Date: Tue, 28 Nov 1995 17:46:32 +1100 From: davidmci-AT-coombs.anu.edu.au (David McInerney) Subject: Re: Green Marxism and Greenies in the Noosphere On Monday, 27 November, "snooty" Barkley Rosser wrote: > Following up on the various discussions of Lenin's >_Materialism and Empirio-Criticism_ I would note that one >of his bugaboos in there is Aleksandr Bogdanov. Let me >suggest that Bogdanov provides a possible starting point for >a "Green Marxist" position. The particularly interesting >work (post-MAEC) is _Tektology: The Universal Science of >Organization_, 1925-28, Moscow. This led directly to the >development of the "noosphere" concept by Vladimir Vernadsky, >"The Biosphere and the Noosphere," _American Science_, 1945, >vol. 33, pp. 1-12. A godd discussion of all this can be found >in Kenneth M. Stokes, _Man and the Biosphere_, 1992, M.E. Sharpe. Hmmm. Almost as to prove my point that Ralph would find much in the pages of Althusser's later work to use in his arguments against Barkley Rosser, here I find Rosser talking about the biosphere/noosphere distinction, the subject of Althusser's critique of French biologist Jacques Monod. Here's a quote: "Theoretically speaking, Monod's *mechanism* resides in the following tendency: the mechanical application of the concepts and the laws of what he calls the bioshpere to what he calls the 'noosphere', the application of the content of materialism appropriate to the biological species to another real object: human societies. This is an idealist use of the materialist content of a determinate science (here, modern biology) in its extension to the object of another science. This idealist use of the materialist content of a determinate science consists of arbitrarily *imposing* upon another science - which possesses a real object, different from that of the first - the materialist content of the first science. Monod declares that the physical support of the biosphere is DNA. I"n the present state of biological science, this materialist thesis is unassailable. But when he believes himself to be a materialist, by giving as the biophysiological basis of what he calls the 'noosphere' - that is to say, the social and historical existence of the human species - the emergence of the *neurobiological support of language*, he is not a materialist but, as we have already said, a 'mechanistic materialist' and in terms of a theory of human history, that now means that he is an *idealist*. For the mechanistic materialism that was materialism's historical representative in the eighteenth century is today no more than one of the representatives of the *idealist* tendency in history. In so far as Monod is a *mechanist*, he is necessarily also a *spiritualist*. His theory that language created mankind might find a sympathetic audience among certain philosophers of anthropology, of literature and, indeed, of psychoanalysis. But we should be suspicious of sympathetic audiences: it is in their interest deliberately to misunderstand what is *said* to them in order to hear what they want to hear. They may be correct in what they want to hear, but they are wrong in hearing it in what is said top them. The theory that language created humanity is, *in Monod's lecture*, a spiritualist theory which ignores the specificity of the materiality of the object in question. To say that language created man is to say that it is not *the materiality of social conditions of existence*, but what Monod himself calls 'the *immateriality*' of the noosphere, 'this realm of ideas and knowledge', which constitutes the real base, and thus the principle, of the scientific intelligibility of human history. No essential difference separates these theses, which Monod believes to be scientific but are in reality merely ideological, from the most classical theses of conventional spiritualism. Indeed, when one has given as the sole material base of the noosphere the biophysical support of the central nervous system, one has to fill the void of the 'noosphere' with the help of the Spirit, because there is no other recourse - and certainly no scientific recourse." (Louis Althusser, _Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientist and Other Essays_, Verso, London, 1990, pp. 151-152) Unless we are to fall into a spiritualism of the "deep green" variety, and assuming that Althusser's critique of Monod can be applied to the work that Barkley Rosser cites, then we must avoid Bogdanov and Vernadsky like the proverbial plague, if we are looking for a 'possible starting point for a "Green Marxist" position'. Mr. David McInerney, Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., AUSTRALIA 0200. e-mail: davidmci-AT-coombs.anu.edu.au; ph: (06) 249 2134; fax: (06) 249 3051 --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- ------------------
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