Date: Sat, 24 Jun 1995 11:06:13 -0400 (EDT) From: "Chris M. Sciabarra" <sciabrrc-AT-is2.NYU.EDU> Subject: Re: Ontology On Sat, 24 Jun 1995, Hans Despain wrote: > Thus, if you are keeping an accounting list, of > what exists on an island of three individuals, Stirner would say > three enities. Marx and Engels would suggest that not only do three > individuals "exists" but a relation between individual 1 & 2, 2 & 3, > 1 & 3, and 1, 2 & 3, or 7 enities. Hans, thanks for your patience in discussing the issues raised by several participants on the list. Just a quick comment on your above formulation however. Ollman makes the point that individuals are constituted by a cluster of relations. In essence, he is saying that the entity itself is DEFINED by the context within which it exists, as well as by its relations with other entities. Actually, Ollman states, in essence: the relations relation with other relations. In other words, the implicit ontology here is that entities don't exist per se, if by entity, we mean an "atomistic" entity. The entity itself IS a relation. This may provoke all sorts of metaphysical discussion, but it does amplify why some non-dialectical thinkers are made rather uncomfortable by such talk. For instance, does internal relations pose an insurmountable problem of individuation? The emphasis seems to be on wholes and relations, and some where, individual entities get lost. This is why Ollman tries to concentrate on the individuation problem in his emphasis on the process of abstraction. But think about it--this book sitting on the table next to me. Is it a book? Must it be defined as a book? A product of labor? A by-product of the system of printing and production? A product of a specific writer? Is it defined by the writer's past? Her parents' past? Her grandparents' past? Is it related to the table it sits on? Would the table be the same table if the book was on it or not? Is it related to a steel worker in Vladivostok? How about to craters on Mars? You see, the reason why dialectics demands CONTEXT is because different levels of generality will yield different relations. The entity is what it is independent of what human beings think or feel. But how we conceptualize the entity's relations very much depends on the level of generality upon which we concentrate. Without specifying context, we fall victim to the fallacies of strict organicity, in which the entity can NEVER be defined adequately because it must ultimately be related to everything else in the universe, which, by the way, we will never know. Not that external relations is any better. It ultimately depends on a kind of strict atomism, in which all entities are independent and self-sufficient. Ironically, both internalism and externalism deny the distinction between essence and accident. The externalists would say that a definition of something's "essence" is arbitrary, since no characteristic of an entity is any more essential than any other. The internalists would say that a definition of something's "essence" is also arbitrary, because EVERYTHING is essential to the entity. By the way, Ayn Rand worked on a solution to this problem which very much mirrors the Marxian emphasis on contextuality. Once we specify context, we can define essential characteristics WITHIN that context, thus avoiding pure subjectivism and detached objectivism (or, as Rand would put it, "intrinsicism"). - Chris =================================================Dr. Chris M. Sciabarra Visiting Scholar, NYU Department of Politics INTERNET: sciabrrc-AT-is2.nyu.edu (NOTE NEW ADDRESS) ================================================= --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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