From: "Hans Despain" <DESPAIN-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu>
Date:          Sat, 24 Jun 1995 00:26:04 GMT-700
Subject:       Ontology 


First, I thank you all for your thoughtful concern, thoughts, and 
comments.  Chris B. and Joseph have asked me to further elucidate a 
distinction and defination of ontology and epistemology (dialectics). 
Below, I simply attempt to draw out the signifance of explicating an 
ontological commitment.  I will attempt to further distinction 
between epistemological and ontological dialectics in a future post. 
Lets start out with the simple point that ontology is the study of 
being; and epistemology the study of knowledge.  Thus, ontology will 
analysis what exists.  Philosophically ontology seems to have played 
a diminishing role from the time of the Greeks to the British 
empiricists.  For the empiricists ontology is a nothing other than 
epistemology because the things that exists are known by way of our 
senses only, so that questions about ontology, or what types of 
things exist, are reduced to what we know from our experiences 
(Bhaksar calls this the epistemic fallacy).

The Kantian system attempts to address this theoritical ill by 
arguing for a dualistic world, whereby there are phenomena which we 
can know, and there is noumena which we cannot know.  This constructs 
a strict veil between two world, one we can know by our sense datum 
the phenomena, and one "hidden" beyond human beings.  Most Kantians 
today reject this dual world ontology and argue that Kant was 
attempting to establish that we cannot know the real world seperated 
from our own conceptual system (Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*).

Now in Kant's ontology we cannot know "things in themselves" this 
belongs to the world of noumena.  This leaves Kant "drunk" in 
Empiricism.  But he offers the tools to get beyond it, that is his 
dialectical comment and transcendental argument.  Kant realizes for 
knowledge to be possible, the empiricist account of "Sense Certainty" 
must be incomplete.  Therefore, positing his dualistic ontology and 
arguing (ontologically) human beings must possess (transcendently) 
"intuitions" which allows them to reason beyond "Sense Certainty."

Kant dialectical comment gives human "reason" strict limits, this is 
illustrated in his infamous anaomiles.  Dualities which human reason 
is incapable of resolving.  His transcendental arguments spring from 
what we know.  That is they are retroductive, in that if we know 
something about a thing, what does it tell us about the type of thing 
it is.  For example, if human beings are able to know something 
beyond "Sense Certainty" than they must possess some power to achieve 
this?  Or, if science is possible, and in fact needed to understand 
our experience what does this tell us about the world we live in?.

Hegel will attempt to explicate Kantian intuitions in his 
*Phenomenology of Mind*, and for Marx his implied ontological 
commitment moves him beyond "that mighty thinker" (Hegel).  But for 
now let me make the point.  Ontology attempts to describe the 
constitution of a being.  Let me offer some examples, for Marx, his 
(explicit) ontological commitment is especially in opposition to Max 
Stirner's individualistic egoism (and at this level quite similar to 
Hegel).  Stirner is committed to a view that sees human being 
constituted by there own inner ego, autonomy is achieved by 
developing one's inner ego to full maturity.  Marx and Engels reject 
this ontological outlook and argue that part of what constitutes a 
human being is their relations to other human beings. Thus, whereby 
for Stirner (and neo-Classical economics) what exists are simply 
individuals, for Marx and Engels what exist are individuals and then 
also the relations.  Thus, if you are keeping an accounting list, of 
what exists on an island of three individuals, Stirner would say 
three enities.  Marx and Engels would suggest that not only do three 
individuals "exists" but a relation between individual 1 & 2, 2 & 3, 
1 & 3, and 1, 2 & 3, or 7 enities.

This may seem relative, but it has great importance, let me offer 
another example, neo-Classical economists suggest that what makes up 
political economy and civil society are a mass of individualistic 
entites bouncing off of each other in their pursuit of fulfilling 
individual desires.  Marx and Engels suggest that the specific 
relations in capitalist society determine these actions.  That is in 
the relationship between the wage-labor and capitalist, is an 
ontological entity which constitutes each one.

Let me offer two more examples, think of the relation between student 
and teacher.  Regardless of the level of cognition, there is a 
specific interaction between them.  It is as if something mediates 
the specific interaction.  O.K. let me give my last example something 
that Chris B. will (hopefully) appreciate.  The relation between 
psychologists and patient, there is a debate whether the relationship 
itself specifically "creates" the ill, or whether mental illness 
truely exists.  I would suspect that Chris B. will argue 
ontologically that mental illness does exist.  Those who oppose this 
however, suggest that somehow this "illness" is imposed on the patient 
by way of the specific relationship of patient/doctor.  Those who 
reject the ontological (quasi-)existence of mental illness suggest 
that psychology not only fails to help the patient but worsen the 
the hyop-condition.  Personally I think arguing over the ontological 
existence of mental illness is quite limited, but certainly the 
specific relationship between the psychologist and patient will 
determine the success of the treatment.

O.K. what is the significance of all this?  The significance for 
economics is being able to argue that capitalism exists, and it exist 
different from a fuedalism or a slave economy.  The next question is 
how does it exist different from other economies.  The neo-Classical 
will suggest that the capitalism constitutes the complete freedom of 
the individual, because for them the relations between wage-laborer 
and capitalist constitutes a different relation than he does for Marx.
For the neo-Classical the cagetories of wage-laborer and capitalist 
is a "choose" or (usually justly) "achieved" position.  For Marx, this 
"freedom" of capitalism is quite limited, I think he would argee that 
generally it can be aruged that *any* one has potential to be a 
captialist or wage-laborer, but that the specific relation requires 
the wage-laborer (and arguably the capitalist) to give up her 
freedom.  The structural coercion inforces these relations, whereby, 
even if we could establish philosophically that on some level 
freedom exists for *anyone* it cannot, by defination of wage-labor 
capialist exist for *everyone*.

Let me leave it here, with a final comment that Bhaskar argues that 
our ontological commitment to what must constitute the world, as 
great significance for our science and philosophy and the vision of 
freedom possible to obtain.  Bhaksar's ontological commitment to 
*stratification* allows for emergence and change, in a world that is 
seemingly indifferent to human existence.  But, at the same time 
human agency can impose its will on the world (nature and socio-
structures) to change it.  Bhaskar also believes that Marx himself is 
implicitly (or should be) commitment to a similar Critical Realist 
ontology, which is beyond his explicit ontology of internal relations.

Hans Despain
University of Utah
despain-AT-econ.sbs.utah.edu

P.S. In a post to follow, specifically to dialectics (and more 
toward Joe's question), I will develop the significance distinction 
between Hegelian and Bhaskarian ontological dialectics.  And how it 
changes the epistemological result. 


     --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---

     ------------------