File spoon-archives/marxism.archive/marxism_1996/96-02-marxism/96-02-18.000, message 521


Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 12:07:36 -0700
From: Lisa Rogers <eqwq.lrogers-AT-state.ut.us>
Subject:  theory of subjectivity? lr to sc


Hi, and welcome back Santiago, please don't apologize for 'taking up
space', my goodness, you're a breath of fresh air.  Sorry it took so
long for me to get back on this post.

I agree with you that there are clearly concepts of subjectivity in
Marx.  I would guess that somebodies have already looked for and
summarized those things, but I don't know.  If it hasn't been done,
well, there's a dissertation topic!

I haven't yet looked at the Critique of Hegel, although I plan to,
for some other purposes than subjectivity, so thanks for the quotes. 
They make a lot of sense.  This looks like 'turning Hegel on its
head.'  

When Marx says that in Hegel "the Idea is subjectivized", I think he
is saying that Hegel sees the Idea as the real cause, an active agent
in shaping and changing society, the family and the state.  From what
little I may know of Hegel, this is a good representation of H.

Of course, I agree with Marx, this seems wrong.  However, I'm curious
about M's statement that the family and civil society are "the true
agents".  In relation to the State, and his critique of Hegel this
could make some sense, I suppose, but...

"The family" doesn't actually do anything, of course, people do, in
the sort of literal sense in which I am thinking.  Of course, there
is a much-quoted bit of Marx about "people make history" which I
think may be compatible with my thinking.

I'm often uncomfortable with ideas of collective action /
subjectivity, that treats a group as if it were an individual, a
'subjectivity' that acts, thinks, etc.  Not that it is never
appropriate, or that group action doesn't happen, of course.

But it sometimes seems to obscure what is happening inside that
group, and sometimes produces very inaccurate images of what is
allegedly happening inside it.  

This is one reason that I am often using an approach that focuses on
individuals, in order to study the relations and interactions between
one and others.  This is surely the place to see how individual
'subjectivities' [?] / ideas / personalities, etc. are formed, isn't
it?

BTW it was somebody else, just before my own post, that claimed that
Marx is lacking a theory of subjectivity.  I don't think hse ever
explained what hse meant by 'theory of subjectivity', what hse was
looking for or wanting to create.  

Still curious,
Lisa

>>> Santiago Colas <scolas-AT-umich.edu>  2/8/96, 12:31pm >>>
Just to build on this thread that Lisa has restarted:

[In Marx'] draft ms. for a Critique of Hegel's _Doctrine of the 
State_ [snip] what he basically says is:  Hegel's  grammar mystifies
the issue of subjectivity in relation to the state.   I'm quoting
from the Penguin edition of Marx's Early Writings.

"The Idea is subjectivized and the _real_ relationship of the family
and  civil society to the state is conceived as their _inner_,
_imaginary_  activity.  The family and civil society are the
preconditions of the  state; they are the true agents; but in
speculative philosophy it is the  reverse.  When the Idea is
subjectivized the real subjects--civil  society, the family,
'circumstances, caprice, etc.'--are all transformed  into _unreal_,
objective moments of the Idea referring to different  things." (p.
62)
[snip]

"If Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the
state  he would not have found it necessary to subjectivize the state
in a  mysteical way.  'The truth of subjectivity,' Hegel claims, 'is
attained  only in a _subject_, and the truth of personality only in a
_person_.'   This too is a mystification.  Subjectivity is a
characteristic of the  subject, personality is a characteristic of
the person.  Instead of  viewing them as the predicates of their
subjects Hegel makes the  predicates into autonomous beings and then
causes them to becomes  transformed into their subjects by means of a
mystical process."
[snip]
At the very least, however, it suggests that Lisa's line of  thought:
subject in the grammatical sense in connection with subject as  agent
of an action is already present very early in Marx's thought.  [snip]
It  seems to me there's the skeleton of a theory of subjectivity
here.

Sorry to take up so much space,
Lisa's post follows for those who missed it.
sc
***
On Fri, 2 Feb 1996, Lisa Rogers wrote: [snip]
>  > My possible beginning of a clue at this point begins with the
> definition of 'subject' in the grammatical sense, the subject is
the> 'who', the one that acts, as distinct from objects.  Webster's
also > offers "the mind, ego, or agent of whatever sort that sustains
or> assumes the form of thought or consciousness."  
>  > Subjective means "relating to or determined by the mind as the
> subject of experience [snip] characteristic of or belonging to
> reality as perceived rather than as independent of mind [snip]
> arising out of or identified by means of one's awareness of one's
own> states and processes: illusory."




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