have 
taken not that I have made many references to Tony Smith's *The Logic 
of Marx's Capital: A Reply to Hegelian criticism*.  Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1990.  Moreover, it as been recommended by a number of us.  I 
would like to offer a summary and presentation to those of you who 
are interested.

I have called this a minimal *dialectical* reading of *Capital* for 
two reasons.  First, Klaus Hartmann has called (or has been called) 
his "non-metaphysical" interpretaion of Hegel's *Logic* a minimal 
reading of this great work.  *Minimal* is in reference to the notion 
that first and foremost what is at stake with dialectics is an 
epistemology, especially an anti-metaphysical moment.  Therefore, 
initially, momentarily, or presentationly the problems of ontological 
commitment and historical teleology (and dialectics of nature) are 
abstracted away (and sometimes aruged against).  Second, not only 
does Smith very much interpret Marx in a similar way, but Smith is 
arguing that Marx very much follows the method and presentation of 
Hegel's own *Logic*.  This is also supported by corresponse to Engels 
and of course in the Second Preface to *Capital*.

Smith's interpretaion centers on the argument that Marx's method is in 
no way ecceletic and confussed, but is instead coherently united 
within a single "architectonic."  This architectonic is in reference 
to the systematic transcendentally organization of the specific 
*subject's* categories, in the case of Marx in *Capital* the 
subject is of course Political Economy.  The categories are ordered 
from the most ontologically abstract to the more ontological 
concrete.  And having arrived at the most concrete determinations, 
Marx (as he tells us in *Grudrisse* and as Hegel does in the 
*Phenomenology of Spirit*) is able to make sense of the chaotic whole 
which he began.

Smith's interpretation is systematic opposed to historical, this 
again is supported by the words of Marx in *Grudrisse*, where he says 
that it would be a mistake to order the categories of Political 
Economy as they appeared historically.  Smith's interpretation is in 
opposition with first L. Colletti's anit-Hegelian return to Kant.  
This opposition is dealt in one of his chapter's in his *Dialectical 
Social Theory: And Its Critics* Albany SUNY Press 1993; and in an 
artical found in *Science and Society* 1986, v. 50,2, titled 
"Hegelianism and Marx: A Reply to Lucio Colletti."  And is the best 
critique of Colletti that I am aware of. [also I have a hunch that 
Colletti being schooled with a Hegelian tradition, and being a 
Marxist probably had a very hard time defending Marxism against 
Hegelian critism, has Smith is able to construct in his work. 
Hence, perhaps it is possilbe that Colletti mistakenly believed he 
needed to hedge-hog Marxism behind Kantianism which had its own 
developed response to Hegelianism? {though I believe he has much to 
defend a Kantian position as would a Hegelian looking for Kantian 
roots}].

Smith offers and critiques three other readings of Marx's *Capital*.  
First is the "Logico-historical Reading," this is the most wide held 
reading of Marx's *Capital*.  And is especially expounded by the 
Stage Capitalism Marxists of the French Regulation School, the U.S. 
SSA of D. Gordon et. al., E. Mandel, Baran and Sweezy, etc.  Smith 
argument against this reading is that he fails to make sense of some 
of the most important logical determinations of Marx, such as the 
Labor Theory of Value.  There is for example no historical mode of 
capitalism which traded commodities directly at their value (i.e., 
what Anwar Shaikh calls direct prices).  But, the logico-
historical reading would argue capitalism has moved from "value" 
to "cost-price" to "costs of production," rendering, according 
for example to Gordon and Boyer the Labor Theory of Value outdated 
and no use for modren capitalism.  From the the logico-historical 
reading the materialist anti-Hegelian dialectic is somehow the 
teleological aim of history.  Hence, the dialectic of history 
eliminates the contingent and accidental features of history, making 
the history of capitalism an intelligible interprise.

The second reading is the "Developmental Thesis," whereby it is 
argued that Marx abandoned his Hegelian roots from the time of 
*Grundrisse* to the writing of *Capital*.  Wherefore, the Hegelians 
view Marx's method as a regress, and the anti-Hegelians as 
progressive severing of his Hegelian roots.  This reading can be 
supported by Marx's early criticisms of Hegel whereby he is finally 
able to dis-entangle himself from his Hegelianism before undertaken 
*Capital*.

The third reading of is the "Incoherence Thesis," Smith himself cites 
especially Hans-Georg Backhaus (all cited in German), whom set out to 
defend, similar to Smith, a systematic reading but became convinced 
that Marx is "incoherent" on the issue, hence, the methods are mixed 
in confussed in Marx's *Capital*.  This would suggest that Marx did 
not understand the Hegelian systematic dialectical logic, and must be 
committed to a telelogical development of history.

Against these readings Smith expounds his dialectical systematic 
Hegelian reading of Marx.  Thus, first Smith must defend his reading 
against the logico-histroical, develomental, and incoherent readings. 
He argues that Marx very well understood Hegelian dialectics and 
believed, as the other Young Hegelian, dialectics to be revoltionary 
and emanicpating.  Though Feuerbach and Marx interpreted Hegel as 
metaphysical they attempted to reformulate him non-metaphysically, 
although they themselves did not realize just how well Hegel 
himself had sowed the seeds of a non-metaphysical reading.  This 
becomes quite clear of Hegel in Klaus Hartmann's and Terry 
Pinkard's presentation, and is very much supported by especially 
Hegel's early writings prior to the *Phenomenology of Mind* (see 
Lukcas' *The Young Hegel* where it should be noted that Hegel himself 
very much critics Christianity which predated Feuerbach, and begins 
to expound a Political Economy which certainly has implication for 
Marxism).

However, Hegelian dialectics where too esoteric for the readers Marx 
wanted to reach, moreover, Hegelianism was being kicked around like a 
"dead dog" due to the bastardization by the Right Hegelians and 
Christian dialectics (which was the true aim of Marx's and 
Feuerbach's; Bauer's and Strauss' aggressive critiques of Hegelianism 
and not necessarily Hegel himself) hence, after the response from 
*Grudrisse* he choose to incorporate historical and empirical data to 
support his otherwise unbending systematic presentation of Political 
Economy categories.


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