Date: Tue, 4 Apr 1995 15:24:47 -0600 (MDT) From: fellini-AT-keynes.econ.utah.edu Subject: Rationaly Choice Thoery?-Reply Hi, Justin thinks that >>>>>My argument isn't based on RCT, since it turns on the potentials of group actors and persons essentially identified as members of groups. Moreover there's nothing about maximizing expected utility. I use the notion of interests (quite deliberately) and not preferences. The list of differences between my (essentially Lukacsian) approach and RCT is very long.<<<< Justin, I am sorry if I might have misunderstood your point; clearly Lukacsian argument is very different from a RCT argument. But still, I am not quite sure that yours has nothing to do with RCT. I think the problem depends on what we mean by rationality. But first I must confess that I still don't think that your argument and Wright's argument are quite different. You said: >>>>Wright's argument is based on a tendency towards increasing productive efficiency and has nothing to do with class or other group struggle. My argument is about resistance to domination and has nothing to do with productive efficiency.<<< I think Wright, at least in those papers, argues that his argument requires a class analysis based on 'interests'. So, his argument must have something to do with class struggle. Lisa (Hi Lisa, it is good to meet you again too, I've always enjoyed your comments) asks why such an argument is based on RCT. I think Howie's comment is excellent on that matter: Howie:>>>For Justin's argument to hold, the individuals who make up the various groups must eventually act in defense of their interests" (which are shaped by their location within a social structure where some groups are dominant and others subordinate). The "rational" impulse to act in one's best interest must ultimately prevail over any counter-vailing tendencies (which can range from deliberate ideological obfuscation, to "irrational" impulses, to general processes of social conditioning).<<<< Furthermore, Justin, I believe the difference between 'preference' and 'interest' in your argument is quite trivial. Rationality principle does not necessarily imply 'preference'; more generally it argues that individuals behave in their self-interest. Clearly, I don't take rationality in its Aristotelian sense (Locke said "God created men as two-legged animals and left Aristotle to make them rational"), in the sense of the conformity to the 'deliverancies of reason'. What we are talking about is 'means-end rationality', in that sense, rationality is a relation between _given_ means and _given_ ends. This is the form of RCT at least in Neoclassical economics: "for all individuals there is something that they optimize (depending on their constraints.)" But this is a very general principle, it applies to almost everything: Like Gary Becker (Nobel winner in economics) did, you can use it to explain the behavior of ants on the one hand and marriages between homosexuals on the other. RCT does not distinguish between a saint and Hitler, for both are quite rational for their given ends (after all, nazis devised one of the most 'efficient' way for mass- murder.) So, how can we explain the differences between them? (Here I am not going to mention the problem that why we should take both the means and ends as given. Is this a good way to understand human agency, which is an essential aspect of Marxist 'praxis'?) In this regard, I don't agree with Lisa in that "This is not intended to "explain everything" as some critics have said, no assumption can, but that is not what it is for." To my mind it was clearly intended to do so. This is an important question, because most economists who use RCT framework do not, and cannot in my mind, consider historical differences and specifities of different societies/modes of productions etc. For them, ancient Greek society is as 'capitalist' as the contemporary societies. It seems to me that, a la Karl Polanyi, RCT is a way to look at non-capitalistic societies from the perspective of capitalism, for our minds are conditioned with the categories of capitalism and for we are forced to behave 'rationally'. This how I read Kevin Quinn's comments (am I right?): Kevin>>>>I agree with Fellini that RCT needs to be anathematized, but also with Justin that it may have descriptive accuracy in our present circumstances. But, first, this accuracy is limited to some parts of our narrowly economic lives, at most. RC models of politics and of the family, e.g., are grossly inaccurate, and economic imperialism, whether of the neoclassical or analytical-marxist variety, is a dead end in consequence. Second, I take issue with the view of social science implicit (I think) in Justin's comments. When we employ RC models to analyze our behavior, we are doing more than a simple description of an independent object. Our articulation of our practices is "partly constitutive" of those practices, to use, with apologies, some hermeneutic jargon. Even a gross misdescription tends, in consequence, to be partly self-fulfilling--the inaccuracy shows up in the way the misdescribed practices "go badly" (see Charles Taylors'"Social Science as Practice") I think, though I would need to do lots of work to make the case that I don't have time for right now, the Early Marx might agree.<<< (I didn't read Charles Taylor much, but I agree with the -mainly hermenuticist- argument that rationality is a very "thin" description of human beings; humans have more 'dimensions' that the RCT prescibes for them. See D. Little's chapter on interpretative theory) And I am afraid Justin, you have such an outlook (at least it appears so to me). Howie has an interesting observation about your argument: >>>> I would want to take issue with Justin's claim that at the level of abstraction that matters one can dispense with any consideration of the content of these interests. For Justin's argument to work the relationship between dominance and emancipation has to be an "absolute" one. For him, there just is domination and there just is emancipation, and, in general, it is a clear cut matter to decide what is what. The example of competing interests between groups of workers that I offered in my last post was designed to suggest that this is never the case.<<<< I agree with Howie; what I see in your argument is there are only two 'individuals', although they refer to 'groups'characterized by their interests and these two "classes" pursue their own interests. The struggle between them suggests a game-theoretic model, and I am sorry but I fail to see the differences between your position and a Neoclassical one (If I remember correctly, Lukacs argued that Marxism is characterized by the dialectical method. Your model is very "dialectical" indeed!). This brings about the other problem associated with RCT; methodological individualism. I am not going to pursue this issue here, but if you think that Marx was a methodological individualist, then I have nothing to say. By the way, I am somewhat dogmatic about Elster or Roemer. Elster always pisses me off. I think D. Little is much more sophisticated than Elster. But still I don't like their "scientific" reconstruction of Marx for what they mean by science is Neoclassical economics. Further, in Little's book (Philosophy of Social Sciences) the chapter on 'materialist' conception of history is nothing but a technological determinist reading of historical materialism, whose merit in Marxism is quite debatable. So, these are my "bullets" for RCT and its application to Marxism; I hope they are "low-calibre" enough. Regards, Fellini --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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