Date: Sat, 25 Nov 95 12:38 GMT From: jplant-AT-cix.compulink.co.uk (Jj Plant) Subject: Russian Elections The following is the whole of a 2 part article scheduled for the WRP Workers Press in the near future, circultaed with their permission. __________________________________________________________________________ ___ Elections for seats in the Russian Duma (parliament) take place on 17 December. Here ALEXEII GUSEV surveys the parties taking part. This first of two articles describes the parties closest to the present government. The second article, to be published next week, will look at the various `opposition' parties including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the stance taken by the parties and trades unions claiming to represent Russian workers. Gusev is a member of the Socialist Workers Union (Russian section of the Workers International to Rebuild the Fourth International). ---------------- One fine day in August, investors cheated by one of Moscow's commercial banks held their regular demonstration in the city. Two years ago these people had put their money into the Favorit bank in good faith. They had been promised a high rate of return - and been left with nothing. `Boiko, give us our money back', they shouted. Their placards carried the same message. They know now that in 1993, their money was used by Oleg Boiko, prominent financier, owner of the National Credit bank and founder of Favorit, to finance the election campaign of Democratic Russia's Choice [the party led by Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister and champion of economic `shock therapy'], of which Boiko was the national chairman. Today, Mr Boiko is thinking not about how to repay the cheated investors, but about how to make new and profitable investments of his own in politics. He has parted company with Gaidar, swapping his party's declining fortunes for the brighter vistas offered by Our Home Is Russia, the bloc led by prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. And who will foot the bill this time? It's full speed ahead as we all prepare for the elections to the National Duma, Russia's parliament ... The political scene is livening up as polling day, 17 December, approaches. Blocs and coalitions are being formed, lists of candidates being registered and electioneering has begun. Bourgeois-bureaucratic clans of various colours have starting the battle for seats. The main fight is expected between the two main sections of the ruling class, which we may conditionally call the `party of power' and the `opposition'. The `party of power' is represented firstly by Our Home Is Russia. Its social base is that part of the former bureaucracy which is fully satisfied with the status quo, resulting from pro- capitalist reform and privatisation. It brings together the heads of the large corporations, banks and financial groups, and everyone knows it was founded to serve their interests. Its nickname is Our Home Is Gazprom, because of Chernomyrdin's close links with that giant among energy industry combines. [In Soviet times, Chernomyrdin for many years headed Gazprom, the state conglomerate which owns most of Russia's vast natural gas reserves.] Nearly all the government ministers and heads of local administration belong to the Our Home Is Russia bloc. Its organisational structure corresponds to its basis in the nomenklatura. So striking is its similarity to the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that even the pro-government newspaper Izvestia referred to it. `Nearly all the party [i.e. CPSU activists in the local economy belong to Our Home Is Russia,' said an article about Our Home Is Russia's organisation in Ulyanovsk region. `Among the bloc's activists are all the district first secretaries of the CPSU. The former CPSU branch officials are well-known as propagandists and agitators.' Izvestia concluded: `It seems that the CPSU regional organisation has just been renamed ``Our Home Is Russia''.' The other strength of Chernomyrdin's bloc is the support it receives from president Yeltsin. It is well known that the prime minister founded the bloc in line with the president's wish for a `centre-right coalition'. True, the original plan devised by Yeltsin's advisers was to create at the same time an equivalent `centre-left coalition' and establish something similar to the American two-party system. In June, Yeltsin himself went on TV to explain all this, designating as head of the `left centrists' the Duma speaker, Ivan Rybkin. The joke was that, since the whole thing was artificial, the members of the political establishment could not agree between themselves who was `right' and who was `left'. In the end, Yeltsin's plan was not fully realised: Rybkin's bloc, Our Fatherland, having set out to unite all `constructive critics' of the government, proved to be a nine-day wonder. The government's `moderate opponents' decided that Our Fatherland's antagonistic image did not sit nicely with the fulfilment of the president's plans. [According to newspaper reports, shortly after the bloc's foundation, two leaders, Boris Gromov and Stanislav Shatalin, quit.] This is how Our Home Is Russia became the main voice for the pro- Yeltsin fraction of the ruling class. What is its ideology and programme? Chernomyrdin is distinguished from his predecessor, Gaidar, by his attachment not simply to economic liberalism but to `state social-liberalism' - i.e. emphasis on the role of the state in the economy and a `social orientation' in politics. The prime minister himself explained at a congress of the bloc the layers of society to which it would be oriented: the first step, he declared, was to stimulate the accumulation of Russian national capital. Reliance on the national capitalist and the national bureaucrat, continuation of pro-market reform `without excessive radicalism', guaranteeing supremacy in the economy for the huge state- and privately-owned monopolies - this is the essence of Chernomyrdin's programme. Our Home Is Russia's appearance is quite natural. The era of Gaidarism [i.e. `shock therapy'], with its passion for destroying the `command-administrative' system and orientation towards the `free' demonopolised market, a la Adam Smith, has gone. The utopian attempt to implant `pure' private capitalism in Russia has, naturally, collapsed. In fact that was not the aim of the nomenklatura's so-called market reforms: the real question for them was to modify and modernise the form of the bureaucracy's social-economic rule and redivide the property. Today, the stage at which this was the business of the day is practically over - and, once again, they talk about the `accumulation of capital' with active assistance from the state. As we will see below, this aim figures in the programme not only of Our Home Is Russia but of the great majority of electoral parties and blocs. A symptom of this trend is the decline of Gaidar's party, Democratic Russia's Choice. If during the last election campaign it was considered the favourite, today it would be hard to find a commentator to predict that it will get more than 5 per cent of the vote, the minimum needed to get Duma seats. Gaidar has become unpopular. He is associated in the ordinary voter's mind with the painful consequences of `shock therapy'. His former sponsors, like the above-mentioned Boiko, have deserted him. The most that is left for Gaidar is to complain that he was not allowed to finish what he had started with `shock therapy', and to criticise the Russian model of `robber-nomenklatura capitalism', even referring to Trotsky's book Revolution Betrayed (!) which stated that elements of the former bureaucracy would gain most from the restoration of private property. The only trump card left in Gaidar's pack is the human rights campaigner Sergei Kovalyov, who is on the Democratic Russia's Choice federal list of candidates. Kovalyov's outstanding condemnation of Russian imperialist aggression against Chechnya evoked widespread sympathy (although as a party, Democratic Russia's Choice had an ambiguous attitude, refusing to openly denounce Yeltsin on the issue.) For voters who accept the general direction of Yeltsin's policy, but are put off by Gaidar's tarnished reputation and find Our Home Is Russia's image too elite and bureaucratic, there are other electoral alliances occupying political niches somewhere between Gaidar and Chernomyrdin. The two worth mentioning are the Yabloko bloc led by Grigory Yavlinsky and Vladimir Lukin, and Boris Fyodorov's Forward Russia movement. The Yavlinsky bloc leans of the support of the middle layers of entrepreneurs, parts of the intelligentsia and state officialdom, and some financial groups, the most important of which is the Most company. Sympathetic sections of the mass media do their best to create the impression that Yavlinsky - once [under Gorbachev] the author of a plan to take Russia to `civilised capitalism' in 500 days - has a unique new programme to lead the economy out of crisis. Of course nobody has yet seen this sensational programme. In Yavlinsky's own statements there is nothing new or unique, just the old cliches about `gradual reform' etc etc. As for Fyodorov, it can be seen from Forward Russia's name that he aspires to the role of a Russian Berlusconi. His election demagogy is closely related to Vladimir Zhirinovsky's, and he has even been called the `democratic Zhirinovsky'. Forward Russia promises to almost immediately eliminate inflation, to stop price increases, to destroy the highest bureaucrats' priveliges and to eradicate crime. Fyodorov, formerly identified as a dedicated `free market' monetarist, is deliberately trying to distance himself from Gaidar [whose finance minister he was at the time of `shock therapy'], constantly emphasising his movement's `patriotism'. Not by chance was he one of the foremost supporters of Yeltsin's invasion of Chechnya. These are the main parties of that part of the bourgeois- bureaucratic class which has already, in general, resolved its `social problem'. But it must be borne in mind that only half the Duma deputies are elected from the party lists, while the other half represent territorial constituencies. And here operates another powerful fraction of the `party of power' - the representatives of the regional elites. There is no question that these forces, resting on the local financial-industrial and bureaucratic circles, are serious competition for all parties and blocs. The August election of the governor of Yekaterinburg district bore witness to their strength: Alexei Strakhov, a protege of Our Home Is Russia, was defeated by Edward Rossel of the Reborn Urals movement. Among opponents of the `party of power', first place belongs to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) led by Gennady Zyuganov. Its social basis is that part of the former bureaucracy which considers itself to have been more or less left out of the reform of the social-economic system: that is, significant sections of the military-industrial complex's management, of the military caste itself and of middle- and lower-level managers in the economy. This fraction of the ruling class is fighting with all its might for a redivision of power and property in its own favour. To this end, the CPRF hopes to secure majority support by claiming to defend the interests of everyone: the `simple workers' and managers, the intelligentsia and small tradespeople, the unemployed and even the `new Russians' (who, according to Zyuganov, are suffering from having `nowhere to invest their money'). Zyuganov's party claims to be uniting `the whole nation' under the banner of patriotism, statehood and `justice'. Analysis of the CPRF's theory and politics shows, unambiguously, not only that it is not `communist' (not even in words) but also that it can not in general be considered part of the left. The cult of a mighty state or `great power'; the counterposition of the `unity of the nation' to the class struggle, as though the latter was invented by some especially greedy sections of the bourgeoisie; the slogan of `mixed forms of ownership' - all these are the typical bill of fare of right-wing political forces. Taking into account the labels it uses, Zyuganov's `communism' can be seen aspiring not only to new methods of social-economic rule by the bureaucracy, but also to well-tried `pre-perestroika' methods. On the other hand, this `communism' needs to attract those voters who, facing poverty and unemployment, have come to the conclusion that `it can not get any worse than it is now', and are even ready to agree to a partial return to the past under the `communists'. Zyuganov's `theoretical' work is a magic Russian salad whose ingredients include Russian religious philosophy, cliches from Stalinist `agitprop' and terms used by western `political science'. His party programme includes: promises of price controls; a struggle to return to `the power of the Soviets' (the Stalin-Brezhnev type, of course) and to restore the USSR; tax cuts; the strengthening of discipline and order; a struggle against the mafia and the criminals; guaranteed `social security' for Russian citizens; and so on - as well as the lofty phrases about the accumulation of a national capital and a greater role for the state in the economy, which are also used by Our Home Is Russia. In a word, the opposition aims to drive out the `Chernomyrdinite' part of the establishment. This would also entail a partial revision of the privatisation programme, in those cases where the interests of the management caste have been damaged, and greater priveliges for various sections of industry, above all those connected with the military-industrial complex. The character of the CPRF's `opposition' was clearly revealed in its attitude to the war unleashed against Chechnya by Russian imperialism. The Zyuganovites saw the invasion of Chechnya as an occasion to attack the government and the executive power. And what for? For mistakes in military planning, for `delay' in dealing with `separatists', and for the fact that when federal troops withdrew from Chechnya they left behind `mountains of weapons' which were taken by the Chechen militia. The CPRF fraction in the Duma, declaring themselves `defenders of the Russian army', blocked even the timid attempts by some `democrats' to express moral condemnation of the empire's soldiers, who they compared to Nazi war criminals. A similar line was taken by newspapers sympathetic to the CPRF. One of these, Sovyetskaya Rossiya, earlier this year published a short story, `In Grozny's Trenches', in which the positive hero is a Russian army lieutenant who shows no mercy to the Chechen enemy. He is contrasted to negative characters, such as a young soldier whose unit is serving in Grozny and who tries to desert, and his mother who comes to take her son away from the front. The tale ends with the `patriotic' soldiers, led by the lieutenant, killing the young `traitor' and his mother - who, by the way, look like Jews. The author - and his `communist' newspaper - approve of this `courageous' deed. The appearance of such proto- fascist material in the `opposition press' tells us far more about the soul of Zyuganovite `communism' than dozens of demagogic declarations by the CPRF bosses. The CPRF's closest ally is the Agrarian Party of Russia headed by Mikhail Lapshin. It consists of bureaucrats from the agricultural sector - directors from various types of co-operatives, kolkhozi (collective farms) and sovkhozi (state farms), most of which have now been renamed joint stock companies. Having resisted the encroachments of the towns, and other bourgeois forces in general, these elements are determined at all costs to preserve their monopoly over the land. Proclaiming themselves `defenders of the peasantry', the Agrarians demand higher state subsidies for agriculture - that is, a larger proportion of the national income for the ruling layers in the countryside. The rest of the Agrarian Party programme, including the political part, does not differ from that of the CPRF. And so the Agrarian fraction in the Duma has been the most militant defender of `our Serb brothers' and the [Bosnian Serb] regime of Radovan Karadzic. The third considerable force in the opposition camp is the Congress of Russian Communities. Its leaders are Yuri Skokov, former secretary of the state security council, who refused to support Yeltsin in his confrontation with the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 [when the `rebels' led by Rutskoi and Khazbulatov were suppressed by Yeltsin]; General Alexandr Lebed, former commander of the 14th Russian army in Pridnestrovya [or Transdnestr, the territory with predominantly Russian population claiming the right to secede from Moldova]; and Sergei Glazyev, a former minister of foreign trade. Originally a small organisation founded to support Russian companies abroad (hence its name), the Congress has taken on political significance with the entry of Skokov and Lebed into its leadership. Skokov is well known for his wide connections in industrial circles. Lebed, a popular personality, rose to prominence after halting the war between Pridnestrovya and Moldova and making searing criticisms of the Pridnestrovya leadership's corruption; he has also attacked `incompetence' at the top of the Russian army, including that of the defence minister, Pavel Grachev. Glazyev is an economist, author of yet another `alternative' economic programme, every bit as mysterious as Yavlinsky's. The same patriotic call as is made by Chernomyrdin and Zyuganov - to defend `the nation's industry' (meaning: the nation's ruling class) - is the essence of the Congress's programme. But it is flavoured with a strong criticism of `monetarist radicalism', in contrast to Our Home Is Russia, and has no call to restore `Soviet power', one of the central demands of the CPRF. Those bourgeois-bureaucratic layers rallying to the Congress occupy a position between the `Chernomyrdinite' and `Zyuganovite' fractions of their class. Lebed is the Congress's most colourful and outstanding leader. Paradoxically, he has sympathisers among `patriots', some sections of the liberal intelligentsia and even among workers. The `patriots' are attracted to his image as a brave general and defender of the `fatherland'; the intellectuals like his criticisms of Grachev, who fell out of favour as a result of the Chechen campaign; the workers see him as a fighter against corruption. Lebed himself has hardly any clearly-defined political views - Skokov and Glazyev lend a helping hand with those - but his clear priority is `restoration of order'. [Lebed is likely to stand in the presidential election next summer.] In the case of him winning power, he would surely not hesitate to use the most drastic measures, for example against strikes that took on a `disruptive' character. It is no accident that he pointed to Pinochet's regime in Chile as an example of his beloved `restoration of order'. But today Lebed poses as an `opponent' of the government, and his party can expect some success in the parliamentary elections. Also in the `opposition' camp stands Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Russian Liberal Democratic Party. Its supporters include considerable layers of the petty bourgeoisie; bureaucratic, military and declasse elements; and - as has been shown by sociological surveys - backward sections of unskilled workers. These people are impressed by Zhirinovsky's shameless demagogy and his promises of all sorts of bribes to his voters, including cheap vodka. Significantly, the Liberal Democratic Party is supported by several financial groups and commercial structures with criminal or mafia connections. (In the 1993 elections, several candidates clearly associated with the mafia got into parliament on Zhirinovsky's list.) Zhirinovsky's position is well known and there is no sense in repeating it. As for its prospects in the Duma elections, the Liberal Democratic Party is certain to win considerably less votes than it did in 1993. Then, it practically monopolised the `non-communist patriotic' niche in politics, but now there are at least ten other nationalist parties and blocs of various shapes and sizes. As a result, Zhirinovsky's potential support is sure to be divided. The most uncompromising opposition force is the Communists-Labour Russia-For the Soviet Union bloc, an alliance based on the Stalinist movement called Labour Russia. Its backbone is the Russian Communist Workers Party led by Victor Anpilov. Socially, Labour Russia represents those very stagnant layers of the former bureaucracy and ideological establishment, who won nothing from the reforms and could not get involved in Russia's `new reality'. All their hopes are concentrated on the resurrection of the Stalinist system - that is, not Brezhnev's or Khruschev's, but exactly Stalin's version, with the undivided supremacy of the `communist' party, `purges' and - top of the agenda! - `regulated reductions in prices'. Demanding the return of a completely state-ised economy and `planned' control of resources (`just like under Stalin'), the Anpilovites try to enlist the support of enterprise directors who are dissatisfied with the present regime. In return for supporting Labour Russia, the latter are guaranteed that they will keep their positions if the `communists' gain power. Nonetheless, Labour Russia's admirers of Stalin and Kim Il Sung can not inspire the faith of the reprsentatives of the more prominent circles of the bureaucracy, let alone the voters, and can not count on any sort of success at the polls. In the spectrum of election platforms, does there exist a single one that represents the interests of the Russian working class and all the labouring masses? The simple answer is no. The former official trade unions, the Federation of Independent Trades Unions of Russia (FITUR), will go to the polls in alliance with two management groupings - the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [which came to prominence in the Duma in 1992, led by Arkadii Volski] and the United Industrialist Party. Justifying the need for such an alliance, the leader of the FITUR, Mikhail Shmakov, claims that `the trades unions' interests completely coincide with those of the vast majority of industrialists'. And this is true - because these trades unions are nothing more than a mechanism to discipline the workforce on behalf of the industrial management. This is the role played by the trade union committees at the enterprises, and no amount of `radical' rhetoric by the top trade union bosses can hide this fact. It would be quite wrong to imagine that there are `rank and file activists' in the FITUR who can put `pressure' on their Çleadership and push it to the left. The notorious `rank and file activists' in the factories - who as a rule are proteges and agents of the management - will only do anything when it is profitable for `the industrialists', as Shmakov calls them. Trade union deputies in the Duma would carry out exactly the same function, as a support mechanism for industrial management ... if this bloc happens to pass the 5 per cent barrier. But that is extremely unlikely. As for the FITUR's `ideology', it is expounded in its principal publication, the newspaper Solidarnost, whose editor is Andrei Isayev, former anarcho-syndicalist and one of the founders [with Boris Kagarlitsky] of the still-born Labour Party. Solidarnost is busy trumpeting the virtues of `social partnership' with enterprise directors, expressing solidarity with the actions of the Russian army in Chechnya and with Radovan Karadzic's `just war' in Bosnia. One recent issue proclaimed that the trades unions' credo coincides with the doctrine of the Russian Orthodox church! The situation in the so-called `alternative' trade union camp is little better. Its right wing has dispersed into various small liberal-bourgeois blocs. The left, in the shape of the alliance of workers' unions, Zashchita [Defence], has merged with the CPRF. The leader of Zashchita, the former `Marxist revolutionary' Yuri Leonov, decided to turn his organisation into a propaganda shop window for Zyuganov's party. Leonov is at present a Duma deputy and hopes to regain a seat, by asking workers to vote for the CPRF. He recently took part in a television talk show and declared: `We have to work things out so that workers have no desire to go on strike. To this end we must put deputies in the Duma in whom people can really believe.' It's a simple recipe: vote for Zyuganov's crowd, and things will be so wonderful that you will never feel like striking or campaigning! Another electoral alliance claiming to represent working people is the Party of Workers' Self-Management, led by Svyatoslov Fyodorov, a noted opthalmologist and director of the Co-operative Institute of Opthalmological Surgery. This party's credo is based on workers' share-ownership, plus the `free market', plus parliamentary democracy. Its utopianism is obvious to many people - after all, it is one thing to run a commercially succesful co- operative doing eye operations, using state-of-the-art technology and know-how - but quite another to run Russian industry, the greater part of which exists in a state of permanent crisis. There are few people who today believe in the magic force of the `free market' seasoned by `self management'. So what can be expected from the December elections? The principal battle - both for the seats elected from the party lists and for those based on territorial constituencies - will be between the three main representatives of the ruling class: the Our Home Is Russia bloc, the regional elites and the CPRF- Agrarian Party alliance. They will be the most powerful forces in the new parliament. The elections may shift the balance of forces slightly, but are extremely unlikely to bring about any radical changes. And the majority of working people in Russia understands this. Certainly no more than 50 per cent of eligible voters will go to the polling stations. This sort of absenteeism reflects the spread of distrust in the political institutions of the system. According to sociological surveys, 67 per cent of the population, fully or partly, does not believe in parliament; 64 per cent does not believe in parties. Illusions in bourgeois democracy are now in the process of being overcome - and this is part of the development of the class consciousness of the Russian proletariat. The time when the working class transforms itself into a `class for itself' is still far off. For now, significant experiences are being accumulated by workers - negative experiences of the ruling class's political activity, and positive ones of struggle, although these are still very limited. This is the preparation for a future active upsurge of the masses. (ends) _________________________________ jplant-AT-cix.compulink.co.uk --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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